To Go or Not to Go

Before you launch off into the clag, take a moment to review your decision-making process. Did you make your go/no-go decision for the right reasons? How well has your training and experience taught you that crucial skill: how not to go. A little introspection might just enhance your life expectancy.

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Every flight consists of countless decisions, which for the mostpart are made as a matter of routine. We decide on routing andaltitudes based on weather forecasts, we decide on fuel loadsbased on weight and balance factors. The results of these decisionsare almost always predictable. People (especially pilots)are reluctant to admit limitations and shortcomings; we like tothink each decision is a result of exceptional skill, carefulreflection, and thorough knowledge of all variables involved.Perhaps other factors affect the decision making process? Afterall, to err is human, to admit it impossible.

  • A pilot departs in a four place single into low instrumentmeteorological conditions, with reports and forecasts of moderateto severe ice. Shortly after takeoff the aircraft goes down. Allfive people on board are killed.

  • The pilot of a popular low wing single engine airplane madeseveral attempts to land on a runway with a crosswind componentin excess of twenty-five knots. On the final attempt, he lostcontrol and was killed in the ensuing crash and fire.

  • After completing a night, non-precision approach, the pilotof a corporate jet elected to land downwind. Touchdown occurredapproximately two-thirds down the runway. The airplane continuedat high speed across a road, through a fence and came to restin a field. There were no injuries, but the aircraft was substantiallydamaged.

In each of these examples there is a common thread. All threeaccidents were the result of a poor decision, or decisions. FederalAviation Administration statistics for 1990 indicate 69.7 percentof all general aviation accidents are related to human factors.11.4 percent were mechanical related and the remaining 18.9 percentwere unknown or undetermined. The implications here are clear.More than two-thirds of all accidents could be prevented by analyzinghuman performance and decision making.

Hazardous Thought Patterns

What makes an otherwise rational person load five people intoa four place airplane and venture into weather which grounds airliners?Why did an experienced pilot make continued attempts to land withvery strong, direct crosswinds when there were at least sevenairports with runways aligned into the wind within twenty- fivemiles. A discussion of human personality traits and attitudesmay help clarify how such obviously poor (at least in hindsight)decisions are made.

Researchers have identified five patterns of hazardous thoughtwhich may contribute to accidents.

  • ANTI-AUTHORITY: This type of individual is apt to actin a way contrary to safety simply in an attempt to defy authority.This person thinks regulations are simply "a bureaucraticwaste of time," "checklists are for the other guy,"and "aircraft manufacturer’s limitations are to be ignored."

  • IMPULSIVITY: This pilot is likely to do anything, aslong as it’s quick. "I’m sure the weather’s ok, besides I’mlate."

  • INVULNERABILITY: This thought pattern is perhaps themost dangerous. This individual thinks "It won’t happen tome. After encountering unexpected head winds this pilot fliespast a good fuel stop "because things always work out."

  • MACHO: Also a very dangerous thought pattern. A Machoindividual believes "I can do it." For this person cancelling(or even delaying) a flight is a sign of weakness and executinggo around is admitting defeat.

  • RESIGNATION: This person, when faced with a challenge,thinks "what’s the use." This pilot might continue flightinto deteriorating weather because "it’s too late to turnback, the decision’s already been made."

Almost every pilot has experienced each of these thought patternsat one time or another. Additionally, each of us can probablyidentify friends or acquaintances who fit one of the categories.

The Bad Decision Chain

Accidents are seldom caused by a single bad judgment. They areusually the result of a chain of bad decisions. The key to accidentprevention lies in recognizing, and breaking, that chain.

  • Step one, evaluate. When faced with a decision, checkto see if it is being made as a result of a hazardous thoughtpattern. Remember, everyone is subject to each of the thoughtpatterns. Have all options been considered?

  • Step two, stop! If the decision is a result of a hazardousthought pattern, break the chain early! Accidents are almost alwaysthe result of a series of events and bad decisions.

  • Step three, verify. Before committing to a course ofaction always check to see if there is a way out if things don’tturn out as expected. Never leave yourself with only one alternative.

Learn How Not To Go

In the course of flight training we spend significant effort onlearning how to complete a procedure. Once certified, even morevalue is placed on "completing the mission." Most crosscountries are flown to the planned destination, most landingsto touchdown, and most instrument approaches to completion. Thego-no-go process shouldn’t stop after take-off, it must be continuous.The "no-go" decision may take the form of a diversionto an alternate, a detour around weather, landing short of thedestination, or a go-around or missed approach.

For many of us this requires a change in thought process. We mustredefine in-flight diversions, go-arounds, and missed approachesas normal procedures. The most important skill a pilot can learnis when and how "not to go."

One footnote: recent statistics are encouraging. Previously mentioned1990 figures indicate a 9.4 percent decrease in accidents causedby human factors when compared with averages for the precedingsix years.

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