| by |
Captain R. Michael Baiada |
NOTE: Following Capt. Baiada's editorial, we've published a reply by an air traffic controller.
As I read Ms. Garvey's
comments in a letter she wrote to USA Today ("FAA out Front on Safety,"
in the August 20, 1997 issue), what struck me most was not FAA's after-the-fact actions,
but her assurance that things are getting better and that positive things are being done.
Given FAA's dismal track record and my own personal observations, this seems hardly the
case.
The FAA was once a national treasure that was the model for aviation authorities
worldwide, but is now a national embarrassment. Instead of improvement, the FAA simply
shifts things around with little of substance actually being improved. FAA is always late
off the mark and never seems to get it right. For the twenty years I have worked with the
FAA, involved in various projects (mostly ATC-related), and as a Captain for a major
airline, none of this surprises me any longer. What is surprising is that nothing is ever
done about it.
The NTSB's recent probable cause report placed a fair amount of blame for the ValuJet
accident on FAA's inaction to ValuJet's problems. But most do not realize that the FAA
division responsible for the safety of our aviation system — the Flight Standards
division — is the smaller of the FAA's two operating divisions. The FAA's other, much
larger division is the Air Traffic Control service (ATC).
The ATC division — which contrary to popular belief has no regulatory authority —
provides separation services for the aircraft flying in the United States airspace.
Unfortunately, as big a structural problem as the ValueJet crash highlighted in the FAA's
Flight Standards division, FAA's ATC side of the house is in far worse shape. Equipment
failures are routine. Air traffic controllers are overloaded and staffing levels are too
low at many ATC facilities. Software is out-of-date and poorly documented. Hardware is
embarrassingly antiquated.
FAA upgrade programs fail one after the other. New controller workstations (DSR and
STARS), over $2 billion worth of new hardware, are less capable than the equipment they
replace. Test and implementation cycles are so long that when the equipment is installed
(if it ever is installed at all), it's already obsolete. Billions of dollars have been
wasted on programs that never will see the light of day. I could go on and on.
But again, nothing is ever done about it.
A meltdown of the ATC system is only a matter of time. In fact, the separation system
has already broken down more than once with deadly consequences. The crash of the USAir
aircraft in Los Angeles a few years ago was a clear breakdown of the ATC system. The
controller was distracted and the pilot did not see the commuter aircraft parked on the
runway and disaster followed. The recent KAL accident in Guam is yet another example.
Although the NTSB will undoubtedly blame these accidents on human error, failure of FAAs
hardware, software and process in the overloaded ATC system are very strong factors that
led to the L.A. and Guam crashes. In both cases, the FAA failed to provide the controller
with the necessary tools to handle the workload. With the right tools, ATC might well have
prevented these accidents, but we will never know.
The FAA has never applied the same rigorous rules to their ATC system software that
they apply to the aircraft flying in the system. For aircraft software, FAA's Flight
Standards division is tasked to monitor and evaluate all software that is installed into
every commercial aircraft as an independent third-party. In principal, Flight Standards
has no vested interest in an aircraft getting certified, and safety is their only concern
(although some would dispute this). But there is no such cross-check for the ATC system
software. Although FAA will say that ATC software is fully evaluated, this check is done
by people that have a vested interest in the software getting approved. Could better
software certification have prevented the Guam accident. Again, we will never know.
Time and again, the FAA has proven that it is no longer technically capable of
maintaining the ATC system. Yet, while airline CEOs devote their energies on lobbying
Congress to influence how the FAA collects money, they ignore how the FAA spends money.
All the while, the FAA wastes billions on ill-fated attempts to modernize and upgrade the
crumbling ATC system, without any tangible progress.
A recent book by ex-DOT Inspector General Mary Schiavo argues that the problem with the
FAA is that it is in the airlines' back pocket. I disagree. In my opinion, the FAA answers
to no one, and never has — not Congress, not DOT, not GAO, and certainly not their
"customers." Pilots, suppliers, and, yes, even the airlines are afraid of the
FAA and refuse to "rock the boat."
FAA's ATC equipment problems can be easily fixed, but I am not sure the management and
cultural issues can. I have heard from more than one person that the FAA is the most
arrogant organization in Washington. This is not the atmosphere and culture upon which we
should build our aviation safety net.
I'm not suggesting that the FAA be privatized, nor that they should be given more
money. FAA cries pauper, but has squandered ten times the money it needs to fix its
problems. What the FAA needs is real leadership, something it hasn't had in recent memory.
The Administration and Congress left the FAA leaderless for nine months. Now that FAA
finally has someone at the top, Ms. Garvey has a very short window of opportunity to exert
the leadership necessary to solve FAA's problems. Although new to the job, the political
correctness of Ms. Garvey's letter to USA Today shows that she is off in the wrong
direction.
Dear Captain Baiada,
I read with great relief your opinions about the FAA ATC division. I can only
say "Thank God" someone other than controllers and other FAA grunts see the FAA
Air Traffic managers for what they are: arrogant and incompetent. For every honest manager
in Air Traffic who actually tries to do a good job, there must be at least fifty who don't
care about anything other than protecting their own job.
I am a 15-year veteran center controller at our nation’s busiest center:
Cleveland. Employee morale is at an all time low, for many of the reasons you mentioned in
your article plus other local and internal management problems. Many large facilities like
Cleveland are the FAA’s dumping grounds for managers who have misbehaved in other
facilities. They are sent to a place where they can disappear in the crowd — but
inevitably the management style that got them in trouble in the first place resurfaces in
their new facility.
I used to believe that controller burnout was a myth, but now I know it does exist. Yet
the cause is not what is usually portrayed in the press: the "stress" of working
traffic. That's the fun and easy part of the job. The real stress comes from dealing every
day with incompetent, rigid and yes, stupid, managers and controllers who think pilots and
airplanes exist because of the FAA Air Traffic Division, instead of the other way around.
The word "service" is not part of their vocabulary. Unfortunately, I see the
incompetence and a non-service-oriented attitude slowly taking over.
I become eligible to retire in approximately five years. There isn't much I can imagine
that would change my mind about leaving on the first day I become eligible.
You are correct when you say that nothing is ever done about any of the bad behavior
and mismanagement rampant in the FAA Air Traffic Division. If you dare to speak up you
become the target of many subtle means of harassment by management. That is why, although
I would like to be able to identify myself to you, I can't take the chance.
Please keep writing about these subjects and revealing these truths to those who are
naive and trusting of Big Brother. Someday, perhaps, the FAA will have to answer to
someone.
I used to be proud of my job, but now I hate to even admit to people what I do for a
living. I've been involved in aviation for nearly 26 years, as pilot, flight instructor
and now controller. I know we still have the safest system in the world, but I am
concerned about how long it will last.
The FAA has a serious problem with equipment, despite what their PR people say. I
understand they are about to scrap a system designed for the approach controls (more
millions wasted) and have multiple problems with the DSR (Display System Replacement)
under development for the centers (this comes after throwing away billions on the ISSS).
Right now the DSR is unusable, though the FAA is plowing ahead with it anyway. I
understand that NATCA (the controller’s union) will not accept it in its present
condition.
The FAA's incompetence with regard to equipment is only part of the problem. The Air
Traffic System in the U.S. is operating today because of the dedication and often
extra-human efforts of the people running it day to day: controllers and airway facility
technicians. I know of no one who would intentionally put an aircraft in danger. But I do
know of people who have become so demoralized by the FAA’s heavy-handed management
approach that they no longer "go the extra mile" or put in the extra effort to
help.
Sincerely,
A Cleveland Center controller who does care
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