AVmail

As you may or may not know, each personal check you write carries with it a risk of having someone gain access to your bank checking or saving account and transferring your funds with an e-check. Your check containing name, address and account number (read routing number) can be used by anyone coming in contact with that check to make purchases. Unlike credit card companies, banks, under Federal Reserve rules, bear no responsibility. Rather it is the responsibility of the merchant (or a thief posing as a merchant) to verify the authenticity of the purchase.

My wife and I are witnesses to this very thing as it happened to our son.

Moreover, your bank will not turn-off electronic access to your account. In fact, they will tell you that they cannot turn-off electronic access. Believe me we begged the president of our bank to do just that and that we didn't want nor had any need for electronic transfers. Their answer was maybe you could find a small, privately-owned bank that would do it for you.

You can easily verify what I'm telling you -- just call your bank, call the local Federal Reserve representative. Nigerians indeed!

I was half asleep looking at an ad in a magazine when it struck me why it is so easy to confuse the turn direction between the AI and the turn coordinator. The white airplane in the turn coordinator "banks" in the same direction as the bank of the aircraft. The white line that represents the horizon in the AI "banks" the other direction. (I know that the horizon actually stays level and the little orange wings of the simulated airplane "bank" the same direction as the turn coordinator.)

My question is this: Why are the human factors on this so bad? At least we could either make the horizon line a different color or make the turn coordinator airplane a different color.

Whomever the group is that feels that 2,000 feet is low enough for training should consider this.

A. Low level will be a part of military training until we are 100% stealth.

B. I am sure Canada and Mexico will lease us some lands and airspace at an exorbitant amount of money. This will only take more jobs out of the country.

Should the world be denied seeing and hearing Lee Harvey Oswald as Jack Ruby shot him? Can censorship of this dramatic footage be justified by saying that it's "cruel" or "insensitive" to force Oswald's next-of-kin listen to his moan, or see his pain-wracked face as he's shot?

Come on now!

On a great number of "cop" shows, or on "network specials," we hear telephone recordings of people who have called 911 during threatening situations. We hear pleas, screams and gunshots as some of these victims die. Are these disclosures also supposed to be censored because of a "sensitivity" issue? Hey, the real world is the real world - like it or not.

It's still implied by ALPA that NBC "broke a trust" when they broadcast portions of the CVR in the Cali crash. As published in AVmail, an ALPA spokesman has attempted to describe the composition of that "trust". I find nothing in the spokesman's description that ties NBC, or any other member of the media, to any trust - either tacit, or otherwise.

The ALPA spokesman also stated that I live in a league of my own. He would obviously be surprised to learn of the supporting comments that I've received after my letter appeared in AVmail. And, most of these comments have come from airline pilots, both active and retired. Among them is a former ALPA air safety representative, and even one who is currently serving as an ALPA elected MEC officer.

As a spokesperson for ALPA, it was proper for Captain McCarthy to outline ALPA's official position. However, it's absurd to think that such a spokesperson reflects the opinion of every airline pilot ALPA represents. No, I am NOT living in a league of my own. This is because ALPA remains a very democratic organization in which even minority opinion is given the light of day. Directing the argument against ME, rather than against the logic of my point-of-view, is not worthy of ALPA. I'm surprised to learn that an official ALPA spokesman has taken such a stance.

For the record, one of the favorable responses I received was from a former airline pilot and ALPA air safety representative, who currently has at least one family member flying as a second generation airline pilot. He's obviously not "insensitive" to the matter at hand. Also, I have a member of my family currently flying as a third generation airline pilot. Just as obviously, I am not insensitive to the "next-of-kin-in-the-cockpit" issue. Keeping that in mind, my opinion remains unchanged.

It seems the wet vacuum pump on Skylane N2469R is likely to go the better part of 10,000 hours before giving trouble. On the other hand, the dry vacuum pumps used on newer models seldom make it to 1,000 hours, and fail suddenly without warning.

The mechanics also mentioned that vacuum gyros usually give warnings they are in failing health.

I was trained as an engineer long before I was trained as a pilot.

The pilot's attitude is to be ready to deal with a gyro failure. The boffin in me reminds me of Dr. Jacoby's last flight.

I'm revising my startup sequence to: (1) watch gyros wake up, (2) check ammeter, and (3) check oil pressure.

It would help to know exactly what to look for. How about an article on recognizing gyro failures before they impact the safety of flight?

Mr. Jordan was correct in that NBC broke no law in using the CVR tape. Leaving aside the question of legal culpability, though, it was clear to me that Mr. Jordan's information about the pilots' issues that relate to the use of CVR tape is at least two decades out of date.

It is true that pilot concerns at first centered around fears that the tapes would be used by FAA or company officials for disciplinary actions. Quite frankly, at that time in American culture, the very idea that the screams of dying airline pilots might be broadcast by commercial radio or TV networks was simply out of the question, so it was not even raised as an issue then.

However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of CVR tapes found their way onto public airwaves. Airline pilots were so outraged at this grisly spectacle that they demanded -- and eventually got -- statutory limits placed on their use.

So when Mr. Jordan questions whether there was any "breech of trust" by the NBC broadcast, the answer is a resounding "yes." As soon as CVR tapes began to be exploited by broadcasters, pilots explicitly (and volubly) added this unwarranted invasion of privacy to their list of concerns. The ensuing moves to tighten NTSB regulations, and the subsequent statutory language that codified this into federal law, specifically increased the restrictions on the release of CVR tapes. In doing so, they enlarged the "trust" that pilots understood to be part of their quid pro quo acceptance of this otherwise invasive device.

Mr. Jordan correctly notes that the NTSB releases written transcripts of all relevant portions of an accident CVR tape. The Air Line Pilots Association strongly supports this practice; but Mr. Jordan then fails to move on to the next logical conclusion: If the written transcript provides sufficient information for the public to understand the evidence made available by this particular accident investigation tool -- and it certainly does -- then what value is added to the accident investigation process by allowing the entire human race to listen to the actual voices of doomed pilots?

The answer, of course, is that nothing is added, but much is lost in terms of human values. Perhaps Mr. Jordan would like to ask the widows and orphans of dead airline pilots the following question: How do you feel every time you hear broadcasts of your deceased husband or father as he screams out the agony of the last terrified moments of his life?

Some of Mr. Jordan's statements can charitably be attributed to not keeping up with the history of this issue. What I find particularly confounding, however, is that someone who holds an ATP rating -- which implies that he has flown as a commercial airline pilot -- would be so insensitive as to the privacy issues that are involved here.

In a quarter-century of commercial flying and doing ALPA safety work, I have yet to run into a working airline pilot who did not immediately raise his hackles and his blood pressure at the very thought of public access to CVR tapes. Mr. Jordan appears to be in a league of his own.

For the rest of us, the carefully crafted balance between the needs of accident investigation and privacy, as embodied in current federal law, are indeed a trust, one that we as pilots hold virtually sacred.

After flying with a friend for an hour in my newly-purchased 1958 Cessna 172, he complained of a dull headache. A couple of weeks later, on our way to Lakeland, Fla., for the annual airshow, we landed after three flight hours to refuel. We both had headaches. This was my first suspicion of CO in the cockpit.

I bought a new "spot" CO detector and installed it on the panel as instructed. We continued on towards Lakeland and after about an hour our headaches returned. (And yes, I am aware of the cumulative effect of CO poisoning.) The spot never changed color even when placed next to the heater exit vent. I decided to keep to low altitudes and not use the heater.

After returning to home base in Alabama, I went to Lowes and bought a $45 electronic CO detector. I installed the battery and laid it on the right seat, pulled the heater knob to full on, and took off. After only about 15 minutes, the detector started shrieking its alert. I opened the windows, closed the heater knob, and returned to base for landing. I removed the cowl and heater shroud and found the telltale signs of exhaust blow-by. As an A & P mechanic, I repaired the problem and went flying with my new cockpit friend again. This time, the electronic CO detector did not screech once, even after almost fours on a cross-country.

The 747-hosted ABL is not the Air Force's first airborne laser platform. In the early 1980's, the Air Force built and successfully tested a sub-megawatt device installed on a highly modified 707 (NKC-135A) known as the Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL). During testing, the ALL shot down cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles and ICBM-like surface-to-surface missiles.

The ALL program, led by Col. John Otten, was critical in developing and proving out much of the technology now in the ABL, although a different type of laser is being used there. In fact much of the old ALL crew, both military and contractor, is now involved in the ABL.

Mike Busch's articles on twins are tremendously useful, as is the depth and detail of many of the other articles and columns. For example, NO SOURCE I'VE EVER FOUND explains Manifold Pressure, Prop and Mixture control as well as John Deakin's Pelican's Perch columns. Even in the best print publications, space is too limited to treat such subjects in the required depth. Yet, the level of detail AVweb's coverage goes to is exactly what owner/operators are interested in. Similarly, Mike Busch's review of the Sandel EHSI is exactly what a potential buyer wants to read, to answer all the questions a typical product review would leave out.

I have a been a member of AVweb for well over 18 months now and I really appreciate the news. I am also the Managing Director of Avsure, the second largest aviation insurer in Australia. We insure about 3,000 small piston aircraft, and have felt the pinch mainly due to customers not requiring insurance while their aircraft cannot fly. Some of our small operators have shut their doors permanently. From the insurer's aspect, everything is a bit fuzzy at the moment.

CASA is trying their level best to pitch the blame and responsibility onto others. For example, last week they were demanding that engine manufacturers give the all-clear. Now they are demanding that insurers give the all clear. CASA is simply palming everyone off while not fully comprehending the situation and how to go about rectifying it. The professor given the task to analyze the contamination has only referred to descriptions of the contaminant as being "white goo" and "black gunk." (I love that technical talk.)

From our point of view, we will cover the aircraft when they are legal to fly -- but while CASA tries to get someone else to give the go-ahead, the whole process is stalled. We are fielding many calls from engineers (mechanics) requesting indemnity for any damage that may occur in flushing the fuel systems with water -- NO WAY!

Mobil is going to have to fix this whole thing at their expense and risk. As an owner/pilot myself, I urge USA pilots to boycott Mobil fuel to help us out here because, let's face it, we are a very small group in comparison to the USA flying fraternity and we could do with all the might and pressure you can help us put on them.

As armchair pilots go, I like to think of myself as proficient. As an AVflash reader (and AVweb crawler), I consider myself particularly well informed.

Yes friends you read it right! What do monkeys have to do with you? Well, in an article published in the Jan 24, 2000 edition of USA Today on page 8a (and on the internet at http://www.USAToday.com), Mr. Ron Mercer, Director of Helena Regional Airport (Montana), stated that "Hell, I can train a monkey to go out there and fight fire."

The article, "NTSB Again Eyes Airport Rescue Capabilities," was dealing Crash Fire Rescue services provided at airports. Mr. Mercer stated that he uses his "groundskeepers, mechanics and custodians" to provide these essential emergency services to the aviation community. According to the article, the Helena Regional Airport handles three daily arrivals and departures of Boeing 737 aircraft. And I am sure many more "commuter" class aircraft. The people from HLN are trained by Mr. Jay Golladay at the Rocky Mountain Emergency Services Training Center. He states that the thought of a janitor fighting a fire aboard a 737 is "very scary."

My question to you: Do you want a "monkey" to come your rescue in times of need? As a 12-year career firefighter and one with over seven years experience as an Aviation Rescue Firefighter, I know the dangers experienced by the aircraft passengers and rescuers. Not only must the fire and rescue services arrive very quickly at airplane crashes, but they must also be well-trained. As a pilot, I am appalled that this person represents anyone within the aviation community. He has done a disservice to all pilots and aircraft owners with this statement!

Just to enlighten some of you that may have questions about "Aviation Firefighter" certification: In order to become Nationally Certified as an "Aviation Rescue Firefighter" one must first attend and pass approximately 250 hours of basic Fire and Emergency Medical training and then complete an additional 40 hours of "Basic" aviation fire training. And that is just "BASIC" ... I am sure you are like me and want someone with advanced training to come to your rescue!

I would urge each of you to take your aviation business away from The Helena Regional Airport. Further, please voice your displeasure with Mr. Mercer's statements by sending email to him at rmercer@icitco.net or call is office at 406-442-2821. For those that would like to send a fax, the number is 406-449-2340

I have never met a firefighter that would not help a person in need. Further, Aviation Firefighters are prepared to give up their life so that one of us in our time of need can survive. We should certainly show them considerably more respect than what Mr. Mercer thinks.

Again, please voice your displeasure with him and let your local fire service know about this article so that they to address this erroneous statement!

As you probably know, some of the contaminated fuel was shipped here to New Zealand, so theoretically, we should have exactly the same situation here as in Australia, grounded aircraft, etc. But it seems that the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority hasn't taken such a drastic view of the situation. The AD in N.Z. calls for the following if there are black deposits found:

It would seem that there is quite a difference between the two authorities as to what to do about this problem.

With an older aircraft the owner must play an active part in the maintenance going far beyond simply finding a competent mechanic. I have "fixed" problems introduced over the years which includes stall warnings, prop governor conversions, magnetos, control rigging, connecting rods, hydraulic lifters... to name a few. Fortunately I have the manuals which cover the airframe and engine and prints for the STCs.

What I do is familiarize myself with the task so that a dialogue will occur with the provider or do it myself and have it signed off. You cannot take the aircraft to someone and say "fix it."

In other words, was it correct to say that NBC is off the legal hook only because of the location of the incident?

While I take no position as to whether or not the news people used good judgment (theirs is a much harder job than mine) I do hate to see it implied that they escaped a legal problem on a technicality when it might be possible that the law was not written with the entire set of possible scenarios contemplated.

This would seem to be a problem with the law, not with NBC.

You state that there is a federal law that prohibits the NTSB from releasing CVR tapes. Tell me, how can NBC be guilty of infraction of a law that applies to the NTSB? If the NTSB released the tapes, then you would have a gripe against the NTSB. However, you don't have a gripe against NBC because they aren't obligated to follow laws that apply to the NTSB, anymore than you or I would be required to follow such laws.

You imply that NBC was somehow guilty of an infraction of the law. Sorry, guys, but you're way off base this time. NBC is under no such constraints.

The "breech of trust" that Captain Duane Woerth has lamented is nonexistent. Those of us who were flying the line back when CVRs were first installed in cockpits were afraid they would be used as eavesdropping enforcement tools. We could foresee company snoops and FAA personnel reviewing selected CVR tapes, just looking for infractions that could be used against pilots. Certain pilots could be selected for "special monitoring" in hopes of finding some infraction for which the pilot might be fined or terminated. Likely targets, of course, would be representatives of the pilot's union, or anyone else that they powers-that-be felt like putting under the microscope.

The same fears existed with the introduction of the FDR, by the way.

To alleviate suspicions and pilot reluctance, the FAA and the airlines agreed that these devices would be used ONLY for investigative purposed after a crash or serious incident. The "trust" that exists, then, is that these devices will NOT be used as monitoring tools to "trap" pilots. They will be used, instead, as investigative tools for the advancement of safety.

In the case at hand, there was no "breech of trust" as claimed by Captain Woerth. The tapes were not used to intimidate, fine or fire any pilot. The tapes, in fact, have been transcribed, in full, in the official NTSB transcript and accident report regarding this crash. Nothing that was aired by NBC was different than that which was written in the official accident report - available to anyone who wants to peruse it, by the way.

The contention that the "lay people" should be shielded from exposure to such information, and that it should be available only to "savvy professionals" is absurd!

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to be able to interpret what is happening in the cockpit when the flight crew says, "Where are we? What's going on here? Hey, we're all f----d up!" Or to interpret the reply, "How did we manage to get so f----d up?"

At that point, it would seem quite apparent to laymen and savvy professionals alike that both of the pilots realized that they had "f----d up!" And, it doesn't matter if these statements are read, or are heard. The inference remains the same, in either case.

Why they kept diving out of the sky after realizing that they were "f----d up" is what causes laymen and savvy professionals, alike, to shake their heads.

And, true to form, the infamous "Oh s--t!" appears on the CVR just after they get the terrain warning, and realize that they're about to crunch into the mountains. It's amazing how often this final exclamation appears on CVR tapes retracted from airline wreckage.

What Captain Woerth should be upset about is the absurd contention that it was a "language difficulty" that contributed to the errors made in that cockpit that night. This was the whole thrust of the Dateline program. In the case of the American 965 crash, there was NOTHING in the way of "language problems" that caused the flight crew to get "f----d up." They were speaking perfect English to each other in that cockpit. And, the error that killed everybody was made solely in the cockpit of that airplane - nowhere else!

To put an actual voice to the words that appear in an official public document (the NTSB Accident Report) hardly seems to be a "breech of trust" as expressed by Captain Woerth. Somebody's got their head screwed on backwards, and it's not NBC.

What the hell does the "I" satand for??? The Service you were referring to in your article is the Royal Australian Air Force (abbreviated to "RAAF").

My reaction to the Cessna Exhaust AD is similar to my reaction to most ADs: bewilderment. The process always seems choreographed. First, the FAA comes out with some blanket proposal, which will almost certainly be unreasonable on its face. If there is a bad part (e.g., the Cessna fuel strainer AD), it is often easy to determine that no mods have been made to that part, etc. How that determination is made tends to be a focus. If a mod applies to Cessnas, it is relatively pointless to have owners exhaustively determine their airplane is a Maule.

Since most of the FAA proposals begin in a place that shares no border with common sense, it must be expensive to hire and maintain the bureaucrats who generate these ideas. Perhaps they are specially bred, matching people with minimal common sense until the trait disappears entirely. Or maybe the proposals are computer generated.

Next, user organizations such as AOPA or CPA or whoever get involved. They say the original proposal is too broad. And, yawn, ultimately some compromise is reached. If this is the way the process works, fine. It keeps the FAA guys in their job. It makes some people pay their dues to the user organizations. Whatever is left on the table, the aircraft manufacturer can simply issue as a Service Bulletin. Their lawyers have to eat.

Most of the time when I read AVweb's accounts of this process, I wish I had one of those ReliefBand bracelets that prevent nausea. Let's see: I pay taxes to keep the FAA going. I belong to EAA and AOPA, and used to belong to CPA. So it's like being suspended over a pit and dropping dollars down to see people do their routine. It's a lot like pro wrestling. Taken in this light, I guess it really is just entertainment, or "regulo-tainment." Alas, it's not nearly as well choreographed as the WWF. With a little attention to detail, maybe you guys could get a bitchin' cable/satellite pay-per-view package.

I used to look forward to getting AVweb. Like so many things on the 'Net, the promise for change was quickly usurped by the revenue needs. Or just pure greed. Or maybe the premise that the 'Net would be different was always hype, anyway. The pages load more quickly in a flying magazine. The pictures are prettier. Do I really need to hear about the latest AD proposal in minutes, come to think of it?

Somehow, in their infinite wisdom, the "experts" wrote that one off as another example of "pilot error." I was a Boeing 727 captain at the time, and knew the captain of the 737 flight, Wendell Whitehouse, very well. "Whitey," as he was known to his many friends and cohorts, had served many times previously as my copilot. Based on his performance on those many flights with me, I would "bet the farm" that pilot error was not involved. Whitey Whitehouse was far too good a pilot for that.

I would think the least the "experts" could do now, in an effort to find the real truth about these mysteries, would be to take another serious look at the record and the evidence from Whitey's crash at Midway. Maybe it wasn't "pilot error" after all!

I have no objection to being publicly identified as a retired airline pilot who knew Whitey personally, but would appreciate my name being withheld.

While I was General Counsel to a Canadian charter airline in the 1980's, I received a communication from the FAA asking me to identify the captain of one of our DC-8-63 aircraft. The aircraft had flown over an area of West Virginia at approximately 8:30 a.m. one bright and sunny morning. It appears that while a couple had been eating breakfast a large piece of the frozen blue stuff had crashed through their ceiling onto their bed. Our aircraft had been identified on radar as the only aircraft over the area for the last 20 minutes.

The cause of the problem was a malfunctioning heater on the outlet pipe. Usually excess liquid is vented into the stratosphere to fall as rain when the weather demands it. With a malfunctioning heater a large block of blue ice accumulates and falls as the largest hail ever recorded.

I heard that tape on the NBC News and I was shocked. I am also sure I never heard a disclaimer or anything said about how they came to get that tape. That aircraft was being flown in accordance with all of the Federal Aviation Regulations that were in force for its operation. To add to this, the airline and crew were obligated to operate in accordance with Colombian law also -- AND because both countries are signatories of the ICAO, that legal document also comes into play.

In light of the above, all of the legal requirements were in place at the time of that accident. There are no ifs, ands or buts about it. Whoever authorized the use of that tape -- and who ever "sold" that tape -- breached Federal and ICAO legal codes. This was no different than the persons who took seat material from the TWA800 accident site and had it analyzed to support their theories.

I have a habit of interjecting my experiences into these problems. I am still a firm believer in "history," and what is experience? In the spring of 1984, I was the Director of Quality Assurance for a large corporation, that operated FAA repair stations in many parts of the world.

Just at quitting time one day a messenger arrived at the plant with a CVR. It was from a new start-up airline out of Newark, N.J., and it was off a B727. My secretary and I stayed and listened to the CVR. She took it all down in shorthand then typed it up. The customer had wanted that information, as it was critical to them.

The tape had three voices on it. Two were in the cockpit when the third arrived. The conversation went something like this: "Did you do a walk-around?" "Yes, about 18 feet of trailing-edge flap is missing on the left wing." "Shit, that's why the fuzz is involved and why the airport police stopped us from taxing out." "I spoke to Newark, they do not want us speaking to anyone." We sent the CVR and transcript back to the company.

In the late summer, of that same year, the FAA offered me a job at the Teterboro office. I took it for the pension and the ability to add my military time to it. Six months went by, and a Congressional inquiry was dropped in my lap (on my desk). I had forgotten about that CVR transcript. I was involved with that airline now from a legal point of view.

I read through this stack of paperwork, and was I shocked. This flap problem involved the same airline. The aircraft had picked up passengers in Baltimore and continued to Newark. A young mother and baby going to Syracuse, N.Y., had complained to her Congressman. "On takeoff, the aircraft vibrated and the overhead bins opened. After a while, it settled down and there was no more vibration. I told the Flight Attendant and was told it was normal. When we were arriving at Newark, the shaking started again. Again, I complained and was told the same thing."

Each time the aircraft took off or started its landing approach, it vibrated. To compound the problem, it was getting progressively worse, as indicated by the other passenger letters to various Congressmen and Senators. I had to go to my supervisor and remove myself from this investigation. By the time I read all of the letters; I had connected the CVR tape that spring, the crew and the airline, to the investigation.

Not only did I know the airline and crew, I knew the aircraft number, flight number, times, dates, and I had pictures from the airport police in Syracuse, etc. I had the whole schmear. AND I was also a witness to the tape transcription. As the aircraft departed Baltimore the trailing-edge flap started to disintegrate. Every passenger complaint went to the cockpit and the passengers were told, "that is normal."

When the aircraft was started in Syracuse and backed out; the airport police had already been notified. A piece of airplane had been found on someone's roof. The owner had heard a bang and the house shook. The airplane part found on the roof was very long and narrow. The tower called all aircraft, no one knew anything. Yet someone had 18 feet of flap missing by this time. It was the airport police that found the flap segment missing on that aircraft.

My final comment is simple: Doc is lucky to be alive and the lawsuit is without merit.

I also have photos of the seconds just after impact and I expect to provide them if this really goes to trial. This is a pathetic result to an incompetent pilot smashing into another simply parked where he was supposed to be. I guess we have degenerated into a litigious society just trying to point fingers even when we are at fault. Totally pathetic.

My response is that it is a fact of life. Human consciousness/awareness seems to flow over time as waves on the ocean. The nature of this wave is failing to understand that we are responsible for our own experiences. It looks like a huge wave to me, and I see it lasting for generations to come. Somehow, consciousness has become corrupted and the victim intellect is prevailing. It is a powerless way to go through life and tragic in its all pervasiveness. Those of us who are not part of the wave have a huge responsibility to all the rest to keep this world aligned as best possible until the wave dissipates.

I would like to know why the White House does not acknowledge and build on the 25-year-old program called The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). It's already in place and working and has been supported by many Administrations. Why do we need ASAP when we have ASRS?

Shortly after receiving the unit, I felt compelled to test it. Holding it in the general vicinity of the combustion products of an ordinary candle or the gas range in my kitchen produced no noticeable indication. Next I tried exposing it intermittently to the exhaust gas from the tailpipe of one of my cars. That produced results pretty quickly. Within two minutes or so, the LCD readout was showing a CO concentration of 999 PPM. To my surprise, however, it was another 5 - 6 minutes before the horn on the unit sounded. Once the horn sounded, my repeated attempts to silence it by pressing the button on the unit were unsuccessful. Ten minutes or so after being moved back to fresh air, and after the LCD readout had dropped to something less than 100 PPM, the horn stopped on its own.

While I like the radio for position reporting, I particularly like it to ask the other pilot in the pattern as to where they are REALLY at versus where they reported to be at, so I know how big a 360 to do to stay out of their way or off their tail. Who's teaching 3 and 4 mile finals anyway?

While I don't find it necessary to report every change in position, it's sure nice to know that there is other traffic at the airport. 'Course, if you want to have the airport all to yourself for a while just announce your intentions with a strong foreign accent, (foreign to Texas). We've found that Asian (any Asian -- East, West or in the middle) works the best [no 'dis intended]. Most of our area pilots (DFW) will find something else to do for a few minutes while that pilot gets on the ground. It's basically our way of saying welcome and of "holding the door" so they can get through to a landing.

Me? I hear just fine and use the radio with some common sense. More importantly, I use it when I screw up, or when the guy in front of me screws up, to let those behind me know what corrective action is being taken.

Mandatory use? No, just stick to procedures, pay attention, use the windows and leave the testosterone at home. We get it both ways at Grand Prairie, Texas [KGPM]. (Daytime-only tower.)

The following letter-to-the-editor was published in The Arizona Republic on 14 Jan 2000. I thought it might be of interest to AVweb readers.

Prez. Clinton touts a "new" program. As Col. Potter, the old philosopher from M*A*S*H used to say... Buffalo Chips! Are memories so short as to forget the near mid air collision reporting system sponsored by the Flight Safety Foundation, "Project Scan", about 40 years ago?. How about the incident reporting systems in the Military that I used to teach at the USC safety school in the mid 60's. Don't the current powers that be realize the success of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)? Even the FAA's Project GAIN, its shortcomings notwithstanding, has recognized the value of non punitive forms of safety info exchange identified in all these and other similar programs.

I offer these words as confirmation of a paper I gave at the August 1999 Canadian Aviation Safety Seminar. Its title was "The Most Significant Human Error in the Aviation System". I identified that error as "the continuing failure by persons in that system to apply, effectively and efficiently, the lessons of past mishaps in order to prevent future accidents". Numerous examples were included.

We learned decades ago the benefits of what now is being proposed. We've also seen the FAA, airline and other managements literally fight implementation of comparable suggestions in the past. Could it be that the various safety commissions are staffed primarily by newcomers to aviation, especially politicians, and/or the FAA is primarily run by its Office of General Counsel?

After having dreamed about the day of my first solo for many months, I passed on the opportunity yesterday. Most miserable, defeated feeling since I first fell in love with aviation while managing a small FBO. Took me much longer than most folks, since I had to overcome the handicap of being raised in a family of confirmed aero-phobes. Felt so good yesterday, first few landings were met with compliments from the instructor, then lost my concentration with a slight crosswind and flared too high, and the instructor grabbed the controls for the first time in many weeks. My hopes for solo plummeted, so when my CFI looked over after the next landing and said, "Do you want to take it around by yourself?" I was stunned. Sadly, I declined, and spent the entire drive home filled with self-doubt, wondering if I would ever have the confidence required to pilot an airplane.

Calling one of my aviation buddies for consolation (my family was rather pleased that I didn't solo), instead got an "earful" of stern advice, either decide you are going to do this, or quit wasting your time and money. And trust your instructor's judgment, not every landing has to be perfect.

I believe that some clarifications are necessary in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding concerning the program itself and its implementation.

The new regulations and standards that create the "owner maintenance" program, including a new flight authority, the Special Certificate of Airworthiness - Owner Maintenance, will be formally promulgated by means of the Canada Gazette process, a regulation making process very similar to that of the U.S. Federal Register process. The new regulations and standards are at least one year away from promulgation.

After taking into account public interest, and in order to expedite the implementation of the program, Transport Canada has taken upon itself to prepare a ministerial exemption to the present regulations. This exemption will provide for the issue of a Flight Permit - Specific Purpose - Owner Maintenance; the flight permit will be issued for a period of 12 months, and it can be renewed by the owner of the aircraft at the end of that period of time.

Transport Canada is presently putting the final touches to the exemption. Barring unforeseen problems, the exemption should be signed before the end of January 2000.

Sincerely,

First, let me say that I worked with Tom in much of the process where the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) participated in the development of constant angle NPAs (CANPAs) for properly equipped aircraft, and constant rate NPAs for "classic" aircraft where adequate DME is not available.

As Tom knows, I had (and have) serious reservations about trying to make a non-precision approach a "precision look-alike" unless three serious conditions are in place: 1. a precision ILS glideslope could be located along the final approach segment in question, in accordance with ICAO ILS vertical obstacle clearance standards, 2. The visibility required before credit for approach lights is geometrically valid, as it is for real ILS approaches, and 3. Existing non-precision approaches over terrain that won't permit the conservative obstacle clearance afforded in ILS criteria be cancelled. The "have your cake and eat it, too" crowd doesn't seem ready to buy into these essential safety limitations.

I believe the British have seen good results over the years with their CANPA efforts because most of their NPAs are over terrain or obstacle that would support the installation of an ILS, if the money were available. In those circumstances, I believe CANPA is vastly superior to dive-and-drive, with its resultant three-mile final flown at MDA.

A bit more on the issue of required visibility minimums: most of the time we don't realize it, but the visibility minimums on an ILS, before credit for approach lights, must equal the geometry of the distance along a 3-degree slope from the DH/A to the runway threshold. With a 200-foot DH/A on a 3-degree slope, this slant range distance is 3,817 feet. Without approach lights (ILS) this results in a standard ILS minimum of 3/4 of a statute mile. With approach lights, it becomes 1/2 mile. But, let's say the DH/A is higher-than-standard, like KCRW Runway 5 (494 feet, height above touchdown [HAT]). The ILS visibility minimum for all approach categories is 1 3/4 miles, but the LOC minimums vary by approach category, from only 1 mile for Category A and B to 1 3/4 miles for Category D.

The 1 3/4 miles represents the slant-range distance from the DH/A to the threshold. But, the non-precision minimums are based on the 3-degree slope only for Approach Category D. The other categories are permitted higher slopes, based on presumed increased maneuverability as the approach category bumps down. This is fine, perhaps, except where swept-wing jets fall into these lower categories. These non-precision minimums used to be more permissive, until ALPA made an assault on them in the mid-1970s. Unfortunately, the minimums are now being reviewed by both the FAA and the Europeans in an effort to "harmonize" international procedures ("harmonize," as in to make more permissive).

The real heartburn for me comes in these permissive non-precision visibility minimums migrating to the CANPA or "precision look-alike" world. That will NOT be a step towards reducing controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).

Now, on to some specific comments made by both John and Tom:

1. The "7 to 1" final segment slope referred to by both authors does not occur in all non-precision final approach segments. It is a design option provided to the procedures specialist and, when applied, the obstacle is supposed to be charted (I say "suppose" because the FAA dropped the ball on this requirement for several years in their all-too-often inward-looking style). If the 7-to-1 is applied, the obstacle must be located within one mile of the fix, and the slope must be applied to the earliest point the fix could be received, assuming maximum adverse system errors. In the case of DME, this normally would be 1/2 mile, yet most DME sets are much more accurate than that close in to the station.

2. John asserts that an electronic glideslope provides only 200 feet of vertical obstacle clearance based, I presume, on the standard DH/A of 200 feet, HAT. That is not correct; the typical ILS glideslope has 600-800 feet of vertical obstacle clearance at the FAF, decreasing to about 140 feet at a 200-foot DH. It becomes less than the typical non-precision obstacle clearance of 250 feet at about 1.4 miles from the runway. Also, although the DH/A is based on a barometric altimeter, the obstacle clearance at the true DH/A point is not. It should be obvious that the combination of an electronic glideslope and tapering obstacle clearance, that is greater in most of the final segment than that for a non-precision IAP, makes an ILS approach much safer from an obstacle clearance standpoint alone.

3. Tom states that an ILS glideslope assures obstacle clearance inside the DH/A point to the runway. This is partially correct, in that any ILS with 1/2 mile visibility is clear of obstacles along a 34:1 (sometimes 50:1 with new ICAO criteria) slope from DH/A to the runway. But, if the required visibility is 1 mile, all bets are off on that one. Further, you cannot depend on Category I ILS glideslopes to reliable below 200 feet; many are, some aren't, and the feds aren't talking. It is proposed that any CANPA IAP with the DH/A concept authorized, will be 34:1 clear from the true DH/A point to the runway, regardless of required visibility; stay tuned on that one.

4. John states that the 1930s approaches were designed to fly level at minimum ROC. That is true, but those pioneers were dabbling into the unknown and with limited insights and experience. I don't know what the non-precision final approach segment ROC was then (perhaps no one really knew!), but by the 1950s, and prior to TERPs, it was not less than 300 feet, and often 400 feet.

Like I've said in many of my articles, I'm an ILS sort of guy. If you fly your first approach into an unfamiliar airport on anything other than a 200-1/2 ILS, you are compromising your safety. I don't mean your personal minimums should necessarily be that low, but the ILS minimums should.

I read Michael Maya Charles' "Rogue Pilot" column, and it seems like there's no way to stop someone like Nate. I was wondering if there would be some way to find out who insurers the aircraft. I'm sure they would be interested in obviously unsafe operations. Perhaps Nate would operate safer if repair costs weren't covered by insurance.

There are several downsides, though: Nate may be rich enough that it doesn't matter. Telling insurance companies could turn into an abused snitch method to harass others. If Nate has no insurance, some innocent injured party would have no recourse for claims.

I believe the quote you were trying to recall was written by Sun Tzu over 2,500 years ago in "The Art of War":

I can't help but wonder why Mike Busch chose to focus on the "hardware" aspects of Robert Bernstein's letter [AVmail 14 Jan 2000], which I see as fairly cut-and-dried. I find the "software" questions he raised to be far more pressing, to wit, "if someone with his experience and ability can't survive a gyro failure in the soup, what hope is there for someone like me?" and "will we REALLY be able to fly the approach in a true emergency situation?".

Such a government-sponsored program -- NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) -- has been operating successfully for more than twenty years. It is funded by FAA and is described in the FARs. Approximately 3,000 reports are received by ASRS each month from airline and general aviation pilots, air traffic controllers, and others in the aviation community. The project is directed by an advisory committee representing all segments of the industry, and is enthusiastically supported by most airlines. Many pilots routinely carry ASRS reporting forms in their flight bags, and the forms are available in their operations offices.

As a member of the small group of retired pilots and controllers recruited by NASA in 1978 to develop and operate the Aviation Safety Reporting System, I originated (and edited until my retirement) the monthly bulletin "CALLBACK"  and wrote the book, "CALLBACK: NASA's Aviation Reporting System" published in 1990 by the Smithsonian Press, The book gives the history of the project and discusses the various types of incidents reported and the lessons learned, and contains a forward by the late Donald Engen.

We checked another dictionary and found a similar definition, with no secondary definition for the words' aviation use. So this prompts my question what is a canard anyway, and where did it get its name?

Ron, the dictionary that we use at AVweb -- Webster's New World College Dictionary -- defines canard in the aviation sense as its second definition, as follows:

So you are not confused, you are right on the money. FYI, I've been told that the term derives from the fact that "canard" is the French word for "duck" (which is confirmed in the dictionary), and the silhouette of a canard aircraft is similar to a duck in flight -- because the duck has its wings toward the rear, and a long neck stretching out in front. Makes sense to me!

Are we all kidding ourselves with the partial panel practice we get in training? I'm quite familiar with the fact that gyros don't fail suddenly like they do when the examiner slaps the no-peeks on them and that failure is a gradual process, but is it a guarantee that in a real life situation even with proper training we won't be able to pick up the discrepancy and sort out the problem until the aircraft is in an unrecoverable attitude? Or, if the problem is picked up in time, will we REALLY be able to fly the approach in a true emergency situation? My friend is convinced that the answer is a resounding "no" to both. I look back both to my partial panel work during my instrument training and now, and I never thought that flying partial panel was such a big deal. My friend points out that it is precisely that attitude that gets pilots like me and others with a lot more hours into trouble when the real thing happens. His point is that no amount of partial panel work can prevent a crash if the pump or the gyro takes a hike at the wrong time.

How right is he?

I remembered having read an article Mike Busch wrote for IFR and AVweb about five years ago ("The Gyro with an Attitude") in which you addressed this topic, and I just reread it. Your first line indicates that the accident database and university research seem to agree that the probability is that a gyro failure in instrument conditions will result in a crash, but what are the actual numbers? Right now, my Bonanza has neither an electric AI or a standby vacuum. I had been considering the purchase of a standby vacuum, but wouldn't it make more sense to install a small electric AI instead? Since my F33A uses a pressure rather than a vacuum system, I wouldn't be able to install the cheaper standby vac that runs off manifold pressure anyway. So, I don't think that there would be a huge difference in cost between the second vacuum and the second AI even if I went with the more expensive 2-1/4" instrument.

I know that Hal Shever's petition was nixed by the FAA, but I haven't seen much written on this topic since your article unless I've just missed them. Especially in light of the tragic Jacoby crash, I think a revisiting of this issue would be extremely worthwhile.

I wrote the attached counterpoint to John Deakin's recent Pelican's Perch columns concerning Constant-Angle Non-Precision Approaches (CANPA). I believe the flying public needs to consider additional information on these subjects to conduct the safest operations possible.

First, a word about my qualifications. I was an Air Force and Air Force Reserve transport pilot and instructor pilot for thirteen years. I recently took a "buy-out" from my Part 121 airline, having completed 27 years including 14 years as a BAC-111 and 737-200/300/400 captain. I spent 15 years as an ALPA Safety Rep and Accident Investigator. During this time I took part in seven major NTSB accidents as an investigator and provided written comments to the NTSB on six other major accidents. I also chaired the ALPA Charting and Instrument Procedures Committee for over 7 years and participated on both the Flight Safety Foundation CFIT and ALAR efforts.

Now, here's my counterpoint. (Note: This article has been checked for TERPS accuracy by Capt. Wally Roberts, the noted expert on TERPS issues.)

While the author has raised a number of points worthy of discussion, I am troubled that he has not had the opportunity to consider the factors that has lead to a changing industry view on flying non precision approach procedures. Flying perfectly good aircraft into the ground (CFIT-Controlled Flight Into Terrain) continues year after year to cause nearly fifty per cent of air carrier crashes worldwide. Flight Safety Foundation statistics clearly show that since the mid 1970s the accident rate per million departures has remained nearly the same. With the increase in departures as the industry grows (and without improvement in the rate) the industry can expect to have one hull loss per week by the year 2010-2015. The vast majority of CFIT accidents happen while flying NPAs (non-precision approaches).

With these facts, two industry groups were formed under the banner of the Flight Safety Foundation to look at ways to stem this unacceptable tide. The first group was the CFIT Group and the second group was the ALAR (Approach and Landing Accident Reduction Group). Both groups were staffed by a highly talented and motivated cross section of individuals representing airlines, regulators, manufacturers, line pilots and research institutions. The Constant Angle Non Precision Approach (CANPA) was one of several improvements suggested by both groups to reverse this needless loss of lives and aircraft.

A number of positions in author Deakin’s articles on CANPA require comment and clarification .

First, NPAs were never specifically designed to always fly at minimum required obstacle clearance altitudes (250 ft above the controlling obstacle inside the FAF). In Europe they are not flown this way. In the US it became common to use the D/D (Dive and Drive method) in the 1950’s when some higher performance military jets had trouble breaking out and lining up on certain runways. The FAA is absolutely neutral on the method of flying these approaches. No one is holding a gun to any one’s head requiring them to use CANPA. However, there are many pilots who desire an improved method of executing NPAs because they recognize NPAs have a much lower level of safety than do precision approaches.

Second, author Deakin states that the use of CANPA will cause more missed approaches . Capt. Paul Woodburn and Capt. David Flemming of British Airways have data including FUQA (digital flight data recording) data to show that their pilots have had greater success using CANPA with fewer missed approaches. In fact both BA and KLM have used their own versions of CANPA for over twenty years.

Third, author Deakin indicates that it is perfectly acceptable under TERPS to cross the FAF and instantly descend to MDA. This is not true. Under Paragraph 289 of TERPS it is necessary to travel seven feet forward for every foot of descent in this segment prior to reaching MDA in order to insure required obstacle clearance. Admittedly, however, in the real world it would take an amazing descent maneuver to threaten one’s self under this provision.

I believe the author has missed a major opportunity to inform his readership of the really serious flaws of the NPA and why the NPA is so dangerous no matter what method is used to execute it. The "Boogey Man" is the NPA itself as the element that needs to be corrected. Hard data from the Netherlands Research Labs shows that NPAs are five times more likely to result in an accident world wide than precision approaches and eight times more likely in the US. Consider that American Airlines believes that their average pilot flies but one non precision approach per year. This statistic is most significant since it indicates that most airline pilots do not fly an adequate number of NPAs per year to retain their proficiency. One has only to look at the number of CFITs on NPAs to bear this out (Bradley, Cali, Dubrovnic, Halifax etc).

One of the most serious flaws of the NPA is the low visibility it is allowed to be used in. The NPA may work well for conditions of reasonable ceilings and visibilities (600 and 2 on a well designed approach). However it becomes a very poor approach at 300 and ½ and an even worse approach at 300 and RVR 2400. This is due to the inherent limitations of not having a glideslope and inadequate vertical visual references during periods of limited visibilities. A three degree descent path to touchdown is considered ideal to match the performance limitations and flight deck visual cutoff angles of modern high performance aircraft. This three degree glideslope requires 318 ft per mile of descent to stay on the ideal three degree slope. This three degree slope will require approximately one mile of visibility for every 318 ft that the ceiling is above the airfield thus if the ceiling was 300 ft AGL you would need about one mile of visibility in order to see the airfield at MDA. (Yes, I know that the FAA only requires minimum visibilities to be legal to fly the approach) What I am talking about is the practical necessity of being able to see the field when you get to minimums no matter what method you use.

While I believe that author Deakin has provided a service by showing the horizontal limitations of the NPA and angled final approach segments (and the resulting dangers), he missed providing knowledge to pilots that they are only guaranteed 250 ft of obstacle clearance vertically from the FAF to the MAP. Remember, this is the altitude the author would have us fly above the obstacles all the way from the FAF to the MAP. This is scary enough on a clear, calm sunny day-it is less than comfortable at night, in limited visibilities and in wind and turbulence. Pilots also need to understand that once they have started their descent from the minimum required obstacle clearance altitude they must visually acquire the obstacles in the visual segment which may penetrate a normal three degree glideslope. This is one of the advantages of the ILS where the precision glideslope is obstacle protected in the visual segment.

An additional danger of NPAs is the location on the NPA where aircraft crash. According to extensive data which was collected and provided by Don Bateman of Allied Signal (now Honeywell) it is one to three miles short of the airport, on centerline and on a near three degree descent path. Why does this happen? It may well have to do with the difficulties pilots have with depth perception in limited visibility as well as possibly being caused by very high work loads.

Another issue which has to be raised about the safety of the NPA relates to the lack of a stabilized approach. The whole world believes in the stabilized approach for high performance aircraft. This is the Holy Grail and for very good reason. However, according to the "old school," the one exception to the need for stabilized approaches is while flying the NPA. In this case, the stabilized approach concept goes out the window and pilots are encouraged to drive along level at 250 ft above the rocks. It is no secret to anyone that this maneuver requires very high power levels as well as nose up deck angles to maintain level flight. When high performance aircraft are in the approach configuration they typically fly 2-2.5 miles per minute. Thus when the airport is at minimum visibilities (as low as 1/2 of a mile), the typical pilot will have only 15-20 seconds to pick up the field, transition to a stabilized approach and to reach the touchdown point. It seems that from a very nose high attitude with high power settings, achieving a stabilized approach appears like a rather Herculean Task. It is also very difficult to judge just when to begin this descent when in limited visibilities with different deck angles than pilots are used to.

The limitations of the human eye to adequately perceive depth under minimum visibilities is another very serious limitation of nonprecision approaches. There are numerous accidents to prove that not only must pilots be able to see the runway environment they must also be able to judge their height in the absence of a glide slope or adequate vertical visual guidance. I believe The Delta Airlines MD-80 accident at LGA to be an excellent example of this phenomenon. This approach had an offset LOC, a glideslope which was unusable below DA/DH (which was higher than standard) and vertical visual guidance which was further down the runway than could be seen under the required 3/4 mile visibility. The pilots ended up with legal minimums on an approach which netted them neither a glideslope nor vertical visual guidance at night with rain on the windshield and lots of wind and turbulence. It is no wonder they sheared the gear off on the edge of the approach apron. The NTSB conveniently disregarded the above information and blamed the accident on problems with the Captain’s contact lenses.

Pilots must also understand the limitations of the NPA as opposed to the precision approach. Most pilots do not understand the reason why they are flying a NPA is that the airport or the runway environment may not qualify for a precision approach under TERPS because of terrain or obstacles. Providing a CANPA with a nearly straight in approach and DME distances to this situation may well be providing a higher standard than is currently available but still no where as high of a standard as a precision approach.

I must also take the author to task for his continued references to "real pilots" and their abilities to "push the envelope to get in" where "wimps" ended up going to the alternate. In my 27 year part 121 career, I never felt that the objective was to provide a visible display of the flight crew’s high levels of testosterone. I always felt it was my job to get the folks to their destination safely even if it took a little longer. In my opinion, it is much better to get the folks there a bit late than never at all. Yes, airplanes do crash. How many of these accidents were caused by "can do" crews who never thought that they would ever be involved in an accident.

I would also like to protest author Deakin's use oft Capt. Jeppesen and at the shot at the current management of Jepp for providing CANPA information to its subscribers. The reason Capt. Jeppesen started providing his airport information products was because he was an innovator who felt that pilots needed the information that he provided and they needed to have better ways of flying their aircraft in adverse weather conditions. While Capt. Jeppesen was never substantially involved in the formulation of TERPS criteria (which provides for vertical and lateral obstacle clearance), I can not imagine him liking to have options denied to him and vertical airspace taken from him if he felt that it added to the safety of his operation.

As for Jepp providing the data for constant angle NPA, they have long done this for the glass airplanes at the requests of their customers. Again, it was the customers of Jepp who requested the CANPA information be placed on the plates. If you do not like the information you are in no way obligated to use it-What if Jepp had refused to publish any plates other than low frequency range approaches-think they would still be around?

The Jepp briefing bulletin is an added service which most pilots value to explain the many changes to our IFR world and certainly one of the better sources for procedural information in the total absence of any definitive guidance from the FAA. (I believe the FAA Instrument Flying Handbook was last rewritten around 1972-certainly no changes since then!)

Just who should the author be taking to task? Should it be the FAA and the airlines for continuing to accept some very deficient approaches which could be greatly improved by being replaced or redesigned to fly straight in stabilized descents? Could it again be the same folks who willing accept unrealistically low visibility minimums when it is in their interests (e.g. CRW where one ILS has higher visibility minimums than the LOC to the same runway)

Who ends up winning as the result of this article? I hope it is the line pilot faced with getting his passengers safely to their destination. I hope he now understands more about the deficiencies of the NPA and how to minimize these deficiencies. Do I agree with author Deakin that pilots should NOT fly NPAs using the CANPA method? Not for a minute! I hold that pilots are exposed to much less danger while flying a stabilized approach and not trolling for the airport. Imagine having a Fed on board, leveling at DH on an ILS and going trolling for the airport. While I understand author Deakin’s concern about getting down to minimums in time to line up with the field and his concern about pilots attempting to salvage an approach when the airfield is spotted too late, I believe that the advantages of CANPA greatly outweigh the dangers outlined by the author Deakin.

I live across the state line in Kansas and could not vote on this. The Kansas City, Mo., City Council has had a long history of bad judgements.

It was also proposed to leave the runway as part of the airport and buy up land to the west to enlarge the facility. This would have allowed air cargo from Mexico and Canada to join the train/truck traffic. But I see the railroad trying to get rid of their competition.

This has gone on for over a hundred years in KC. In the 1800s, where the Missouri and the Kansas (KAW) rivers intersect, the railroad built a bridge. The bridge was placed across the KAW and just happened to be low enough that river boats could not navigate. This forced the river traffic to the north to Omaha and made the railroad the only transportation to the west in Kansas. This cut out their competition.

I'd like to start by saying that AVweb is a part of my daily life and the site that my computer signs on to each and every day. I work at a television station and I am always amazed at the amount of information that you gather that doesn't seem to make the mass media accounts. You provide a great combination of entertainment, information and advocacy (what a balancing act that must amount to!) and even manage to ruffle a few feathers now and then with your tongue in cheek editorial style. Keep up the great work!

I'm writing to extol the pleasure that the link to the live webcam at Palomar Airport [http://www.camzone.com/cams/airportcam/stream.html] in San Diego brings me. Since finding the link on AVweb's new ATC Audio and Web Cams link page, I have kept the site on my desktop at work allowing me to check in on what's happening there. It's very relaxing to be able to get away to another place (much warmer than the weather we're experiencing up here in Alberta, Canada right now!) and especially to be able to just watch people and planes coming and going. I spend a fair amount of time at airports throughout North America just watching the action and listening to my scanner...now I can enjoy my favorite stress reliever anytime, particularly at work where stress relief is critical!

You wrote:

Assessing a terrorist threat for a Delta Force style commando response...

Checking the flight deck for compliance with company policy (remember that drunken NWA pilot set a few years ago?)...

Determining condition and reaction of flight crew during in an in-flight emergency post mortem.

If I were king I would change the wording to non tower airports and tower airports and private or restricted fields requiring prior approval for use.

I have been flying for 35 years and the situation at non-tower airports has become a major safety issue to me. Most of these airports have traffic coming from right, left and straight in.

I have been at OKV (Winchester, VA) and have observed departing traffic taking left traffic, straight out and right traffic departures and the same thing for arriving aircraft.

This one took place at Marble Mountain Air Field, a small U.S. Marine Corps' helicopter base located a few miles to the east of large Danang Air Base, which was a major tactical jet base and which also served as a Viet Nam arrival point for FNG's starting their tours in country.

We exhausted rotor heads stationed at Marble were aroused from our slumber one night by a horrendous roaring sound outside of our hootches. It sounded like a locomotive going full blast was going to come right in through the hootch window. Some of us old timers who had been through many mortar and ground attacks of the base were curious about the source of the noise, but were very tired and not curious enough to do anything but roll out of our bunks onto the hootch floor, place a flak jacket over our heads and try to go back to sleep. This was a fairly common response to a mortar attack, and the greatest hazard involved we felt was actually going to sleep on the floor and waking up the next morning with some very aching bones.

When we got up the next morning and walked over to the commonly shared toilet facilities we were stunned to see a huge jet transport sitting at the south end of our little 3 or 4 thousand foot runway. We learned that the pilot flying one of the contract airliners (a stretch DC-8 if I remember right) bringing in a hundred plus FNG's had decided to make the final portion of his approach and landing at Danang in a visual mode. Both the Danang runway and the Marble Mountain runway were oriented north - south and the pilot got a little disoriented and landed at Marble instead of Danang. The horrendous roaring that we had heard during the night was this poor fellow applying full power thrust reverse, plus probably every other means at his disposal to stop his machine. I wonder what first went through his mind when he first realized how little runway he had remaining to stop his plane in. But stop it he did and there it sat the next morning a few feet from the south end of the runway.

We all wondered what would happen to the plane (and also the pilot) and there was much speculation about how, or if, the plane could be flown out. Eventually a large tug with a tow bar was brought in and the airplane was pushed backwards to the north end of the runway -- there was no room for any turning or taxiing. When it became evident that the intent was to fly the plane out by taking off from that short runway we all expressed opinions on the probability of success, placed bets one way or the other and jockeyed for a position to view the forthcoming display.

The aircraft engines were started, brakes were held, power levers were advanced, sand and dust were blown a tremendous distance behind the plane (Marble was located on a sandy beach), and slowly the plane began to roll. Now before becoming a rotor head (by force I might add) I had spent several years flying tactical jets and I had a fairly good feel for how a jet can perform and I was a bit skeptical about the success of the operation I was about to view. Not to worry -- I had failed to take into proper account the fact that the transport now had no load at all and was very likely extremely low on fuel since its intended flight was just across the bay to Danang.

About half way down that short runway the pilot roarched back on the controls, the nose wheel popped into the air and by the time he reached the end of the runway I think he was over a thousand feet AGL and turning towards Danang to refuel and then haul some lucky souls home who had completed their tours.

I believe the Technik-Museum Speyer that is referred to is located in Germany, on Autobahn 8 near Stuttgart. They have a great 5-story metal slide -- the only way to get to it is to by climbing up to the top of the building, enter at the back of a German version of the Ford Tri-motor (mounted on the building), walk through the cabin to a door just behind the cockpit and exit to the landing for the slide. It's only two Deutsche Marks to slide as many time as you want. My 3-year-old son loves it!

Just thought I'd take a moment to write a middle-of-a-sleepless-nite note to you all. I've been an AVweb member for several years now, and have been receiving your weekly (now twice/week) email newsletters probably since your inception. I wanted you to know how much I enjoy your articles and look forward to the aviation news updates. I find your journalism style to be very refreshing and interesting, if sometimes sarcastic and irreverent.

When I was there two weeks ago, Speyer/Ludwigshafen airport was still in Germany (admittedly this was last century). But Austrians have so many great ballrooms, that they needn´t be worried.

RE: ATC Outage 1/6/00, Washington

Dear Congressman Pease:

I noted in an AP story that you stated that this recent major outage of the ATC system underscored the need to give the FAA more money to modernize the ATC System.

Please forgive my bluntness, but I find it strange that Congress gets all upset and loudly demands action when an airline-related failure traps consumers on an airplane for hours. Yet when repeated ATC failures frequently transform entire regions of the nation into winged gulags of trapped passengers, the first thing you want to do is toss money at the FAA, instead of demanding accountability. Until this happens, no amount of funding will fix the ATC mess.

It wasn't a lack of funding that cancelled your flight, Congressman. It was a lack of competence at the FAA in how they spend money. Indeed, the equipment that failed in Washington was part of their "modernization" program. The same was true of the outage earlier this week which shut down flights in New England.

With all due respect, your solution only feeds the problem. I urge you and your colleagues to focus no longer on the symptom - which is the ATC system - but the problem, which is a continued and long term management failure of the FAA. Your response should have been one that expressed outrage and demanded answers from the FAA, which has spent over $27 billion in the last 18 years in failed modernization programs. You should have asked why their "modernized" equipment failed at two centers in the same week, and less than a year after hundreds of millions of tax dollars were spent in their installation.

You might also be interested to know, Congressman, that ATC equipment failures which resulted in delays or flight cancellations increased 34% in 1999. And this is with the replacement of all host computers at ATC centers. Clearly, FAA Administrator Garvey is not getting the job done, regardless of impassioned PR stunts that express the contrary.

It is time that Congress stopped taking the FAA's word about fixing the ATC system, and begin to give them the hard oversight that is now woefully missing. It is not funding, but how they spend that money.

Reversing the track record of fiscal irresponsibility and management failure at the FAA should be your first priority, not more funding that in the past has mostly allowed the FAA to buy the wrong things faster. Year after year, Congress has merely taken the word of the FAA management, and despite billions spent, we still have major failures like the one you encountered.

FAA failures in this area have resulted in thousands of travelers being put at risk. In some cases, they have lost their lives due to FAA mis-management of the ATC system, as was experienced in Guam in 1997.

Please, Congressman, let's stop acting as if the solution is simply money. It's time that you and the rest of Congress started to hold the FAA accountable, instead of treating them like co-victims.

Our firm has done extensive research on the ATC issue. It was a study published in cooperation with another firm (RMB Associates) that prompted the 1994 Congressional hearings that moved Free Flight to a top FAA priority. If we can provide you or your staff with additional information on this critical matter, please feel free to call me or Captain Michael Baiada who can also be reached at (303) 674-0229.

Sincerely

It is the opinion of this writer, that Congress, the industry, the GA population, and the flying public, will see the need for change in the ATC system, and that they will have the foresight to see the requirement to pay for what you request and are provided.

Instrument Approach Procedures (IAP) minimums are based on a reasonable altimeter setting. For many years the FAA has published minimums based on a "Local" altimeter setting and offered an alternative set of minimums if the local altimeter was not available. Provided of course, there was another source available in the area. This was a good plan and offered redundancy.

Some airports that have AWOS or ASOS and/or Part Time Control Towers are now predicating IAP minimums on that SOLE altimeter setting source, with no backup!

The problem with a single approved source to base minimums on, is if the AWOS/ASOS fails (power failure, transmitter failure, sensor failure), or the Tower closes and that destination altimeter setting is the only altimeter setting upon which the IAP is predicated, the ATC controller is directed to advise the pilot that the procedure(s) is "NOT AVAILABLE." See Air Traffic Bulletin No. 99-5, Fall 1999, "Approved Altimeter Setting for Instrument Approach".

What happened? Why the changes?

An example of this oversight (we hope) is in the Columbus (Ohio) area; Ohio State University Airport, (OSU), Bolton Field (TZR), Newark (VTA), Mt. Vernon/Knox County (4I3) and Lancaster (LHQ). All these GA airports provide relief for Port Columbus Int'l Airport (CMH), and at one time all these airports used other altimeters setting or the CMH altimeter setting as a backup...

This is an unacceptable situation and a safety concern as it immediately removes perfectly good airports with good IAP's from use due to some minor glitch. Causing unnecessary flights to alternate airports, wasting fuel, disrupting personal and business trips and needlessly burdens the ATC system.

It's so typical, just when one branch of the FAA starts doing some good out there by publishing lots of good IAP (i.e., GPS), increasing the utilization of non-air carrier airports, another branch throws us a curve that will send us back to those big overcrowded airports when it's IMC, slow down the big iron and creating more IFR delays for everyone!

Recommended Action: Publish alternative altimeter setting minimums for ALL IAPs that now rely on automated single source altimeter setting, i.e., AWOS/ASOS or part-time control tower. Good examples of what we need in IAP's is published for Mansfield, Ohio (MFD) and Marion, Indiana (MZZ).

As has David Cox [AVmail, 02 Jan 2000], I have also been using cabin heat regularly, now that it is winter. The readings I get range from about 10 to a high of about 75, which is getting close to the 100 threshold mentioned by Mr. Cox. In my case, there is an accompanying exhaust odor. Some of that could be from holes in the firewall where wires pass through into the cabin, as they do for the new EGT gauge. As we all know, CO itself is odorless, but it's probably mixed with the gasses coming inside. Knowing how dangerous CO and other gasses are, I've been flying with a wing vent open a little and the fresh air vent fully open, despite the cold. When I close the cabin heat control, the readings drop.

The muffler on my plane did have a crack which was repaired, but I am thinking of having the shop remove it for non-destructive testing (NDT). Perhaps I should have the mechanic remove the heat exchanger shroud from the muffler and pressurize the exhaust system to a few PSI with a vacuum cleaner (as you suggested to Mr. Cox), before sending out the muffler for NDT.

During the annual inspection in October two cylinders had to be removed for repair due to low compression readings. Before that was done, the AIM did not detect any CO in the cockpit. The first time I started up after the repair, the detector screamed.

Re your story about the bird in the cockpit of the Ansett 737:

On my retirement flight from CDG (Paris) to IAD (Washington DC) as captain of a UAL 767, a small bird showed up in the cockpit and began to flit about. Over the crew's objections, I decreed that we capture it, and report the incident to the company. This generated some hilarious radio traffic along the lines of "He'd better chirp pretty, because the Ag department wants to talk to him."

Upon arrival, a passenger agent accompanied me and the bee-one-are-dee to the Dept. of Agriculture office. I told the ag-man that the little guy had brought me luck on my retirement trip, and not to kill it.

"What do you expect me to do? I can't turn it loose or keep it for a pet."

The passenger agent intervened. "We have a flight leaving for Paris in a few hours."

The Ag-man rolled his eyes, but said he would see what he could do.

Yep, the airline flew the little bird back to CDG, where he flew away under his own power, perhaps to tell his buddies about his adventures.

My experience in my Cessna 150 and a friend's Cessna 180 is this. Flying without any cabin ventilation (heat or fresh air) causes negative pressure in the cabin due to leaks around the doors. Riding in the back seat of the C180 without the heat on results in a large movement of air from the tail cone to the cabin blowing on the back of your legs. When the heat is turned on it stops, or nearly so.

It seems that a pilot flying a Cessna 140 took off at night immediately after consuming a large amount of alcohol. He called the FSS right after take-off for help because he was disoriented but was not obviously under the influence. As the FSS people tried to talk him back to the airport the pilot was rapidly becoming more and more inebriated as the alcohol was being absorbed into his system and the effect was starting to become obvious to the folks on the ground.

After unsuccessfully working with him for about an hour the flight ended tragically with the poor drunk pilot literally begging and screaming for help but unable to help himself on that very dark night.

After all these years I still wonder if he had friends who could have prevented him from getting into that airplane. If an acquaintance of mine were trying to drive or fly drunk I would sit on him if necessary; never would I fear being arrested for interfering with an aircraft. Folks, it just will not happen that way. However, one could call 911 for assistance. Better to have him arrested than dead.

In the words of Dennis Miller, that is just my opinion, I could be wrong!!!

Months before New Year's Eve, I'd decided I was going to be in the air to bring it in. I figured I'd see either a lot of fireworks, or everything go dark.

I started practicing my night landings, using Alliance (AFW) as my practice field. Alliance is a big, non-passenger operation with an American Airlines maintenance facility. On one of my first night flights, I was cleared to land "number two behind the American 767. Caution wake turbulence." (No kidding!) As I repeated the clearance, I did the chain of events in my head. Dark. Wake turbulence. No visual glide slope. No way to stay above and beyond the 767 flight path. I keyed the mike again and said, "If it's all the same to you guys, I'll head on back to Northwest regional." The point of the drill was to build confidence, not fly upside down. Or land upside down. I came back other nights, and got so I could enjoy the pretty Christmas lights as I became more and more convinced it was possible to land in the dark.

The reports of the cancelled airline flights added a new possibility: What if nobody was using DFW that night? Would they let my little Cessna 150 land there? What could it hurt to ask?

A friend gave me an airport diagram, so I had all the runways and taxiways to refer to -- just in case. I had all the approach and tower frequencies written on my kneeboard, in BIG numbers so I could see them, and I stocked up on red lens flashlights. I was all set. Now if only the weather and ATC would cooperate.

Don Peterson is my primary flight instructor, and has been a friend ever since. I invited him along to share the fun. We enjoyed a nice dinner, then watched the TV coverage. As soon as the ball dropped in Times Square (one hour before midnight Central time), we headed to the airport. On the way out the door, Don said, "Which one of us is night current?" I laughed and replied, "I am. Really current." The preflight was brief since I had flown earlier in the day, and refueled afterwards. We were in the air in short order. It was amazing to see nothing in the Dallas airspace but stars.

My airplane is a 'classic' 1961 straight tail Cessna 150. The avionics consist of a handheld radio wired to an external antenna, and a Mode C transponder. One of the best parts about listening to the ATC tape later was hearing how good my radio and I sound!

Me: "Dallas approach, Cessna 7206X is a 150 out of Northwest regional at two thousand five hundred, going to watch the fireworks."

App: "Where are there any fireworks?"

Me: "There's some in Fort Worth, and some in Dallas. I'd like to see the ones in Dallas."

App: "Squawk 4765"

App: "7206X radar contact 4 miles east of Alliance. Cleared into Class B airspace."

Me: "Approach, I was wondering if me and my 150 could do a touch and go on one of your fine runways."

(Pause.)

App: "Uhhhhh. I don't... There might be landing fees, but you should be... Fly a heading of zero nine zero and let me go ask some questions. Expect one eight right."

(Don and I are giggling in the cockpit, pumping fists and saying, "Yes! Yes!")

App: "Continue your approach and contact tower on 124.15."

Me: "Contact tower 124.15 and thanks very much."

(Switching frequencies...)

Me: "Dallas tower, Cessna 7206X with you at 2500 feet."

Twr: "Dallas altimeter is 30.04. Do you have DFW in sight?"

(...which is kind of like asking if you have Planet Earth in sight...)

Me: "Altimeter 30.04 and I have DFW in sight"

Twr: "7206X, cleared touch and go runway 18 right. What are your intentions after landing?"

(Don put me up to this next part.)

Me: "Well, I need to work on my night currency. How about right closed traffic?"

Twr: "NEGATIVE. We're not able to do that tonight."

(...or any other night, he's probably thinking...)

Me: "Okay, we'd like to fly east to White Rock lake and then back to Northwest regional."

Now the practicing at Alliance paid off. If I hadn't gotten used to lots of lights at a big airport, I would have been really confused. As it was, I had no problem finding the runway -- the correct runway -- and the two light PAPI. The wind was 190 at 6; visibility unlimited and crystal clear. As I wafted in at my usual 65 miles an hour on short final, I had all the time in the world to savor this landing. Don's an instructor, so he said "add power." I was the pilot who was night current, so I didn't. We waited a beat, then he said, "this looks like it's going to work out." It did. Not a greaser, but the nose wheel thumped over those big centerline lights as I pushed in carb heat and raised the manual flaps, then added full throttle and took off from Dallas Fort Worth International Airport. Laughing out loud from the sheer fun of it; the luck of everything working out.

Tower was talking to a helicopter that had popped up. He called "traffic off the departure end of 18 is a 150 doing a touch and go." The helo pilot came back with "That's kind of unusual..." Tower: "I just thought I'd let you know about it." Eventually, I climbed to 2500 and tower turned me over to the Love field controller to go orbit downtown. I was one of a dozen planes Love tower was handling, and the guy was a real pro, having fun with this once-in-a-lifetime evening. He counted down the last ten seconds, and right on cue the fireworks blossomed over downtown Dallas. All of us on the frequency wished a happy New Year to each other, and thanked the controller. It was a great party.

Also, this is not about PASS' contract negotiations with the FAA, it's about FLIGHT SAFETY!

I ordered a set of Lord motor mounts for my Beechcraft B-24R Sierra from Aircraft Spruce and presented them to my local FBO for installation on my airplane in concert with other work that was to be done on the airplane. The Sierra uses two Lord J-10778-14 mounts and two J-10778-16 mounts. The mount kits are identical except for the spacer.

The local shop checked the part numbers on the box and installed the contents of the boxes in the location shown on the Beech drawings for the airplane. The mechanic said that he noted that the mounts that he removed were different than the new mounts and that he had gone back and checked the part number on the box again to be sure that the proper part was being installed.

Well folks, it didn't work. The little Sierra shook like a wet dog on start up and shutdown. Something was not right. I took it back to the shop and they said that nothing was wrong with their work. I called Beech and they explained the spacer difference. I then went back to the shop and paid them to lift the engine and move it far enough to verify the actual mounts installed. They called me with the sad news. Yes, all four of the mounts they had installed were actually J-10778-16 kits. The original boxes were consulted and two were marked 14 and two were marked 16.

I called Aircraft Spruce and purchased two J-10778-14 mount kits and they had them drop shipped directly from Aviall. Lord would not issue credit on the new mounts without having the mislabeled 16 mounts in hand. I finally did get credit on the two mounts from Spruce. I hope they got credit from Lord. I claimed reimbursement for the four hours shop time required to remove and exchange the mounts. Aircraft Spruce advises me that Lord will not honor this request. The shop here will not participate in their having installed the wrong parts and guess who ends up eating about $200.00 worth of labor.

Have you ever tried to take the keys away from a drunk? My wife tried recently to do that for a female friend and co-worker. The scene was brutal and, thanks to the interference of a security guard at the high rise, the drunk managed to get the keys back and depart.

Personally, if I couldn't verbally dissuade the person, I would not attempt in the least to interfere. I have known too many drunks that carried weapons and in their fogged state would kill their best friend for interfering. I know, if they go out on the road they can create some real carnage.

The problem is that our laws don't protect the person that tries to run interference. You can be charged with theft for taking their keys even if you don't move the car. Until the laws are made to reflect those now on the books for "good Samaritans" who stop to render aid, we will not be able to put the stops on this type of drunken behavior. And even then, I am not sure it will work due to the belligerent nature of some drunks.

Things like disabling their car will work, but you have to have someone to distract them. When it is a one-on-one situation (as in my wife's case), it is not possible to divert their attention while someone disables the car. Plus, I have seen drunks drive off with all four tires flat after running through a tire slasher, so what are you gonna do? A lot of people don't know how to disable newer cars with all the electronic ignition stuff, and some of them are darn difficult to do. You can't just pull the wire to the coil and many of the spark plug wires are next to impossible to reach anymore.

With airplanes, you run afoul of federal laws regarding interfering with aircraft.

And the normally sane AVweb newswire calls it "best flying stunt" of the new year?

Tell you what: Under my government, this two-bit clown would be slapped into solitary confinement on bread and water for about five years!

Please repair your account of this fool's outrageous act.

My audience that day was a recently promoted captain for a major air carrier, a former Air Force fighter pilot who had more type ratings on his ticket than space permitted, who was in the process of checking me out in a J-3 Cub. He listened quietly to my comments, then gave me a serious dressing down. He was furious that I would pay lip service to such nonsense as the inevitability of a gear-up landing, and felt that sayings like "Those who have..." were insulting to every competent pilot in the sky. In no uncertain terms he told me that proficient flying starts with the proper attitude, and the right attitude would NEVER permit a gear-up landing (I assume he wasn't including legitimate mechanical problems, but at that point I wasn't questioning anything). He thought the saying should be changed to "Those Who Have, and should never fly again, and Those Who Won't, because they are good pilots."

Ok, buddy, let's run the following scenario: The CFI's friends are indeed unsuccessful at keeping the inebriated pilot on the ground. He takes off, runs it out of fuel or becomes disoriented, and tries to land the airplane on a highway ... and slams into a vehicle.

One or more members of YOUR family are in the vehicle.

Want to think about your statement again, Mr. Alvarez?

By the way, your diatribe about AVweb was way off the mark. And your comments about Mr. Kaputa's name were particularly offensive.

With the advent of cold weather here in Toronto, I have been using cabin heat more regularly. A couple of weeks ago, I started getting readings on the AIM detector (which sits on the floor just in front of the fuel selector in my 182) of between 10 and 20 ppm. When I bring the detector up onto the seat beside me, the readings drop off to zero again. The operating information included with the unit refer to readings over 100 as being significant. I get no accompanying exhaust smell at all.

These readings seem small (low) but any reading at all perhaps should be cause for some concern. I am contemplating having my shop remove and test the shroud from my cabin heater assembly to test for potential leaks ... but before taking that drastic step I thought I'd ask your opinion. Do you get low readings like this on the AIM device in your 310? Do other of your readers have any experience with the AIM detector that would mirror mine?

My annual is done each year in early March .. I would prefer to wait till then to do any major diagnosis work if I can .. however, as you point out in your article, any CO issues are not to be taken lightly!!

If you could give me your thoughts or any other source for information on this issue, I'd appreciate your help.

You know I wouldn't miss one golden word of AVmail, both the mail from your devoted readers and the answers thereto. But I am moved to take up my trusty pen ... er ... keyboard - to communicate the following:

1. Having just made reservations to fly from Boston to LAX on AA and then (shudder) from LAX to San Luis on America West, I fully sympathize and agree with Captain R. Michael Baiada's assessment that flying somehow isn't what it used to be. Instead of getting better, it seems to be getting more frightening, more uncomfortable and more undependable by the minute. (If I were a year younger than my present age of 78, I'd consider walking...) Your response to Captain Baiada's documentation was just a wee bit off the mark. The envelope, which you misread slightly, contained the winner of the Drama Critics John Wayne Award, and the winner was....Ronald Reagan, who fired all the PATCO Air Traffic Controllers, thus making his thoughtless but dramatic statement and ensuring that the airways would be less safe for everyone in the U.S. whose lives are in the hands of overworked, understaffed and often under-trained ATCs. In my opinion, Captain Baiada's letter deserved more serious consideration than it was given.

2. Darryl Phillips' December 20th letter noting AVweb's anti-liberal bias seemed an eminently fair observation. Naturally, you didn't recognize yourself in the mirror he held up. (Does Tom DeLay think he's so far right that he's practically falling off the platform? No, he considers himself the voice of sweet reason..) Those of us who may be rash enough to share Darryl Phillips' point of view understand that people who are able to afford to be general aviation enthusiasts must be among the fortunate citizens with at least SOME, if not loads of, spare cash. They aren't liberals. They don't need to be. They're doing okay and their only gripe is with a government that taxes them so that some of that spare cash can be used for more urgent priorities, like feeding the poor, upgrading public schools, sheltering the homeless, etc. If you've never been poor or hungry, it's easy to turn away and say those people in need are simply lazy and shiftless. But having been poor and hungry once myself, (although, thank God, never homeless) I can tell you that it is not always for lack of trying that one can be in dire straits. Yes, there are times when I do want more government interference, and you ought to try to get at least ONE person on your staff that can understand that point of view before you proclaim yourselves free of anti-liberal bias.

Now try to be gentle in your reporting of the Y2K non-event. Could be that all the hype (and millions spent) vis-a-vis prevention actually made it so. Of course I can afford to be nonchalant--I'm sending this on a Macintosh!