ATC Pitfalls – Communication

When words are the only means of expression, pilots and controllers need to listen more carefully to each other and to what they are saying.

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Only a small percentage of the controller work force in the system today-or for that matter, in the past-are or have been pilots. Controllers are taught to perform the duties and provide the services that are outlined in the controller’s bible, the FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control Manual. While they have been made aware of litigation in which the courts have cited controllers for not doing enough for a pilot(Avianca Flight 52), they are also aware that some people in the aviation community feel that controllers sometimes try to do too much in the way of providing assistance and thereby impinge on the pilot’s responsibilities. Somewhere in between, perhaps we can find a happy medium.

The Pilot/Controller responsibilities as outlined in the AIM provide for a degree of redundancy by virtue of the manner in which they overlap-and this is a good thing. This overlapping of responsibilities (such as readback/ hearback errors) in many cases can reduce the possibility for potential safety related failures within the National Airspace System.

Although both the accidents I will refer to in this article involve air carriers, there are points to be made that have the potential to improve the lot of all of us who fly.

What I am about to say in no way is a condemnation of any particular pilot or controller. This is my opinion combined with the facts of each accident and is based on twenty-five years in the ATC system, which includes a stint in the Air Traffic Evaluations branch, as well as fifty-one years as a licensed pilot-seven of which were spent as an airline pilot with a regional carrier. I’ll start with the ATC end of the equation.

A Failure To Communicate

The controllers working Avianca Airlines flight 52-which crashed near Kennedy Airport in January 1990, as a result of fuel exhaustion-did everything in accordance with the procedures that govern the services and separation standards they were taught to provide.

Avianca had been holding for 73 minutes when ATC asked how much longer they could hold; the first officer replied “about five minutes.” The NTSB opined that the controllers should have informed the pilots of the weather related delays but by the same token, proper planning and situational awareness on the part of the pilots should have led to an assessment of the situation and a divert to their alternate while they had sufficient fuel to do so.

Consider what might have happened had the controllers been pilots. Under these circumstances would the controller who handed off the Avianca flight made the receiving controller responsible for putting the Avianca flight on the localizer aware of the situation? Would that controller then have done everything he could to expedite the vector to the final approach course?

Almost without exception, every major accident involving ATC has led to a change in the procedures by controllers. Even the FAA came into being as a result of a mid-air collision between two air carrier aircraft over the Grand Canyon.

Often It’s What You Don’t Say

Because controllers are unable to read the body language of the pilots for whom they are providing ATC services, it is imperative that some training should be given to the ATC specialist in how to recognize that a pilot is in, or getting close to, an untenable situation. Having a basic understanding of what a pilot must know and, to some extent, what a pilot must do in order to conduct a safe flight should cause some warning flags when a controller hears or sees something that seems out of place.

Quite often it is not what pilots say, but what they don’t say that should cause a controller to ask questions. It could be that nothing is amiss. On the other hand, one question (for example, “what is your remaining fuel on board?”) might make a difference in the manner in which the controller interacts with said pilot. A question of that nature asked by ATC might cause the pilot to more clearly reflect on the severity of the situation. That one question might cause the controller to treat that flight in an entirely different manner.

Lack of ATC Knowledge

Now let’s look at the other side of the coin. What training does a pilot receive that offers insight into how a controller goes about separating aircraft? Over and above a possible review of separation standards little if any training of this nature is given to pilots.

The controller’s manual prescribes the separation minima and services controllers use in the performance of their duties. Those standards are designed to give the system and the controller sufficient time to correct a possible “loss of separation” situation before it becomes an accident.

Controllers are required to report any known loss of separation. In most cases, those who use the voluntary reporting system, called ATSAP, can expect no punitive action (except in cases of negligence). If controllers do not use ATSAP then the FAA decides the consequences (possible suspension, training, and decertification).

The third skill of the pilot triptych is communication (everyone remembers the first two right; aviate, and navigate). An important part of communication is listening as well as speaking and herein lies the conundrum; the weakest part of the controller/pilot interface is the only one we have… the radio.

A pilot who miss-reads an ATC instruction has committed a “readback” error and controllers are taught to be on the lookout for such errors. A miss-spoken word or phrase on the part of a controller not corrected by that controller is a “hear-back” error and controllers are also taught to listen carefully to what they say. The third problem is this; a statement, request or instruction issued by either a pilot or a controller that has not been acknowledged is an incomplete communication, therefore, no communication at all.

ATC Traps

What follows is a thumbnail recap of the collision between a Fairchild Metroliner (SkyWest Flight 5569) and a Boeing 737 (USAir Flight 1493) on runway 25 left at LAX. In this instance it was well after sunset in February 1991, when the Metroliner was taxied into position on the runway and instructed to hold while awaiting traffic that had landed on the outboard runway to cross down field.

At this point a flight crew well versed in the pit falls of the ATC system would have been listening carefully for additional instructions from the controller who was in charge of that runway complex. In a perfect pilot world the flying pilot would have been resting his hand on the power levers awaiting a takeoff clearance and the non-flying pilot- or for that matter, both of them-would have been hanging on every word uttered by ATC.

Proactive Is The Word

In this instance the next transmission made was by another air carrier who reported a five-mile final but was not acknowledged by the tower controller. That alone should have raised a number of red flags on the part of the Metroliner crew. They should have been asking themselves has the traffic crossed down field and why has the tower not cleared us for takeoff? Has the tower forgotten us? (In fact the tower had forgotten them). After all, there is an aircraft on final for the runway on which we are sitting that is traveling at about two and one half miles per minute and has not… repeat, not been acknowledged by the tower controller.

The Boeing again calls the tower and is ignored for the second time. The Metroliner crew should have called the tower and asked for a departure clearance. Had they not received one, they should have taxied clear of the runway all the while informing the tower that they were exiting the runway.

The landing traffic then calls the tower a third time and is acknowledged by the tower with a landing clearance.

In that perfect pilot world I speak of, the Metroliner crew would have quickly taxied off the runway, but we all know that didn’t happen. The Metroliner crew trusted ATC to ensure separation would exist between itself and any arriving traffic. That didn’t happen either.

An accident like this should not have happened if the pilots of the Metroliner been trained to understand what ATC scenarios have the potential to put them in a compromising situation.

Active Listening

For the most part, we as pilots should be taught to listen carefully to what is going on around us in order to maintain the highest degree of situational awareness possible. Encased in that cocoon we call a cockpit, flight deck or just the pointed end of the flying machine, we sometimes forget to maintain an awareness of how other traffic is being handled by ATC and how we fit into the overall picture.

Today, air carrier as well as corporate flight departments devote a great deal of flight crew training that includes communication and decision making that are designed to improve situational awareness. An important part of that situational awareness is the interaction, or in the above mentioned case, a lack thereof between a pilot and an air traffic control specialist.

Piloting in the IFR environment is a challenging and rewarding activity-most of the time. But on occasion, when things go wrong, it can be a stressful, and perhaps traumatic situation for the controller-but it is always a life or death proposition for the aviator.

Bill Hill, a retired air traffic controller,and former Air Ambulance pilot,has flown for SkyWest Airlines, beenan examiner for Eclipse Jet and holdsATP MEL, COMM SEL, Glider, CFISMEL Instrument and glider privileges.

This article originally appeared in the December 2013 issue of IFR Refresher magazine.

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