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Eric Jaderborg, Phillip J. Kolczynski |
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| About the Author ... |
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Eric Jaderborg holds an ATP
certificate with seven type ratings, a Commercial Seaplane rating, and a
Private Glider rating. He has logged over 8,000 hours in a 22-year aviation
career that includes eight years as an airline pilot and, most recently, 10
years as an FAA Operations Inspector. He is an active CFI with Airplane-Single
Engine, Instrument, and Multiengine ratings. He lives with his wife, a fellow
pilot, in Arkansas. Together, they own and fly a vintage Aeronca
Champ.
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| EricJ@AVweb.com |
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| About the Author ... |

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Phillip J. Kolczynski
manages his own law firm in Irvine, California. He has a national practice,
concentrating in aviation, product liability and business litigation in federal
and state courts. Phil teaches evidence, product liability and aviation law at
the Aviation Safety Program, School of Engineering, University Of Southern
California. He chaired the 1990 ABA National Institute on Aviation Litigation in
Washington, D.C., and has spoken nationally at numerous aviation litigation
symposia.
Prior to moving to California in 1983, he was a trial attorney in the
Aviation Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., and the Litigation
Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration,
Washington, D.C. Phil graduated from Case Western Reserve School of Law,
Cleveland, Ohio, in December, 1976, and attended college at Marquette
University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1969 where he held a Navy ROTC Full
Scholarship. Before entering law school, he was a Marine Corps Captain and F-4
Phantom Pilot. He is a Commercial Pilot with instrument and multiengine
ratings.
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| AviationLaw@AVweb.com |
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| AviationLawCorp.com |
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"Enforcement Survival School" is like finding yourself in
Jurassic Park. I'll let you guess who the dinosaurs are.
In Jurassic Park I, a.k.a., "Enforcement Survival School,
Part 1," the lawyer was devoured by "T-REX" right off the "john." At least, he
left the legacy of the "Duct Tape Defense." In Jurassic Park II, a.k.a.,
"Enforcement Survival School, Part 2," the lawyer warned you on "How Not to
Deal with FAA Inspectors!" (you know who has the teeth in this
industry).
Now, just as Jurassic Park III appears at the big
screen, "Enforcement Survival School, Part 3" comes to your small screen,
with tips on how to preserve some golden eggs to defeat the
dinosaurs.
After watching the original Jurassic Park, I resolved never again to
interact with man-eating beasts larger than myself — even screen versions. I
made daily exceptions, of course, in order to visit the office.
It was only after Bob Hoover won the
fight to reinstate his medical (and most of us on the inside were rooting for
him from behind the scenes) that I learned who really has the teeth in this
industry. In the end, Gentleman Bob was checkmated not by the mighty FAA — in
all its pigheaded certitude — but by a faceless, nameless insurance
underwriter with the incredible, unchallengeable power of cancellation. But
that's grist for a different mill, and a different day.
Today's job is to finish what we've started — to show you the light at the
end of the tunnel, and to help you make sure it doesn't turn out to be an
oncoming train or a crew building more tunnel. Your story is straight, you
told the truth (or else you left the tape over your mouth), and you've
practiced the mind-bending contortions of "thinking like an inspector." That's
not all, though. There are a few more things you can do to help yourself out
— both before and after trouble starts.
[If you haven't read the disclaimers at the beginning of Part One of this series —
or if you have forgotten what's in them — please read them
now.]
Many people get in trouble with the FAA because they don't know (or claim
not to know) — and don't take the time to figure out — the implications of
what they're doing. We've all heard horror stories about conflicting FAA
interpretations. I've witnessed some myself. It's frustrating, sometimes, and
time-consuming trying to get an official answer from the government about
anything. But for every person trapped in some public fight over
interpretations, I'd bet there are 10 who could have saved themselves a lot of
trouble by taking the time to look for an answer rather than shoot from the
hip, or take someone else's word for something.
"Aviation is like a grocery store," a supervisor once told me. "There are
people around who can give you a price check, or point you to the correct
aisle, but mostly you're expected to know — or find out — what you need,
fill your own cart, and push it to the checkout counter yourself." The price
of freedom is education and personal responsibility, and nowhere is this more
evident than in aviation.
It's a complex business we're in — way
more complex than it needs to be. The FAA may be responsible for this
complexity, and you may think it's delivering a death blow to general aviation
thereby. In many cases, I'd agree with you. You may think the regulations —
hell, the whole damn legal system — is out of hand, and that it's time to
take up staves and pitch forks and head for Washington, D.C. But none of that
matters right this minute — before you take your next flight. You are a
specialist in the eyes of the law, and the more sophisticated your ratings and
experience, the more of a specialist you are. What does matter right this
minute is how well you understand the standards of your practice as a person
with special talents, and special responsibilities. That's more than a BFR, or
three takeoffs and landings every 90 days, or IFR proficiency, or any
proficiency. It's taking the time to learn the nuances of rules and procedures
that affect you, comprehending their meaning, and keeping up with the changes.
It means participating in the rulemaking process, seeking answers on your own
when there appear to be none, and understanding where the ambiguities are —
the opportunities for conflict. There is no alternative to this, short of
willful ignorance. And "ignorance" isn't a plea that will win you a favorable
judgment.
The business of self-education has a more immediate benefit, however.
Self-education is what prepares you to carry on an intelligent conversation
with an aviation safety inspector on the day the telephone rings, or the
letter arrives — and after. If you're convinced that whatever you've been
accused of is no crime — or should be dismissed, or modified — you'll be in
a much better position to convince the inspector in charge of your
investigation if you are well-versed, well-spoken, and if you can resist the
temptation to make your point by trying to make the inspector look like an
idiot.
As a Marine I was taught the "6 Ps," but the 5 "Ps" in
this title will do the job. Pilots master the task of preflight planning;
therefore, prior planning should come natural when dealing with a FSDO
inspector. It is necessary when an inspector starts sniffing around and asking
about something you've already done.
Prior planning will pay off before you grant an interview
to the inspector. If an inspector starts asking you questions about an
incident or possible flight violation ask him/her: "What FARs am I suspected
of violating?" or "What FARs are you concerned with?" Reread the FARs and
study the wording before you grant the interview, comment, or answer
questions. Review the operator's handbook when an inspector is inquiring about
your aircraft operating procedures. Review the current charts when an
inspector wants to know "where" you were during a certain portion of a flight
that you have already completed.
Prior planning even pays off if you will hire a lawyer.
When you contact a lawyer, you will save money on fees if you can provide him
with all the pertinent information concerning your supposed violation. One of
the first things he will do is to research all the relevant facts, and he will
charge you for his work.
There are some situations where, after
review and research, you become convinced that you did inadvertently commit a
violation. You can save yourself both legal fees and embarrassment if you
recognize the facts early and prepare yourself to accept a fair
sanction.
In my experience the FAA seldom brings enforcement actions
against airmen who have not committed some type of violation; however, I have
seen plenty of cases where the sanctions sought were unduly severe. It may be
worth retaining an attorney to evaluate your case even if you have committed a
violation so that you can get his advice and help in reducing the
sanction.
One thing you can be sure of is that the FAA is going to dedicate
considerable time and resources to your investigation — especially if
evidence of a violation begins to appear. As necessary, inspectors will
travel, interview witnesses in person, take statements, shoot pictures, draw
diagrams, collect weather and ATC data, and research applicable rules,
interpretations, and sometimes even case law. Investigation of accidents,
incidents, and violations is a high-priority business at the FAA, and for good
reason: The law requires it. Also, evidence trails chill quickly. If an
inspector is going to get to the bottom of something, it's best to begin the
descent at once. No matter what anyone tells you, the agency is not — as a
matter of policy — interested in creating violations where none exist.
However, it is interested in finding the ones that do exist, and in
determining what to do about them. If it finds stronger evidence against you
than for you, it will proceed. The FAA's job is to find evidence; your job is
to make sure it finds all the evidence that favors you. Although you probably
can't afford to make a second career of it, you should be prepared to fill in
the gaps in the FAA's coverage.
One thing you cannot be sure of is that the FAA will find all the evidence
that clears you, that it will know where to look for it, or even that it will
do a thorough investigation. There are three reasons for this. The first
reason comes from the FAA's motive for even getting involved in an
investigation. An inspector is like a police officer responding to a call.
He's got to assume that something is going on, otherwise there's no reason for
looking into it. He just doesn't know what it is yet — or who's responsible.
He's looking for evidence that will justify proceeding further with the
investigation. If he finds it, he will proceed — perhaps even make an arrest.
If he doesn't find it — or if the evidence doesn't support the conclusion
that a crime has taken place — he'll stop. But the investigator's eyes are
focused on finding evidence, not on finding nothing. This is an important bias
that can lead even an experienced investigator to see some things and not
others, or to miss important details that should be there, but aren't.
The second reason is that aviation
safety inspectors — just like pilots, doctors, lawyers, and police officers
— come in all sizes, descriptions, and levels of talent. Some are just better
investigators than others. If you're lucky, you'll be dealing with someone
who's experienced, dedicated, and who isn't trying to keep 16 balls in the air
all at the same time — or else, who has extraordinary juggling talent. If
you're not lucky, your investigation will be handled with less-than-perfect
attention by someone who is buried by competing tasks, or who just doesn't
understand the situation. Also, even the best inspectors sometimes make
simple, bonehead mistakes.
The third reason is that some people refuse to cooperate with an FAA
investigation, either because they are angry with the agency over some
personal baggage, or because they are fearful of getting involved in something
that might harm a friend or colleague. The average, non-flying citizen is more
than happy to assist in grounding an airplane, but the very people who can
help you — your fellow airmen — often won't if they are approached by the
FAA.
What you must do is make sure that any evidence that might support you gets
preserved and presented. If, for example, you are accused of a violation in a
situation that might be on an ATC tape, and you think there might be something
on that tape that will clear you or mitigate the violation (like confused call
signs, unclear or faulty directions, ATC mistakes, etc.) be sure those tapes
get preserved, and that you obtain a copy. An FAA investigator should do this
anyway — but what if he misses the deadline, doesn't get everything
available, or fails to ask for something because he either didn't know about
it, or didn't realize its importance? ATC master tapes — including voice
tapes, radar tracks, and flight plan data — are recycled at each facility
after just 15 days, unless pulled and set aside for an investigation. After
that, the evidence is gone, along with any chance to recover something that
might clear you (or condemn you, for that matter).
It's not unusual for time-critical data to be lost. Sometimes it's lost
because an incident is more than 15 days old when the FSDO learns about it.
But sometimes the data is goes unpreserved because no one asked for it, or
because of a missed communication. I once investigated an accident involving a
cargo hauler who ran out of gas. It was one of those foggy winter nights where
the changing visibility hovers just around minimums, tempting hapless airmen
to try "just one more." After hanging around for an hour-and-a-half shooting
approaches at his destination, the pilot finally diverted to a VFR airport
less than 30 minutes away. He waited too long, though, and crashed his starved
airplane in a moonless tract of wheat stubble just short of the runway,
walking away from the wreckage. I asked the TRACON Quality Assurance
Specialist for a "full accident package," thinking I would get everything ATC
had to offer. When it arrived about three weeks later, however, it included
only the TRACON voice tapes and radar tracks, not the tower tapes from the
airport where he was shooting the approach. That was "a different facility,"
you see, and I had not specifically asked for those tapes. I was furious, as
much with myself as with TRACON, but any record of the pilot's conversation
with the tower — including last-minute weather reports he may have received
— was gone forever.
On another occasion, I looked into a nighttime near-collision on a runway
at an airport with a nonfederal tower. It involved an unlighted aircraft that
managed to land without attracting anyone's attention. It was nearly mowed
down a few minutes later by a corporate jet. Fortunately, the runway was wide.
The pilot of the "dark" airplane was feeling his way along the edge of the
runway like a blind man tapping along the side of a building. Also, the jet
jockeys were quick in their stirrups. I made repeated attempts to get the
tower tape, but five-and-a-half years later — when I finally turned in my
keys — it still hadn't shown up.
Perhaps neither of those tapes would have helped the airmen in those cases,
but the point is that evidence is occasionally missed or lost in an
investigation. You shouldn't rely on the FAA to gather the evidence to save
you. Your attorney should be able to help you get tapes, weather data, and
other official information. Anything your attorney obtains on your behalf is
privileged, which means if you get it and they don't — tough luck for them.
It may cost you something extra, but what is a clean record worth? Even if you
did commit a violation, what would it be worth if you could provide an
alternative explanation for what happened, or mitigate it in some way? Don't
wait for the FAA to interview all the witnesses, either. Gather statements
from potentially friendly witnesses — or have your attorney do it under the
attorney-client privilege. People talk to each other in a different way than
they talk to the government.
If you were accused of flying too low, for example, wouldn't it be worth
the effort if you could cast doubt on someone's estimate of your altitude? If
you have three witnesses who say "500 feet" and the FAA has two witnesses who
say "200 feet," you might win — you might even get the FAA to withdraw —
depending upon the credibility of those witnesses. In some cases, your
evidence might get the FAA to drop the onerous (and insurance-busting)
citation of FAR 91.13. The FSDO might issue a Warning Letter, or maybe reduce
a sanction from 90 days to 30, or even 15 — to be served in the winter while
your airplane is in the shop for annual. Sure, that's not a clear victory, but
maybe you'd never get one, anyway. And isn't that better than spending the
whole summer on the beach for lack of mitigating evidence you could have
rounded up yourself?
I know of, or have heard of, many cases where an airman
finally recognized that he wouldn't be able to talk the FAA out of an
enforcement action. The airman then hired an attorney, who discovered that
some valuable defense evidence had already been rerecorded, lost or
destroyed.
The FAA may have a duty to preserve various tapes, data,
and documents for a certain period of time for its own purposes. What if FAA
personnel fail to follow their own rules and allow such material to be
destroyed? Does this exonerate you for a violation that the FAA can prove with
evidence which has not been destroyed?
Don't assume that a NTSB
Administrative Law Judge is going to believe your claim that you were deprived
of a meaningful defense because of the missing FAA material. Unless you can
prove that FAA personnel destroyed documents, data, or tape recordings to
sabotage your defense, you are not likely to avoid the penalty for the
violation. This is particularly true if there was an opportunity to take
practical and/or legal steps to preserve the potential evidence such as with a
"Preservation of Evidence Letter," subpoena, or court order.
FAA investigators should collect evidence of mitigation
and other evidence that may help the airman, if relevant to the enforcement
goals of the FAA. As a practical matter, however, the only thing you can count
on is that the FAA investigator will collect sufficient evidence of violations
to support the enforcement recommendations in the Enforcement Investigative
Report (EIR). Don't assume that the investigator will locate all of the
relevant evidence in government files, or any of the defense evidence outside
of the government's files, e.g., witnesses, manufacturer data, correspondence,
etc.
Besides voice tape recordings, radar/transponder data, and
other physical evidence, most cases turn on documentary and testimonial
evidence. Lawyers usually have to establish the foundation for the
admissibility of documentary evidence. So, just because you find some letter
or memorandum helpful to your case, that doesn't mean it will necessarily be
admitted into evidence at your hearing. The lawyer must normally establish the
admissibility of such documents and overcome hearsay objections if the person
who prepared or signed the document is not present at the hearing to testify.
Airmen should not assume that they can establish their defense by simply
collecting statements from favorable witnesses. They should advise their
lawyer of the availability of favorable witnesses and allow the lawyer to
capture the potential testimonial evidence in admissible form (by deposition)
or line up the witnesses to testify in person.
Obtaining favorable testimony from a non-partisan witness
is an art. In my experience the quality of a witness interview depends on the
skill of the interrogator, and how soon after the event the witness is
questioned.
If you suspect an FAA investigation but have a witness, it
may be important to hire a lawyer who can immediately arrange the interview of
a key witness to "statementize" him. The object is to confirm a favorable or
at least, a non-harmful recollection of the facts. Although the statement
itself may not be admissible, it can be very helpful to prevent a change in
the recollection of the witness (potential impeachment if the witness changes
his story when questioned by the FAA).
Witnesses, particularly those who hold an FAA certificate,
can be easily influenced by an official FAA investigator. I'm not suggesting
that FAA investigators ever abuse their power, or try to coerce a
ticket-holder witness to support charges. Some people just have
authority-compliant personalities. Others wonder whether through abject
cooperation, they may avoid becoming the target of an investigation about
their prior mistakes. I know of a couple of cases where ticket-holder
witnesses had such a clear and vocal recollection of the violation that they
could have won an award in the movie, "Witness For The
Prosecution."
In his hit song "The Garden of Allah," — a cynical reflection on the
ethics of modern urban society — Don Henley uses the voice of an "expert
witness" to suggest that "there are no facts, there is no truth — just data
to be manipulated." The use of "expert" testimony is sometimes controversial,
even distasteful. It's not something you can do to achieve an early
resolution. It's something you do after you've given up trying to persuade the
FAA to your position and shifted your focus to the presiding judge.
Furthermore, it's expensive. But it is something you should consider investing
in if it looks like the facts of your case might be open to more than one
interpretation.
When the FAA shows up in court, the
inspector that takes the stand will be considered an expert. The attorney
handling the agency's case will begin by establishing that inspector's
credibility. There isn't much you're going to do to poke holes in that
credibility without making yourself look argumentative, desperate, and mean.
Unless an inspector makes an ass of him/herself on the stand, he's going to
come across as credible and "disinterested" — in the legal sense of the word,
i.e., absent of any personal stake in the outcome of the case. You, on the
other hand, will be presumed to be "interested." In cases of conflicting
testimony, a tie usually doesn't go to the person who's "interested" because
it is assumed that an interested party might say anything to protect that
interest. Unfair? Biased? Yup. After all, it isn't as if the FAA has no
"stake" in the outcome of its case. But it's a bias you're going to have to
reckon with nevertheless.
One of the best things you can do is round up somebody equally
"disinterested" — someone who can take the facts and spin them in a different
direction. Of course, that person will have an "interest," too — he's getting
paid, after all. But for some reason that doesn't seem to make a difference —
perhaps because the expert gets paid whether or not the testimony he provides
affects the outcome. If the FAA can't rebut the testimony of your expert, you
might win. Unlike your testimony, which the FAA will anticipate, the agency
may not know what your expert is going to say — or even that you've hired one
— and won't be able to prepare for it.
That's what happened a few years ago when the FAA brought a case against
the crew of a Boeing 737 that accepted a clearance in actual IFR conditions
for an ILS to one runway (the "right"), but set up the cockpit for the ILS to
a parallel runway (the "left") on the side of the airport opposite the
direction from which they were approaching (i.e., they were approaching from
the far right). An FAA inspector conducting a cockpit en route inspection
aboard the flight did not intervene because he was not in a position to see
that the wrong frequencies had been dialed into the nav radios (the knobs on
older model 737s make it next-to-impossible to read the dials on the center
console from the jump seat, even if you strain to look at them). He could not
see that the crew was using approach charts for the wrong runway, and was thus
unaware himself of the crew's own lack of situational awareness. The aircraft
broke out of the cloud base as it was crossing the median between the runways
— after the flight had been handed-off to the tower. When queried by the
controller about their position, they announced that they were "intercepting
the localizer for the left." The controller then challenged the crew about
their clearance, but since there was no traffic using the ILS to the left at
the moment, and since they broke clear of the clouds more or less at the same
time, he resolved the error by clearing the flight to land on the left runway.
The case brought against the crew centered around whether or not they had
failed to follow an ATC instruction in violation of FAR 91.123(a) by flying
the wrong approach, and whether their neglect in clarifying their instructions
created the potential for careless endangerment. (Legally, "potential"
endangerment is as much a cause for action as "actual" endangerment.)
At the trial, the pilots acknowledged their error in setting up the cockpit
for the wrong approach, but argued (through their attorney, of course) that
they never really deviated from their protected airspace, and that — anyway
— the tower controller's clearance to land constituted an "amendment" to
their approach clearance, nullifying their error. In support of their
position, they presented an expert witness who testified that, according to
his calculations of speed and trajectory from the moment of last contact, the
aircraft never fully intercepted the localizer to the "left" before receiving
clearance to land, and thus did not technically depart from the protected
airspace for the approach to the "right."
This is a point that the crewmembers could have made in their own
testimony, of course. They could have done their own research and posited the
same conclusion. Instead, however, they brought forth someone with verifiable
qualifications who lent the matter an air of sophisticated detachment. He was
"disinterested." He had been hired to research the facts and offer a
professional judgment — nothing more. His testimony came as a surprise to the
FAA, which wasn't prepared to mount an effective rebuttal, in part because the
hard data that might have challenged the expert's testimony wasn't available.
The judge made no specific determination that the crew's expert was any more
credible than the government's experts, but he didn't have to — the testimony
was plausible, and unrebutted, thus meeting the crew's obligation to provide
an alternative explanation of the facts. The pilots went free, thanks to their
expert, and the FAA declined to appeal. Now, we could argue all day about
whether or not this case was correctly decided, but one thing is certain: To a
crew dependent upon their certificates for a living, this expert was worth
every penny he charged.
In air-crash litigation, I almost always use expert
witnesses. They are valuable to help prove causation, product defect, standard
of care, etc. Expert witnesses are not only valuable for their opinions but
they also develop and provide the foundation for demonstrative evidence and
can help the attorney prepare the case. (See my article on AVweb,
"Aviation Expert
Witnesses.")
Expert witnesses are
underutilized in FAA enforcement litigation. Part of the problem is that few
airmen can afford two sets of professional fees — one for their lawyer and
another for the expert.
There is another limitation with regard to the use of
experts in enforcement cases. The Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) of the
NTSB, who preside over the hearings, may not permit experts to render opinions
on the ultimate question of whether the airman committed the violation. The
ALJ must make that decision. However, experts may be very helpful to the
airman if the defense is based on some technical or scientific issue upon
which the expert can shed some light. Co-author Eric Jaderborg has provided an
excellent anecdote of how proper expert opinion testimony saved the
day.
Typically, in major litigation, the lawyers for the
various parties routinely take the depositions of their opponent's experts
before trial. Parties are required to disclose their experts and the opinions
of their experts ahead of time. Thus, the lawyers usually know what the
opposing expert will say before the final hearing or trial. To the extent to
which the ALJs follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, as
they are supposed to, the parties in an enforcement case can also obtain the
disclosure of expert opinions and take expert depositions before trial.
However, in the run-of-the-mill enforcement case, the parties do not spend the
money on this type of preparation. Accordingly, Eric Jaderborg is correct in
pointing out that if the respondent (airman) uses an expert, he may be able to
surprise the FAA with the expert's opinion at the hearing.
When you think about it, the FAA will have their expert at
the hearing — the FAA FSDO inspector. FSDO inspectors have varying degrees of
experience and credentials, but they are generalists. One can usually find an
expert with more specific expertise on the issues in dispute and thus be in a
position to have a "leg up" on the FAA at the hearing.
Another tip, if FAA investigatory impropriety or FAA
internal procedures become a relevant issue to the defense, a recently retired
FSDO inspector may be the perfect expert to expose the wrongdoing.
"...and with his sling in his hand David went forth to
meet the Philistine." - I Samuel 17:40.
In the end, how you fare in an encounter with the FAA will depend upon more
than a ragged set of facts collected by an inspector, and more than the tricks
your attorney can pull out of a briefcase. It will depend upon your
willingness to go out and "meet the Philistine" instead of waiting for the
Philistine to meet you. It will depend upon preparation, timing, truth,
insight, and constructive engagement. Antoine de St. Exupéry once observed
that "defeat is a thing of weariness, of incoherence, of boredom ... and above
all of futility." If you can avoid these appearances of disaster, and work to
give your accusers a plausible alternative, you just might avoid ruin, and
come away with your dignity intact, and your certificate in your pocket.
In the reader comments following this three-part series, some important —
and disturbing — points have been made regarding the effect of the appellate
court decision in Garvey, FAA v. NTSB and Richard Lee Merrell, 190 F. 3rd
571, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1999), which Phil analyzed in his AVweb
article, "A Dangerous New
Precedent In FAA Enforcement Law." A few readers suggested that in the
light of Merrell, there is nothing further to be done; that since the
FAA can, in theory, cram its interpretations down the NTSB's throat, there is
no point in doing anything but throwing oneself on the "mercy" of the agency
and hoping for the best.
I cannot agree. And I once again choose this forum — as I did in my own article on the subject of
"known icing conditions" — to emphasize the vital importance of
independent judicial review of any and all legal opinions and actions, FAA or
otherwise. Along with the civil liberties guaranteed under the Bill of Rights,
nothing is more fundamental to a free people than the right to independent
judicial review. Without it, we are slaves.
Merrell may not be the final word. It is the opinion of the Federal
Appeals Court of the D.C. Circuit on a specific set of facts. While the
principles the court applied to those facts are nightmarish in their
implications, they are vulnerable to a review by the United States Supreme
Court — if not in that case, then in some other. One reason those principles
may never face such a review is that potential adversaries sometimes prefer to
keep opinions like this corked in a bottle — like an UZI-wielding genie —
with threats of "uncorking" made by the attorneys on one side and "damage
control" being practiced by the attorneys on the other. Another reason might
be the failure of those affected by the decision to pool their resources, link
arms, and fight.
There is a proverb I learned within FAA circles: "If you don't want the
answer, don't ask the question." Thus, the only thing worse than having
Merrell upheld by the D.C. Circuit would be to have a review of it
turned down by the Supreme Court — or to have it upheld in a similar case,
and trumpeted throughout the land. Any attorney will tell you that a day in
open court is often worse than a night in jail.
On the other hand, the robed and bespectacled judges of the court have, on
occasion, been persuaded by reason. Now and then, something they decide
actually resembles justice. Furthermore, it is occasionally possible to
persuade legislators to take the path of reform. But it's god-awful expensive.
That's why I suggested, and continue to support, the idea of an "aviation
legal defense fund" — a sort of ACLU for aviation certificate holders —
aimed at advancing important, factually "clean" cases to higher courts for the
purpose of overturning travesties like Merrell, and upholding, or
expanding, the rights of people whose lives are disrupted by administrative
injustice. An ordinary legal insurance program can't touch the cost of
litigating such cases. Most pilots would rather buy a new airplane than spend
their life savings — without support — on a crusade that might fail.
But organizations concerned with a variety of civil rights causes have been
fighting for justice in the criminal, civil, and legislative arenas for
decades, with some success — albeit mixed. Isn't it time to begin the fight
for administrative reform? Perhaps this is an idea whose "time is come" — at
least for serious discussion. After Merrell, can you think of a better
time?
Eric and I have received comments on AVweb to the
effect that our articles just scare airmen, and the only ones who benefit are
the lawyers. Others simply believe that it is hopeless to defend against the
FAA in an enforcement case.
Should you be scared? I can tell you that the typical
airman never has a serious problem with the FAA. The FAA FSDO employees are
usually more helpful than threatening. As a lawyer, I have the same jaundiced
perspective as a doctor; I see sick patients — clients with problems. Just as
a doctor prescribes for illness, I advise for legal afflictions, and defend
people who are unfairly accused, or if fairly accused, are facing unduly harsh
sanctions.
If you will not commit flight violations then read these
articles for amusement. If you do get in trouble then I should tell you about
the emails I have received from airmen who received a Notice of Proposed
Certificate Action, didn't have the benefit of guidance from people like Eric
Jaderborg, and ended up never flying again when the loss could have been
prevented.
It is not hopeless to defend against the FAA, even with
some of the recent adverse precedents I have written about (e.g., the
Merrell case). It may be hopeless to defend against the FAA if an
airman tries to do so without competent defense counsel. After all, the FAA
has a lawyer and will use its extensive resources to prosecute a case. If the
FAA has the advantages, then it's even more important to get proper
representation. Even where the FAA has a solid case against an airman, a good
lawyer can often persuade or force a compromise.