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| Top News: ADS-B Is Your Friend | back to top |  |
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U.S. Public Waking Up To Benefits Of NextGen ADS-B?
That said, the NextGen system isn't expected to be fully operational until sometime in the 2020s at the earliest and potentially long after the current financial crisis and spike in fuel costs have been otherwise addressed. If nothing else, the timing gives us all pause to figure out how we're going to pay for the little black wonderboxes that we'll all install in our aircraft (some estimates put the cost to airlines at about $200,000 per airplane) as essential pieces to the overall puzzle of more efficient air traffic control. |
Late last week, The Associated Press wrote in multiple short articles (and at least
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| New Aircraft | back to top | |
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Ramping Up The Unmanned Air Force
Where previously the military had rotated flying pilots from manned to unmanned aircraft duty, a first batch of 20 applicants is now being sought from officers ranking at least captain with four to six years' commissioned experience for non-flying pilot positions. The Air Force is already working out the details (from what wings they'll wear to what pay) for a drone pilot career track available to non-pilot officers who have never flown in an aircraft that is under their command. So far, enlisted airmen will not be considered for larger Predator and Reaper drones, but they may be responsible for smaller "micro" air surveillance vehicles, like the Desert Hawk and Scan Eagle.
Comp Air Attracts Dollars, Heads For Certification
Comp Air is now accepting $100,000 deposits on the $2.95 million Honeywell TPE331-14GR-powered airplane, and hopes the aircraft's 5,000-pound useful load, 900-foot takeoff roll and 2,500-nm range will appeal to air taxi and corporate interests, among others. |
"Off we go into the wild blue yonder" will take a significant turn as the military plans to grow its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles
from about 100 to about 370, and its roster of non-flying pilots from about 450 to 1,100, by 2011. Those figures will make UAV pilots a major stakeholder in the Air Force's campaigns, ahead of the
group of C-17 pilots and second only to F-16 drivers. Attracting applicants to ground-based piloting offers its own challenges, as does the required volume of personnel, the proposed three-year window
for applicant acquisition and training, the training methodology that will create pilots that meet FAA standards without ever being trained in aircraft, and formal details of the non-flying pilot
position itself. The Air Force will open two new training centers next year in hopes of producing 300 qualified drone pilots over a four-month period and is developing all-new channels for the new
career path and a new way of waging war. Any of those non-flying pilots might one day attack targets in Afghanistan during the day and eat dinners at home in Nevada each evening. Hopefully, their
enemies won't follow them there.
Comp Air, the manufacturer known for its sturdy back-country-capable, turbine-powered kit aircraft, has announced that it has been
granted $150 million to develop, certify and produce the 310-knot, eight-plus-two, near-standup cabin (with lavatory)
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| Signal and Noise | back to top | |
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Qantas Probes Laptop Link After Painful Altitude Deviations
Passengers are now being asked if they were using any form of personal electronic device at the time of the incident. The ATSB has said an "irregularity" in one of the aircraft's flight system computers may have caused the altitude change.
In Indy, $200 Million For Home Owners May Have Helped
That, plus land claimed by the airport and homes purchased from noise-afflicted residents, has helped and so have the efforts of FedEx. Airport Director Robert Duncan told the Indianapolis Star that "FedEx has been replacing its fleet with newer, quieter aircraft." The improvements don't mean that all residents are happy but, at least over 23 years, $200 million can be correlated with an improvement. |
The rapid altitude change last Tuesday of an Airbus A330-300 cruising at 37,000 feet with 303 passengers aboard resulted in
injuries to at least 74 people, a potential compensation bill for the airline (Qantas) and new concerns about potential conflicts between laptop computers and commercial aircraft systems. In July,
manipulation of a wireless mouse was blamed for the course deviation of a Qantas jet, according to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). This more recent deviation (from altitude) resulted in
fractures, lacerations and suspected spinal injuries for passengers who became in-cabin lotto balls while bound for Perth from Singapore. According to the flight's data recorder, the jet dropped 650
feet in about twenty seconds, then dropped another 400 feet in 16 seconds. Those drops reportedly followed a climb of about 300 feet and crew reports that they observed "some irregularity with the
aircraft's elevator control system," according to the ATSB. The aircraft made an emergency landing at Learmouth air force base near Exmouth.
An investment of nearly $200 million federal and local dollars spent over 20 years has purchased roughly 2,900 acres and
1,200 homes and has, according to one study, made Indianapolis International Airport a friendlier (read: quieter) neighbor. The impact of airplane noise has diminished, according to consultants for
the airport authority, but that may have just as much to do with improved jet engine technology as it does with the aforementioned airport-area expenditures. Federal noise studies began at the airport
in 1985, soon after FedEx opened a hub there and began sending waves of departures into the night skies. Since then, a series of five-year studies has found that the size of the officially designated
noise impact zone continues to shrink. On one side of the airport, the zones have receded nearly two miles closer to the airport. Even some homes no longer in the noise area can qualify for free sound
insulation, windows and repairs that are paid by the airport.
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| Safety & Security | back to top | |
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AOPA ASF Launches Free Online Safety Course
The course takes about an hour to complete, but may be stopped at any point (your progress is saved) and completed at your convenience. Completion of the course, which also involves a separate ten-question quiz, makes you eligible for credit in the FAA Wings proficiency program and potential insurance benefits for pilots who carry insurance through AOPA.
TSA Issues GA Security NPRM
The NPRM will affect only aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 lbs but it will also affect airports that handle aircraft that size and larger, which is likely a substantial number of GA airports throughout the country. Among the measures contained in the complicated document are security training for flight crews, audits for operators and requirements for airports that serve the so-called "large aircraft." The groups haven't had time to digest the full document but they are saying they appreciate the chance to. The TSA has the power to simply impose the rule but , after months of discussions with various GA groups, decided to issue a standard NPRM that includes a 60-day comment period. |
AOPA Air Safety Foundation Friday announced the launch of a free online course called "Do The Right Thing" designed "to help
pilots improve their decision-making skills" and reduce accidents by preventing the formation of poor decision strings. Based on its seminar titled "
First impressions of a massive
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Boeing And Machinists To Resume Talks
Grand Opening Of Tuskegee Airmen National Historic Site
The event recognized the first phase of the site's overall development -- phase two is due next April when the full site, including an iMax theater in a restored second hangar, is scheduled to open to the public. The progress is the result of legislation passed by Congress in 1998 and signed by the president, appropriating $29.1 million for phase one development. From 1941 through 1946, more than 990 pilots graduated from the flight training program at Tuskegee, with 450 going on to serve their country overseas. The men were the nation's first black military pilots and flew more than 700 bomber escort missions and, according to the Tuskegee Airmain Web site never lost a bomber to enemy fighters. |
The month-long strike has already further delayed the 787 Dreamliner, is starting to affect airlines' expansion plans, is disrupting
the business of metal makers around the world and may (according to some analysts) last through December, but both the company and the Machinists Union have agreed to resume talks. The two sides
continue to be at odds over pay, benefits and the use of outside suppliers. No firm dates have been set, but the two sides have agreed to "pursue talks through the federal mediator," according to a
statement on the company's Web site. The union's Web site added that "we are working out the details of the return to the table." Boeing is expected to lose about $100 million per day in revenue while
its production facilities remain closed. The company's last firm offer, a three-year contract, was rejected followed by a worker walk-out (that consists of 27,000 employees) Sept. 6. Boeing's third
quarter deliveries of 84 aircraft were down 23 percent from 2007, well below the pre-strike forecast of 119 aircraft. The associated drop in revenue for Boeing's commercial plane unit is likely also
close to 23 percent. On the demand side of the equation, airlines will feel the effects of the 21 aircraft Boeing is no longer building every two weeks.
Friday, Oct. 10, 2008, marked the grand opening and recognition of the Tuskegee Airmen National Historic Site at Moton Field, Tuskegee,
Ala., now officially a national landmark. The site serves as testament to the all-black 99th Fighter Squadron and 332nd Fighter Group of World War II whose combat performance and civilian struggles
have earned them legendary status. The weekend's ceremonies were free and open to the public and saw the attendance of thousands, including a few of the surviving airmen.
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| Reader Voices | back to top | |
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AVmail: Oct. 13, 2008Reader mail this week about hangar fees, FSS, FusionMan and more.
Click here to read this week's letters to the editor.
AVweb's Newstips Address ...
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Columns | Features | What's New | Calendar | Brainteasers
The Pilot's Lounge #131: Spin TrainingStudent pilots don't have to prove they can recover from a spin, but AVweb's Rick Durden knows the training advantages that come from near-spins.
Click here to read Rick Durden's column.
It always fascinates me that general aviation airports somehow become ghost towns about 5:00 on Sunday afternoons, even if the weather is superb. This particular Sunday was no exception: The Pilot's Lounge at the virtual airport was rapidly emptying. The students had headed home, and the only folks around were some of the flight school instructors who were finishing up paperwork as I was finishing up the post-flight review with Rex, my student. It was longer than usual because of an unplanned event during the lesson. By the time I had taken care of documenting the lesson, Rex had paid the airplane rental and my fee and departed, I was the only one in the building. I decided to stick around because the Lounge was quiet and I wanted to make some notes to myself about the lesson. Something good had happened and it caused me to look at what I taught and how, and also to see if I could find a way to reproduce some part of the learning experience Rex had for other students and my flight-review clients.
Even Stall Recovery Was A ChallengeRex's lesson was a post-solo review of maneuvers before we started the dual cross-country phase of the Private pilot rating. Prior to solo, students demonstrate that they can generally recognize and recover from stalls, but there is no real attempt to put polish on the process. The student should realize when the airplane is about to stall and prevent it from happening. If the plane does stall, it should be on purpose and recovery should take place without a major loss of altitude, although it may not be especially pretty. Following the first few solo flights, the stall series is repeated with the goal of helping the student become more familiar and comfortable with flying the airplane at high angles of attack and not stalling it inadvertently. It is part of the process of moving the student's level of performance up to what I feel is appropriate for someone who is soon to be carrying passengers. Today things had been going about as I expected. Rex was much as I was at the post-solo stage: absolutely terrified of stalls. We'd joked about it because I remembered vividly just how awful it felt when I was doing power-on stalls: I couldn't see anything ahead, and it felt as if the airplane's nose was pointed straight up. I thought that if I pulled back any more, we would flip over backwards, go through some hideous, uncontrollable, monstrous gyrations and die gruesomely. That was if I were lucky. If I really messed up, I knew in my heart of hearts that the process of my demise would be even worse. Because of my own remembered fear and later running across some sadistic flight instructors who intentionally scared students to "see if they had what it takes to be a pilot," my approach to teaching stalls has been to work into things in a step-by-step fashion. It starts with showing that stalls are predictable things and that the airplane isn't lying in wait to snatch the student and dash him to the ground into unrecognizable pieces. I also spend time discussing spins, what they are, how they come about, how to prevent them and how to recover if prevention doesn't work. When there is an airplane available that is certificated for intentional spins, I offer spin training -- as much or as little as a student desires -- and recommend to each that they be able to enter and recover from a fully developed spin, but I do not require it, nor does the FAA. Thus far, Rex had declined to do any spins and I hadn't pressed him. It was enough at this point that he could grit his teeth and, with steely-eyed determination, do two or three power-on stalls in a lesson. Today, he had done one, taking it to the break, lowering the nose of the Cessna 150 to the horizon and then -- once the speed started to build -- slowly raising the nose to normal climb attitude, losing only about 150 feet, a pretty decent performance. I told him so. His only comment was, "Man, I hate these." I asked him to take the next one only to where the stall warning was sounding steadily, taking a moment to work on being aware how the controls felt at the edge of a stall, to see if he could detect any airframe buffet and to notice how far aft the control wheel was. Then, before the airplane stalled, he was to recover to a normal climb.
Sneaking Up Behind Them ...
All was going well: The stall warning horn had come to life, the tendons in Rex's neck were prominent, the ball was about a half-width right of centered and I was anticipating him lowering the nose in another two or three seconds. Suddenly, something big, black and fast went under the left wing. I jerked forward and snapped my head to the left, looking around Rex, thinking that we had barely missed smacking into a turkey buzzard. He also whipped his head to the left and flinched. Hard. The yoke came back to the stop. The 150 stalled, started to roll to the left and pitched down. When he again looked ahead, Rex quickly figured out that all was not well. The horizon was not only tilting at an increasing rate, it was well above the nose and getting higher. He his initial reaction was predictable, the next two weren't. First Rex pulled on the yoke for all he was worth, trying to bring the nose up where it belonged. Then he firewalled the left rudder pedal. What had just been a significant left yaw suddenly was dramatic. Rex promptly applied body English to try and stop the left turn. He leaned to the right. He leaned all the way into my lap, pinning my arms. I figured it would probably be a good time to see if I could talk him through recovery from a power-on spin. It didn't even take much prompting. Rex is no dummy, plus we'd discussed and he'd read about spins. He knew, intellectually, what to do, although doing it the first time one experiences an airplane whirling around as it feels as if it's pointed straight down isn't the easiest task in the world. With a little prompting, Rex first centered the ailerons, then closed the throttle, applied full right rudder and, after he had it to the stop, he started moving the control wheel forward. Almost immediately the rotation stopped, the awful twisting feeling ended and the weird, drumming, thwanging sounds stopped as the wings started flying again and the airspeed built in the dive. The moment the rotation began to slow, Rex proceeded to sit upright. Once it stopped, he recognized that the airplane was in a common, garden-variety dive and started raising the nose. As Rex stabilized the airplane in a climb, he looked at me and said, "Wow. We didn't die." A moment later, he went on: "I did that recovery, didn't I?" I responded, "I will state categorically that I did not touch the controls." After we landed, we talked about spins, spin entries, stalls and control inputs for a while. Rex said that as the airplane started to roll, he suddenly got the rudders confused and reacted as he had as a kid on his sled, where he pushed on the left side of the steering bar to go right. After the discussion, Rex departed in a good mood. He had seen the tiger in its lair and spat back at it. As we scheduled his next lesson, he said he wanted to do some more spins to try and see if he could recover before the rotation started. He said he was looking forward to it ... it would be fun.
Should Everyone Do This?So, there I sat, in one of the beat-up, old recliners in the Lounge, having watched a student have a very good learning experience and figuring out how I could build on it for him and how to make use of it with others. I made some notes and began to ask myself more important questions in the overall context of staying alive in little airplanes. With stall/spin accidents still killing so many people each year, what is the best way of teaching my students and recurrent-training pilots how to handle the low-speed end of the flight envelope, right near the stall? How can I make sure that my students protect themselves from stalling and spinning in? Do I insist that they learn how to do spins? Do I emphasize spins? Should we work most on stall avoidance? Is there a Star Trek rerun on tonight? (I'm aging and my mind wanders.) I used the computer in the Lounge to look up some material on stall/spin accidents and found that they were right up there in the litany of high-percentage fatal accidents. Most of them happen at relatively low altitude, on takeoff, approach to landing or while "maneuvering" (which, on further checking, would probably be more accurately referred to as "buzzing"). We practice stalls up high, yet that is not where we face the risk of a stall/spin crash. So, why do we teach spins at all? After all, in the reports of stall/spin accidents, almost none of the airplanes are high enough for a spin to fully develop prior to impact; almost no one gets beyond the incipient stage, also called the "It's gonna happen if you don't do something" stage of a spin. After some thought, I reached some conclusions and formed some opinions.
Checkride Requirements
At a basic level, I am of the opinion that the old Private pilot requirement to enter a spin and recover on a specified heading within a certain, arbitrary number of degrees is rightfully dead. It got to where the concentration was on the recovery on heading, with the student learning how to use the ailerons in the latter part of the recovery to hit a heading, something that can be seriously counterproductive if ailerons are used in the initial portion of the recovery. Spin recovery occurs most rapidly with the ailerons neutral and, depending on the airplane, the wrong aileron deflection can prolong a spin or actually prevent recovery. I also learned that a huge percentage of the pilot examiners would have the applicant do the spin recovery portion of the checkride solo, while the examiner watched from the ground. I figure they knew something. Despite thinking the old spin requirement should not be revived, I am firmly of the opinion that every pilot who is going to be carrying passengers should have experienced a bare minimum of at least one spin of at least two turns before recovery is started. We demonstrate and require unusual-attitude recovery because things that the pilot or outside forces induce can upset an airplane and the pilot should have seen such a thing before and know how to recover. A spin is merely something the airplane will do if provoked. The first one a pilot sees should not, in my opinion, be without an instructor at the other set of controls. Yes, we may chase off some students if the spin experience is required. Then again, there is the approach that if we really make the spin-training requirement tough, we'll chase off all of the students, we won't have any pilots and there will be no stall/spin accidents, thus accomplishing the goal. Silly comments aside, students quit for many reasons, some because they don't like stalls or steep turns or landings. A good instructor should be able to create a climate of trust prior to demonstrating a spin so that the student doesn't run screaming to the exits. Beyond observing a spin, I would like to see a student demonstrate spin recovery in each direction, and a logbook endorsement made to that effect, similar to what is required of flight instructor applicants now. Part of the reason is for them to see how much altitude is lost in the first part of the spin and why it's most important to recognize what is happening very early and start the recovery very early so the spin never gets going. I want the student to recognize that twisting, gut-churning roll and pitch-down that characterizes the very first stage of an incipient spin and have developed an emotional response to it. They should have it ingrained in them that, when the airplane begins that roll off and pitch down, it's time for the ailerons to be centered, the rudder to go to the stop and the yoke to go forward, so there is no "What in the world is happening?" reaction delay that erases the chance of a recovering before ground impact.
Down Low is BadAll of this is tied in with discussion with the student that the serious risk is the stall at low altitude, so the student must demonstrate mastery of recovery from a cross-control stall the moment after the break. It is my opinion that in addition to current training in stall recognition and avoidance (which I think is extremely important in itself), the student should be experiencing stalls with the ball off center, in all airplane configurations we experience in real life (takeoff flaps and full flaps at full power, approach and landing flaps at partial power and power off, etc.) and demonstrate recovery from that now-familiar pitch down and roll-off before the autorotation of the stall begins, with a minimum loss of altitude. It also means showing and understanding that the minimum loss of altitude may very well be 500 feet or so, and the visceral knowledge that stalls at low altitude are killers; recognition of an approach to a stall and avoidance of the stall itself is what is truly going to save their lives. It means using the training technique of the delayed stall recovery and the falling leaf as confidence builders. First, simply have the student stall the airplane, hold the wheel all the way aft, ailerons centered, and not recover from the stall or series of stalls that occur, while keeping the airplane going straight with the rudder. A glance at the VSI teaches how fast the airplane is descending and the student learns that the rudder is still very effective. The next step is the falling leaf, where the yoke is held full aft in the stall, but the student applies rudder at the stall break, initiating that roll-off and pitch-down of the incipient spin, but then puts the opposite rudder to the stop to cause the roll and yaw to stop and then start in the other direction, whereupon the rudders are reversed and the action repeated through about 1,000 feet of altitude loss. It allows a student to learn that something can be done about that horrible roll and yaw and which control is used for it, and that it is effective. It also means explaining and showing that holding the yoke aft during a recovery attempt means the airplane remains stalled and is descending like a dropped sewer cover.
The Myth of the Safe Shallow Turns
Which leads into the next phase of the training: Explain that the myth of making only shallow turns in the pattern or on landing approach is a killer. It's better to roll into a 45-degree bank when turning final rather than trying to rudder the airplane around in a shallow bank. The stall speed does not go up all that much in a 45-degree bank; it's only the angles beyond that where it curves upwards dramatically. Ruddering the airplane around means uncoordinated flight, which means seriously increased drag, which increases the risk of a stall. Then, when it does stall, it means recover, may take more altitude than is available even if recovery started instantly. A coordinated turn, even of as much as 45-degrees of bank, does not increase the stall risk nearly as much as the uncoordinated turn. And if the pilot does still screw up and stall, a successful recovery from a coordinated stall is much more likely and possible in as little as 100 feet. It also means to serious discussions of buzzing, including how fast the speed goes away in a pull-up, how incredibly much there is to hit that cannot be seen when flying low and how the world looks different from 200 feet agl than it does from 1000 feet, especially the apparent position of the horizon, which can fool a person. It also means pointing out that everyone has a cell-phone camera and, if one is stupid enough to do a buzz job, it is going to be photographed and very possibly turned into the FAA. That photo is evidence that is extremely difficult to refute. Do I recommend teaching buzzing to students by going down the runway at 200 feet? After a lot of thought, no. I teach it at 3000 feet agl. I have the student do a pull up and then look out the window at something and start a turn to go back toward it. It startles the heck out of the student when the stall warning goes off, or the airplane stalls inadvertently. Finally, for my students and flight-review pilots flying airplanes that are approved for spins, I am going to do something that Rich Stowell -- an aerobatic and upset-training instructor -- recommended: Create diversions when the pilot is flying the airplane very near the stall. When the pilot knows the stall is coming, recovery becomes second nature. When it is a bit of a surprise recovery may be delayed. If the pilot can experience that surprise with an instructor handy, learning takes place. That way, when it happens later for real, with no instructor present, the chance of successful recovery in the available altitude is better. Rich has pilots stall the airplane while looking out the window, or while reaching for something in the back seat – anything to match how it can sneak up on someone in the real world. I think his ideas are excellent. I'm also thinking that I may just try to duplicate what happened with Rex by turning my head suddenly to the left and exclaiming, "What was that?!" The risk of the stall/spin accident is when it is entered down low. Unfortunately, that's the one variable I do not feel I can put into the training equation. The margin is too fine. Remember back in the 1960s when some FAA examiners were interpreting the multi-engine checkride guidelines to require Vmc demonstrations at 500 feet agl. Until things were straightened out, they were licensing survivors and the countryside was littered with wrecked twins. I cannot recommend teaching stalls at 500 feet agl. That's where demonstration at altitude, noting altimeter readings and a lot of discussion, come in; there is only so much practice bleeding we can have our students do. The important thing, in my opinion, is that we have to spend a lot of time in slow flight, near the stall, with our students so that they internalize the feel of an airplane near the stall, keep the ball centered and are likely to stall only when they desire it to take place. Yet, we have to realize that they will err and so we also have to have them experience a lot of stalls -- flaps up and down, at different power settings, different bank angles and with different rates of onset, ball centered and off to the side -- because a hoary truth of aviation is that we only do well what we have done before. What's scary is that most pilots carrying passengers have spent less time doing slow flight and stalls than it took to read this column. See you next month.
Want to read more from Rick Durden? Check out the rest of his columns. // -->
Probable Cause #65: Bad Conditions, Poor PlanningIt's hard to imagine an instrument-rated pilot flying into a Midwestern winter without checking the destination weather.
Click here for the full story.
Every pilot wants to avoid tough winter weather, especially icing conditions, even if that means delaying a flight or canceling one altogether. But some pilots are foolish enough to think that last-minute weather decisions will save them during a poorly-planned IFR approach. Poor IFR skills during a long day of flying in December 2004 took the lives of three people when a Piper Saratoga crashed executing the GPS approach to the Glenwood Municipal Airport (GHW) at Glenwood, Minn., about 100 miles northwest of Minneapolis. The day started at 0615 (CST) when the pilot called the Miami Automated Flight Service Station and filed three IFR flight plans. The first was from Page Field at Fort Myers, Fla., (FMY) to Albany, Ga., (ABY). The second was from ABY to Mount Vernon, Ill., (MVN), and the third from MVN to Glenwood. The briefer provided weather information for the first two flights, but after the briefer described a tornado watch and convective SIGMET for the route of flight between ABY and MVN, the pilot declined further information. Perhaps he planned to check the weather at Albany. The leg between Fort Myers and Albany went as planned. At 0945 the pilot called the Macon AFSS and requested an abbreviated weather briefing for the second leg from ABY to MVN, but again did not ask the briefer about the weather on the third leg. In fact, there is no record that the pilot ever checked the weather for the third leg to Glenwood. Departing from Mount Vernon, the Saratoga pilot contacted Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center at 1342 (CST) and asked for his clearance to Glenwood and was cleared there at 10,000 feet. At 1550 the flight was handed off to Minneapolis Center. At 1600 the controller queried the pilot about flight conditions. The pilot responded, "We're kinda in a little haze here. I think the tops may be only about two thousand or three thousand above us and a lot of thin clouds below us." He added, "We haven't picked up any ice yet. The outside temperature shows minus seven Celsius." The flight appeared to continue normally and at 2236 Minneapolis cleared the aircraft to descend from 10,000 feet to 6000 feet, and shortly thereafter at pilot's discretion to 4000 feet. A few minutes later, while passing 6000 feet, the pilot asked for a climb back to 7000 feet because he was "picking up a fair amount of ice." The controller asked for another pilot report on flight conditions. The pilot responded that he had rime on the windshield and "rime and mixed" icing on the wings. When prompted he categorized it as "light," and said the outside air temperature was minus 2 degrees Celsius. He reported that he broke out of the tops of the clouds at 6400 feet on the way to 7000 feet. Twenty minutes later, the pilot requested the GPS approach to Runway 33 at Glenwood and also asked to remain at 7000 feet as long as possible due to known icing.
The Approach Begins
At 1706 the controller cleared the aircraft for the full approach into Glenwood and told the pilot to remain at or above 3500 feet until established on a published portion of the approach. When the pilot acknowledged being established, the controller cleared him to leave the frequency. There was no further communication with the aircraft. A radar plot showed the Saratoga intercepting the approach course at 6800 feet and crossing KODMY, the final approach fix, at 6000 feet. The aircraft was only five miles from the runway. The FAF crossing altitude at KODMY is listed as 3000 feet, and the straight-in MDA is 1760 feet MSL. With the Glenwood field elevation at 1393 feet MSL, this placed the aircraft 4607 feet above the ground. The last radar hit showed the aircraft two miles from the end of the runway at 2607 feet above the ground. Initial impact was with a barbed-wire fence and pasture about one mile northwest of the Glenwood Airport. The aircraft continued into a residential yard causing minor damage to the house. Since it was dark, a witness in her backyard saw the aircraft's lights just before it crashed. The airplane approached her position from the north and appeared to "dive down and impact the ground." Witnesses reported that the weather conditions as "misty and foggy." At 1655 Glenwood AWOS reported a ceiling at 200 feet, visibility of 1-1-4 miles in mist, wind 050 degrees at 8 knots, and the temperature and dewpoint at 2 degrees Celsius. Investigators noted that the weather reports for GHW from 0055 (CST) through the entire day included the 200-foot ceiling and less than two miles visibility. The terminal forecast for Alexandria (AXN), Minn., located 14 miles north of Glenwood was issued at 1339 (CST). From 1400 to 1700 it called for a ceiling of 100-foot overcast and 1/4 mile in fog with a temporary 300-foot overcast and 1/2 mile in light rain, snow, and fog. After 1700, a 300-foot overcast ceiling and 2 miles in light snow and mist was expected with a temporary 100-foot overcast and 3/4-mile visibility. An AIRMET for icing was issued at 1445 (CST) and called for occasional moderate rime and mixed icing from the freezing level to 16,000 feet. The freezing level was forecast to be between 4000 and 6000 feet.
The Pilot's Role
The private pilot had logged 710 hours of total flight time in the 3-1/2 years since receiving his license, and 684 hours in the same make and model as the accident aircraft. Nineteen hours of night time had been logged, with the last being 14 months earlier. Investigators reported that the pilot had 84 hours of total instrument time with 2.9 hours flown in the 90 days prior to the accident. Should the pilot have had any reasonable expectation of making a successful approach to Glenwood considering the weather? How did it end up north of the airport headed southbound? The controller did not offer a weather report to the pilot, and the pilot did not tell the controller he had received the AWOS. If he'd checked the weather before leaving Mount Vernon he would have known the weather was below landing minimums. Was the pilot tired? He called Flight Service at 0615 and the accident occurred at 1710 at the end of what appears to be an 11-hour day of flying three legs from Fort Myers, Fla., to Glenwood, Minn. While it appears that the pilot was on the proper inbound course, he was much too high to see the ground in time to make a safe landing. It appears he attempted to dive the airplane toward the surface before reaching the missed approach point. If the witness accounts are accurate, it means that at some point the pilot realized he had flown beyond the airport. Instead of making a missed approach, he turned around and was trying to locate the field while flying at a very low altitude. FAR 91.175 prohibits flight below MDA unless the aircraft is in a position allowing a descent to a landing using normal maneuvers. If the aircraft arrived at the missed approach point at an altitude that was well above MDA, the Saratoga pilot should have begun the missed approach immediately. At a two-mile final, the pilot would have had to descend 2,240 feet to reach the MDA by the missed approach point. That equates to 1,140 feet per mile or a descent rate of nearly 1,800 feet per minute. Needless to say, a steep descent rate that close to the ground is extremely dangerous, especially because the pilot would also need to look for the runway, which would mean taking his eyes away from the instrument panel. That could lead to busting the MDA and flying the airplane into the ground at a high rate of descent. The reported weather made it highly unlikely that, even if the airplane had been at MDA at or just before the missed approach point, the pilot would have been able to visually acquire the airport or runway environment. Another factor was ice, which we know the aircraft was picking up at 6000 feet. The AIRMET called for icing conditions starting from 4000 to 6000 feet and going up to 16,000 feet. The witness description of the aircraft diving into the ground could have indicated a stall. Perhaps the aircraft got too slow and the pilot lost control with some ice still clinging to the wings.
AnalysisThe NTSB determined the accident was caused by the pilot's failure to execute a missed approach as well as his failure to maintain sufficient altitude and clearance from terrain and obstructions. Contributing factors were the pilot's failure to obtain a preflight weather briefing, his decision to delay descent for approach (icing concerns), cloud ceilings below the minimum descent altitude and in-flight icing conditions. This accident is a good example of what not to do during an instrument approach. First, if there is a strong likelihood that the approach will be unsuccessful, why bother in the first place? Fly to an alternate where a better approach, better weather, or both can be found. Stay out of icing conditions if you are not experienced in flying in them and you do not have an aircraft with the proper de-ice and anti-ice equipment. Staying on top too long can lead to just as deadly an outcome as can flying in ice without any protection. When flying a non-precision instrument approach, be certain that you are established on the approach and at the proper altitude before passing the final approach fix. Set up a stabilized approach at a reasonable and steady descent rate that will put you at MDA in a position to make a safe landing should you get a visual on the runway environment or airport. If you reach the MDA on any approach and can't make a safe landing, make the missed approach. Don't ever fly over the airport at or below MDA with the hope you will find the runway or some landmark you recognize. That practice is neither safe nor legal, yet accident reports tell us that pilots do it anyway. The Saratoga pilot was determined to stay above the clouds until the last minute to avoid the ice. But his strategy was flawed, because he didn't plan on a stabilized approach. He waited much too long and descended at a rate that was unsafe, perhaps because he did not want to climb back into the clouds and risk accumulating more ice at a dangerously low altitude. Using good common sense and having a strong set of personal limitations go a long way toward preventing accidents such like this.
More accident analyses are available in AVweb's Probable Cause Index. And for monthly articles about IFR flying including accident reports like this one, subscribe to AVweb's sister publication, IFR Refresher. // -->
AVweb Insider Blog: Why Falling Oil Prices Aren't Good News
No, it's not. And here's why: Higher gas prices may be the only way out of our distastrous dependence on imported oil.
Read more in our latest AVweb Insider blog. |
In the current economic gloom, oil prices are in retreat. That's a good thing, right?
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RAIM Prediction: You'll Need It Next Year, and Jeppesen Has ItFile Size 3.4 MB / Running Time 3:45
Podcast Index | How to Listen | Subscribe Via RSS
When TSO 129 IFR GPS first appeared, it had onboard software called receiver autonomous integrity monitoring to keep track of the nav solution's reliability. The advent of WAAS diminished RAIM's importance, but now that many operators are using GPS as primary navigation when operating RNAV, RAIM is again important. Beginning next summer, any aircraft operating RNAV with GPS as primary nav — and many business aircraft are — will need a means of predicting RAIM availability.
As part of its popular JetPlan online flight planning system, Jeppesen has recently added a module that essentially makes RAIM prediction a menu-choice item. You plan your route, altitude and departure as usual and ask the system to calculate RAIM availability over that route. If there are gaps in the plan, the software will find them, and you can plan accordingly. The system is entirely online-based and, as Jeppesen's Mike Cetinich describes in this podcast, the calculation takes mere seconds.
This podcast is brought to you by
Bose
Corporation.
Video of the Week: Radio-Controlled F-18 CamRecommend a Video | VOTW Archive Here at AVweb's video-watching department, we see plenty of radio-controlled aircraft, in addition to the full-size ones. Our latest "Video of the Week" is something we don't see every day, however — an RC F-18 with carrying a tiny camera on its journey.
Don't forget to send us links to any interesting videos you find out there. If you're impressed by it, there's a good chance other AVweb readers will be too. And if we use a video you recommend on AVweb, we'll send out an official AVweb baseball cap as a "thank you."
AVweb's NBAA Convention 2008 Video Round-UpOriginal, Exclusive Videos from AVweb | Reader-Submitted & Viral Videos
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FBO of the Week: Showalter Flying Service (KORL, Orlando, FL)
Nominate an FBO | Rules | Tips | Questions | Winning FBOs
AVweb's "FBO of the Week" ribbon goes to Showalter Flying Service at KORL in Orlando, Florida.
AVweb reader Jim Thomas recommended the FBO for exceptional performance "amid the hubbub of NBAA":
Despite nearly 500 aircraft on static display, the great crew at Showalter are still delivering high-quality service with a smile. All fees are waived with a minimum fuel purchase, even as little as a gallon! Showalter has hosted EAA Chapter 74 since the new terminal was built and also provides facilities for the Orlando Youth Aviation Center's "Introduction to Aviation" class series for kids 10-16. I've always found them to go above and beyond on any request. Bob & Kim Showalter run a class act.
Keep those nominations coming. For complete contest rules, click here.
AVweb is actively seeking out the best FBOs in the country and another one, submitted by you, will be spotlighted here next Monday! |
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| The Lighter Side of Flight | back to top | |
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Short FinalOn Friday, October 10, Qantas's first Airbus A380 visited Auckland, marking the first visit of the type to New Zealand. It did a press junket promotional flight across the city and environs, filmed by a news helicopter, ZK-HST. This was heard on Auckland control 124.3:
ZK-HST:
Auckland Control:
ZK-HST: |
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AVwebBiz: AVweb's Business Aviation Newsletter
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HAVE YOU SIGNED UP yet for AVweb's NO-COST weekly business aviation newsletter, AVwebBiz? Reporting on breaking news,
Business AVflash focuses on the companies, the products and the industry leaders that make headlines in the business aviation industry. Business AVflash is a must read. Sign up today at | Names Behind the News | back to top | |
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Meet the AVwebFlash TeamAVwebFlash is a weekly summary of the latest news, articles, products, features, and events featured on AVweb, the internet's aviation magazine and news service.
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