AVmail

It was a bomb, only a bomb could do it, and there are motives for a bomb and then it's not anybody's fault but the bad guys, whoever they are. And a very exciting story.

It will be a missile when acknowledged it went down in W-15, an area of naval ships with missiles on board, must be cover up by US Navy. And even more exciting.

It will be fuel tank explosion as soon as singed bits of wreckage are identified, must be God's fault with static electricity. Boring.

Soon, the enemies of Egypt with motives for terrorist attack will be revealed.

Soon the conspiracy angles of cover-up or assassination of important people on board will start to circulate.

Soon the stories of heroic efforts and impacted emotions of those heroes recovering the wreckage will appear.

Soon, the officials will be thanking everyone for their interest in aviation safety, and to not speculate and cause unnecessary grief, because they are doing the best they can and it will take years to have an answer and any internet stories just hampers the investigation.

Soon, the manufacturer will be saying what a safe airplane it is and flying is much safer than driving.

Soon, the government oversight agency will issue a few Airworthiness Directives, throw some blame around, and file a few lawsuits to show they are working hard to mollify the people.

Soon, the condition of the inside of the engines, the radar plots, the wreckage debris pattern, the maintenance records, the weather and winds, the FDR, the CVR, the cargo manifest, photos of and access to the wreckage reconstruction, will all be classified, be hidden, be hard to access, and be distorted or cropped.

And of course, days after event, it could be all those above and possibly many more. The confident keep thinking and modifying their hypotheses as facts arrive by the minute, while the scared and ignorant want to silence the conjecture and hide and wait and hope all the activity just goes away and things can get back to normal.

I enjoyed AVweb's Brainteasers quiz #22 on emergencies. I do have a question though.

On a recent flight to Williamsburgh, VA (JGG) I was flying on an IFR flight plan and talking to Washington Center. A 172 came on asking for immediate vectors to the nearest airport as his engine was missing badly. The controller vectored him to Ahoskie and he was about 15 NM from Ahoskie when all this started. Center asked if he wanted to declare and emergency and he said "NO". When he got to within 6 NM he saw that he could not make the airport and indicated he was going to land on a nearby road. Again he was asked if he wanted to declare an emergency and again he declined. The controller had a Baron fly over the area to relay communications for him and apparently he landed alright.

I was telling this story to a flight instructor friend of mine and indicated I was surprised he never declared an emergency. His response was that it would not have helped the situation at all since he was going to a uncontrolled field and ended up landing away from emergency facilities.

What a fascinating discussion thread on ATC delays this is in AVweb.

My experience of ATC and its problems is that of a frequent flyer with over 100,000 miles worldwide each year. I appreciate the prime function of ATC is safety and I am very tolerant of delays because the end result is I reach my destination alive!

I have some friends working in ATC here in the UK and do have some understanding of the problems in the industry. I am also responsible for contracting a traffic spotting fixed wing service (Cessna 310) on behalf of the radio station I work for and I make sure there are seats on board for ATC staff any time they wish to come with us.

But two major causes of delay astonish me in this high-tech world of communication.

The first is the inability of the FAA to establish a realistic method of flow control given the technology that is now available. I was amazed to learn here on AVweb that when a congested airport like EWR has flow restriction operating for traffic heading towards it, all the sectors which have EWR bound traffic are not fully in the picture. The controller who explained his problem of having to hold or vector flights in his sector because he had a restriction of EWR traffic but the sectors feeding him had no restriction should never have been put in that position.

Every aircraft with a flight plan should be registered in a central flow control computer on departure then all the constantly changing factors like weather and route congestion updated in real time so that each sector handling a flight is able to give it the optimum service so the sectors just outside the congested area do not get this problem. Seems simple enough to me and the costs would be recovered by virtual of the elimination of holding patterns at lower altitudes which invariably burn up more fuel.

The second cause is the crazy scheduling by airlines of departures and arrivals in excess of runway and air route capacity. I was glad to read here that Northwest has finally realized that bad scheduling can be a major cause of delays and increased costs to airlines. I hope their cooperation with ATC bears fruit.

Communication is the key to progress in this matter. Rather than looking for who to blame, all the major airlines should be looking for who to talk to and LISTEN to. By working it out together with ATC, the airlines would be able to rebuild their schedules to eliminate a large part of these delays.

I have a great respect for the good work carried out by controllers who do their best in very difficult circumstances but always keep safety as the number one priority.

Last month, Sept 29th, I was on CO 157 due out of EWR at 1650 local. After pushback at 1715 we were on the taxiway for TWO HOURS before we finally took off. I noticed on the departing runway that aircraft seemed to be restricted to one every six minutes. When I finally reached SFO I missed my connecting flight and had to take a hotel overnight at a cost of $240. Despite this annoyance, I was still grateful that the flight had reached SFO safely but was puzzled at what combination of circumstances had led to such a delay. EWR was working under clear visibility and SFO also had good weather. It could have been some form of equipment malfunction in the ATC system that led to such a restriction. The end product was a safe flight and that must always be the priority.

For me there are two sets of unsung heroes of the ATC system.

The first are the approach controllers at busy international airports who manage to filter complex traffic mixes into an orderly queue of arrivals. The knowledge of the capabilities of every aircraft type and required safe separations combined with communicating with pilots whose first language is not English is a task I do not envy.

The second are the cool characters who handle multiple cross runway operations like at SFO looking after both departures and arrivals. I was on an NWA 747 going into SFO on the morning of October 16th when we had to execute a go round. I know it happens quite a bit at SFO but I do appreciate safety is always paramount -- so no big deal.

I know I am in safe hands when ATC is operated at the sharp end by people who care with passion.

Is the need for more controllers simply understood and not stated, or do outsiders not understand how critical the shortage is?

I don't know if the aviation industry understands what that means on a daily basis. It means that more and more ATC sectors are being worked by one person instead of two (or three). It means that when you need a second person to handle the traffic that they are late in getting there or they don't show up at all. That means there are more and more "unable" to requests and more "say again, I was on the landline." In other words, we get behind the power curve more often and stay behind longer.

My major concern about this situation (of course) is the safety aspect. Safety is (and has been) degraded. It's as simple as two controllers working a sector are safer than one working alone. But if I can't get people excited about that, I will gladly take the opportunity to push for two controllers per position for efficiency's sake.

Absent a major recession, the demand on our nation's airspace infrastructure will push the ATC system even farther past its original safety design limits. And worse yet, with more errors and delays comes the frustration and the pressure to do something, anything. Sadly, actions taken under this type of pressure have, and will continue to lead to the inevitable -- catastrophe.

It is clear to me that those responsible for ATC system oversight (DOT, GAO, Congress, airlines, etc.) must stop telling FAA what they are doing wrong, and begin telling them what to do right.

The real problem with the ATC system is simple -- FAA's complete lack of vision.

From MLS to AAS, and now to GPS, ADS-B and NAS 4.0, FAA continues to prove that its vision is seriously flawed or nonexistent. They continue to spend billions ($27 Billion since 1982) on R&D and unproven technologies in an ill-fated attempt to squeeze a few more years out of the current ATC process, yet we are losing the one thing that we cannot afford to lose -- time

In the interests of safety, it is incumbent on the airlines and others to look outside FAA for a different vision of how to fix the chronic delays, operational errors and equipment problems inherent in our 40-year-old ATC system.

As I have stated in the past, I have the vision to fix the ATC problem within three years while increasing safety and capacity for less than $1 Billion. But without a change of direction by FAA, it won't happen. FAA wins; the airlines, the flying public and the taxpayers lose.

I don't know if you quoted this directly from some source, or pieced it together, but unless the word "amateur" is a direct quote, I'm surprised you'd let that slip into AVweb. I don't see that as any different than if you described a pilot other than airline as being an "amateur pilot" (such as the "common" media is so likely to do).

Having sky-dived myself, and having a friend who's an owner of the largest DZ in Colorado, I would think that they would rather not be referred to as amateur jumpers...

I would be interested in hearing John Deakin's opinion on the recent Lear 35 accident involving Payne Stewart. I know at this point he would be speculating, but we will take that into account. My own speculation. based on 25 years with USAir, is this:

1. Do most business jet Captains preflight their oxygen system prior to departure and do they do it correctly? Having an explosive decompression happens so seldom that most pilots do not really give it serious consideration therefore perhaps the Ox system does not get checked properly!

2. Even with the airlines I observed many pilots that simply toggled the Ox system to the 100% level and then flipped the switch that let the Ox flow a bit. Never even try on the mask. Might mess up the hairdo. I have found on a few occasions, after pulling the mask down to put it on that it was "Disconnected". I have found valves in the manifold set to the off position. (Previous maintenance was done on system.)

3. There should have been enough time for the pilot to grab the mask as I am sure he was taught, however I suspect (and here I go speculating) that there was something wrong with the oxygen system. It did not work. Even if the cabin pax had gotten to the masks in time, their supply of oxygen was probably from the same bottle.

The oxygen system in aircraft that fly in the Flight levels, especially above 25000', have been taken too lightly. Maybe now this will change. I cringe when I think about all those guys flying at 25000 to 30000 with nothing but chemical canisters. In the early days of Malibu sales even the canisters were an extra-cost option that some pilots did not opt for.

Okay, John, what's your take on all this?? Thanks!

Regarding the tragic crash of Payne Stewart's plane, I wonder if I could ask a couple of questions about depressurization?

If at that altitude -- about 39,000 feet -- sudden depressurization occurs and there are only 5 to 10 seconds to put on an oxygen mask, if you were able to get the mask on, wouldn't there be a pressure conflict from what your body is breathing to the outside pressure which is nil ? Is that why they have an emergency decent procedure? What psi is the oxygen going into your body through the system? Also, shouldn't one flight crew member always be on oxygen at that altitude for safety?

I think that AVweb has a chance to really point out some facts here. As we are all pro-aviation, the recent rash of celebrity crashes seem a pending doom. People will remember John Denver, JFK Jr, and Payne Stewart and point to GA as the problem. Some will point out the recent helicopter accident involving Harrison Ford, or stunt pilot Wayne Handley. All are minor in the grand scheme of things.

I think that the press misses out on the fact that quick-donning oxygen masks are required at those flight altitudes. In addition, everyone is using FAA numbers for useful time post decompression. They are saying 10 to 15 seconds. These are best-case scenarios. Most likely it's 8 to 10 seconds. Without a quick-donning mask on, there is little chance of a crew being able to interpret what happened, grabbing the mask, and pulling the oxygen flow valve prior to hypoxia. FAR 91.211 provides the clear loophole for not wearing a mask:

Since there were two pilots, they need not have the quick-donning mask on since they were under FL410. Who knows, speculating like the press is, maybe the crew was not familiar with the location of the masks, the pressure loss caused them to lose their breath, and within seconds they were suffering from hypoxia. Who knows. We probably will never know the exact cause after the horrific crash that ensued.

I don't believe many pilots have been able to experience the effects of high altitude. I've gone through an FAA-approved course once before, and am already in the process of planning for an additional course in the January time frame at Edwards Air Force Base. The Air Force, along with the FAA, have this course available to all pilots. Why don't commercial pilots use it as well? It includes ground school, decompression simulation in an Air Force altitude chamber tank and exercises to show the effects of hypoxia. VERY, and I stress, VERY educational. When you can't write down your own first name on a simple question test because you can't comprehend the question/don't understand what your name is, it's kind of spooky.

The FAA leaves a nice note on our licenses, "Safety is no accident, it must be planned." I'm planning for the future, forcing myself to experience it first hand. I'm practicing, getting myself ready, is the rest of the community ready? If not, WHY NOT?

I thought I'd throw in my two cents' worth about the contract tower program.

My background: I am a former Marine Corps airfield services officer (aircraft fire-rescue and airfield matting/lighting/arresting gear). I've been an airport fire chief at three military airfields and one civilian airport, and I'm currently an airport director, so I've had the pleasure of dealing with many air traffic control folks on various issues. Also, I was the Safety Chief (fire/rescue, operations, and law enforcement) at the airport in Albany, Georgia, when the tower went contract (it had previously been FAA-manned). Truth be told, I viewed the idea with a rather jaundiced eye (I'm from Missouri -- show me!). I knew nothing about the track record of contract towers at other airports and I was quite skeptical about having non-FAA people working with my Safety Officers, especially when an aircraft emergency or mishap was in progress.

But I'm now a believer that contract controllers can be are just as competent as FAA controllers (hell, pretty much all of them are FAA or military trained). The ones at Albany certainly were. I could not tell any difference in the proficiency between either group (as it should be).

And the contract controllers were a LOT friendlier and easier to work with than the FAA controllers were at times. One of the latter, in particular, was a real pain. He had terrific mood swings and regularly acted as though pilots passing through his airspace and vehicles on his AOA were an imposition. He was well-known throughout the local flying community, and the pilots (and my Safety Officers) had little use for him. Everyone could tell the difference when the FAA controllers left and the contract controllers came in, and our traffic numbers started to go back up. And I regularly heard favorable comments about the contract controllers from the pilots I associated with at the airport and EAA meetings.

Why the difference? There's one big incentive for the contract controllers -- they know that if the airport doesn't like the service they've been getting, it will let the FAA know loud and clear. It doesn't matter to the airport which company comes in and works, as long as they do a good job. On the other hand, the FAA controllers have the union and government work rules to protect them. They have to be competent -- but they don't have to be customer-friendly.

A further incentive -- the benefit/cost (B/C) ratio for a number of the airports with contract towers hovers close to 1.0, which is the break-even point. If the traffic numbers go down, and the B/C goes below 1.0, the airport has to pay the difference. In Albany's case, while the FAA controllers were there, the airport received a two-year letter notifying us that the B/C was below 1.0 and if it didn't go up, the tower would have to close (this was before the FAA instituted the cost-sharing program). After the contract controllers came on board, the numbers started to rise, we saw an increase in activity, and the B/C went back up over 1.0. Was it entirely due to the friendlier attitudes of the contract controllers? They certainly played a major role, if the comments from my fellow pilots and EAA members were any indication. There's a heck of a difference between an abrupt "Contact Center, xxx.x," and "Contact center, xxx.x, y'all come back now, y'hear?"

I can hear the anvil chorus now -- "That's anecdotal evidence, don't judge all FAA controllers and contract controllers by what you experienced at one airport." True enough. However, almost all of the other airport directors I've talked to (and I've talked to a BUNCH of them) have had very favorable experiences with the contract controllers. And if the contract controllers were unsafe, why would the FAA stick its neck out by giving them passing grades on their evaluations? I know that the Albany contract controllers did just fine in their evaluations -- it didn't appear to me that the Feds fudged the evaluations or cut any slack to the contract folks, and that's as it should be.

If there is a problem with the program, it's in the staffing (as has been pointed out by NATCA). The FAA does indeed need to make the contractors toe the line to meet staffing standards, and we (the airports) will help them monitor the contractors if they give us half a chance. When we asked the Feds to give us the necessary information to do just that, they said they couldn't, as that information was part of each contractor's bid, and giving it out would compromise the confidentiality of their bids. But they did say they would look for ways to help us keep tabs on the contractors' staffing and adherence to the contract.

In summary: I went from being a hard-nosed skeptic to an eager believer on the subject of contracting Level 1 towers. I don't know enough about contracting out anything above that level, I'll leave that debate to those who have a dog in that fight. And I'll be happy to listen to arguments against the contract towers. But if those arguments focus don't focus heavily on the safety and customer service aspects, it'll be tough to get me to change my mind, based on my experience and the comments I've heard from other airport folks.

So thanks a lot, AVweb! My wife will now be the finest-outfitted pilot at FFZ. Meanwhile, I'm still flying with my ten-year-old headset, and I may not be able to afford avgas much longer. Guess I'll be lookin' for that second job soon.

Regarding your "QANTAS DECISION PAR FOR THE COURSE" story and the comment that "Qantas has never lost an aircraft and isn't about to let this bogey be the first" ...

The truth is that Qantas has had over 60 aircraft accidents since WW2 including at least 15 where the aircraft was a total loss, five with fatalities and at least four with no survivors.

My source? Wings to the World -- the story of Qantas from 1945 to 1966 by Sir Hudson Fysh.

The authors credentials are excellent. Not only was he one of the founders of QF but Chairman of the Board (CEO) for many years until his retirement in 1966.

Appendix 8 is titled Accidents to Qantas aircraft 1946-66 Excluding accidents to light aircraft (the capital E is in the official title). This lists most of the heavy aircraft accidents however the text and photographs include several more including one with no survivors.

One should remember that although QF has not had a fatal since January 1970 it must be remembered that QF is a very small airline -- just 44 aircraft before the merger with Australian about 5 years ago.

While United has had four fatal accidents since 1970 it has operated over 15 million flights in that period giving it a fatal accident rate of less than 1 per 3.75 million flights.

QF has operated less than 1.1 million flights in the same period. Assuming the same rate of operations this means QF needs just one fatal before September 2068 to have a worse fatal accident rate than United. (The math is 3.75 / 1.1 x 29 plus 1970 = 2068.86.)

So it would be very interesting to read a test of good quality passive headsets in AVweb. After all, the passive ones are quite a bit cheaper than active ones. And as Mike Busch stated in his review of the latest LightSPEED active headset, most active headsets do not improve the silencing capabilities that much in active headsets compared to passive ones, at least not in headsets up to $400.

I figure, many guys like me rather want passive quality headsets, than low end active ones. They will probably serve us longer and take the beating of being transported in a bag, being moved from one rental plane to another.

It appears as though Continental has increased the price of their crankshaft from $2,600 to $5,000 dollars.

I realize that they set their price at $2,600 to make the necessary change not hurt so bad. However, even with the shortage, is there any way to get them to reduce the price of a new crank back to the $2,600 dollar range?

Your choice of fruit in the headline "NATA Squeezes an FAA Lemon" struck me as curious. Given that you quote NATA vice-president Andrew Cebula, and that "cebula" is Polish for "onion," perhaps you might have considered something along the lines of "Repair Stations in a Pickle."

Brings tears to your eyes, doesn't it?

Consider Part 103, the Ultralight Regs. The original idea was simple and philosophically sound: You can, under 103, do many things with no regulation, but only if you fly a single place aircraft and put no one else at risk. The last part is addressed by limiting operations to uninhabited areas.

Over time, enterprising people turned the UL into something close to a small airplane. They weren't hang-gliders, and the opportunities to 'teach yourself' were getting into the realm of pure lunacy. It would be a little like going out and renting a 152 to teach yourself. If I wanted to teach myself, I'd certainly rather rent than own.

But, the fundamental reality of Part 103 remained that of a single place airplane. The resolution came by coaxing the FAA to adopt certain training exemptions to Part 103. Now there are Ultralight Trainers with two seats, plus some additional fuel and weight. There are UL instructors who can haul around a student who, we are told, is not a 'passenger'.

EAA faces a somewhat similar problem. Most experimentals are 'different' from the Cessnas that people train in and rent or own. In some cases, the high performance end, the differences can be significant-- risky. There may be certificated aircraft that are similar, but as you combine elements like high performance and tailwheel, you may not get 'close enough'. You may not get the person to do enough training, anyway.

Obvious solution: if you want to buy a high performance experimental, why not train in the same model? Because aircraft with that category of airworthiness certificate are not supposed to be used for commercial purposes. For the most part, this limitation makes sense, given the limited purpose that cert provides. If you want training you may still find dealers, manufacturers, or other owners who will help without 'compensation', at least directly. But clearly, letting people use private aircraft, experimentals, for training, would be easier if you could pay them.

It might work, may work, but it probably will be messy. The UL exemption for two place immediately created a lot of flight instructors and a lot of 'trainers'. It seems obvious that there have been abuses. The FAA has seethed. Aside from this, the exemption process creates a lot of inequities and difficulties.

Two people could build exactly the same aircraft, a two place. One could register it as a homebuilt experimental. This airplane would have an airworthiness cert. The other could register it as a UL trainer, in which case he wouldn't deal with the FAA. Rather, he would go to one of the UL orgs and get an exemption, which he would carry around. Because there are two paths, several differences are possible along the way. The homebuilder has to actually do the building. The UL 'instructor' does not. He can have a dealer or the kid next door build it.

In a year, both the owners might decide to sell their aircraft. Assuming the construction was similar, these aircraft are physically the same. But one will have an airworthiness certificate, so any certificated pilot might fly it. The other will qualify for an exemption as a two place UL, but only for someone with an instructor rating, a UL instructor. If the aircraft with an airworthiness cert was sold to a UL instructor, that instructor would not be able to instruct in that aircraft because it had that piece of paper attached to it. He can't have a UL if the aircraft has an airworthiness certificate, though he might choose to un-certificate it and get the exemption. It would be difficult to go from an exempted trainer to a homebuilt experimental, under the regs.

The UL training programs have been quite successful. No one is arguing that. The only question is whether the process of regulation through exemption created rules that did not fit in terribly well with other rules.

Anyone who studies the history of UL's will find that many of the regs that really affect the sport are actually exemptions. The primary UL org, the US Ultralight Association, has been quite adept in advancing the sport through exemptions. Given the high level of competition and tension between USUA and EAA, it is interesting to see EAA moving down their sister orgs path.

USUA basically maxed out the exemption process, by trying to pile exemptions on top of each other. The Malone petition attempted to expand the privileges of those who trained under the training exemption, by giving the students another exemption for larger, or two place, aircraft. The FAA said "No". In part, this led to the formation of an ARAC committee to produce a new set of regs. That is embodied in Sport Pilot, a simplified airman certificate. Sport Pilot is a very hard sell because the exemption process and the abuses, have made people impatient with the cumbersome process of making 'real' regs. The exemption can be instant gratification. The exemption process prevents nasty comprehensive examinations of the regs. It protects what the orgs have, while offering a chance for more. Some regs may be over TBO.

In terms of EAA's request for an exemption to allow commercial use of experimentals for 'type' training, it certainly sounds good on the surface. But you do have to wonder how people may try to abuse this. What's going to prevent 'regular' training from taking place in experimentals? If experimentals are acceptable for one type of training, why not for another, anyway? The FAA may end up appearing to say "Well, they're not safe enough to train in, unless not training in them is more unsafe." Which begs the question: "ARE they safe to train in, and under what circumstances?"

EAA has almost complete control of the experimental aircraft scene. They have been heavily involved with the FAA. They also have a clear agenda -- high performance. EAA should certainly have to defend its position, at least relative to other interests. It is far from clear that the exemption process allows this to happen.

If EAA is granted an exemption, there may be abuses and there may be requests for more exemptions. The issue that EAA is addressing really suggests that where they have taken the sport has outstripped the original regs. The regulator should ask if this solution is a 'Band-aid'. EAA wants to push for high performance. That probably suggests other issues, in addition to flight training, deserve a second look. Is the aircraft certification adequate for homebuilt turbines? Flight training is part of 'safety' and that makes it a good issue, tactically. The tendency has been to try to expand the exemptions, away from the easily justified, into areas where it would be 'convenient'. But the 'exempted' use can be very hard to define. It also can create identical aircraft with different sets of paper attached to them, and pilots with different kinds of certifications, medical requirements, etc, doing exactly the same thing.

If the exemption process is sloppy, that creates other hazards. The only time the regs really matter is when things go very wrong and the legal liability is piling up. At this point, the lawyers and insurance companies will certainly become familiar with the letter of the law or regulation. If the regulations are not comprehensive, if they don't reflect the evolution of the sport, it is the little guy who will pay, but maybe only in that extreme case.

You can go to many airports and see the heavily regulated GA aircraft with regular airworthiness certificates. Next to them are the far less heavily regulated experimentals. Next to them may be completely unregulated UL's. There certainly are tensions here, and there isn't a lot of middle ground. The FAA hasn't devoted many resources to the non-commercial side of aviation. It's easy to see the abuses and the problem areas. The FAA probably needs a regulatory process that is more flexible than regular rulemaking, without using the 'emergency' exemption process.

A reference that I have gives the ceiling of the C-130 as 41,000'. I'm not sure if your "58 degrees" above is Celsius or Fahrenheit, but a standard temperature and lapse rate would put the temperature at 41,000' at -64 degrees C (-84.5 degrees F). Today's actual temperature over Indianapolis at 41,000' is -51 degrees C (-59 degrees F).

Couldn't I use FE Personal Edition as "quasi radar" in the airplane itself, if I find a way to connect a laptop to a data cable and that to a cell phone and dial in to an internet service provider, and then use FE?

Do cell phones work up there?

Fair enough, there are technical reasons not to use a cellphone aloft. But does a cellphone ENDANGER the operation of the aircraft? What about a GPS, or a laptop, or a CD player? That is a very different problem involving FAA rather than FCC.

In my opinion, if an aircraft system can be upset by a cellphone, that aircraft system can be upset by a great many signal sources and is of very questionable safety in the first place.

You don't have to be an electrical engineer to understand the relationship. Things with tiny batteries can only produce tiny signals. Things with bigger batteries can produce more. And things with big thick power lines coming in can produce a LOT more! If an aircraft system responds to a one-watt cellphone, think what it might do with a million watt TV station. What about all those high powered RF induction heaters and EDM machines and electroplaters and other electrical processes being used in the industrial area under the approach?

Today our world is full of signal sources. Most of them are far more powerful than a little cellphone, and many are less regulated. If that Gameboy in coach class is a hazard to flight, the only sane answer is to ground that aircraft until better systems are installed. And if better systems are not available (which in most cases they are not), then we had better be asking FAA some serious questions. Safety of flight is far too important to trust it to some kid playing with his toy.

On the other hand, if the FAA has been doing it's job properly and the certified aircraft systems are safe, then FAA ought to have faith in them and quit telling everyone to turn off their gadgets below 10,000 feet.

A brief note on my experience with the AIM SAS-696D carbon monoxide detector recommended by Mike Busch in his AVweb review article. My flight instructor brought his detector to the airport to demo it in my Cessna 150. We took off, climbed, cruised, turned cabin heat and air off and on, and landed. All of this with a detector reading of zero. At this point, I was beginning to question the utility of the detector.

As we taxied out behind another aircraft for a second takeoff, the reading rose to 15. We departed behind the preceding aircraft and the reading went to 25. As we turned to a heading different from the lead aircraft, the reading slowly decreased to zero and remained there for the remainder of our flight.

However, I was disturbed when I read his article. He may have gotten interested in this kind of theory independently, but my friend Gale Craig has been working on Newtonian lift theory for many many years. He finally published a book in 1995 called "Newtonian Aerodynamics Fundamentals" ISBN 0-9646806-0-2. Since that time, work suspiciously similar to his has appeared in several places. One author even published an article with material lifted directly from Gale's book! I am not saying that this has happened in this case, but I do think it bears investigation. You can get in touch with Gale at gcraig@iquest.net.

I hate to be the bearer of this kind of comment, and I realize that you had no way of knowing about this in advance. But, I do like to see credit where credit is due.

I enjoyed your Mike Busch's article in AVweb titled Flying Real-World Weather. I began wx-flying in 1972(?) when I got my multi in a Beech D-18 and the owner promptly sent me off on a trip to N.Y. or Chicago (escapes me now). I didn't like the weather forecast -- tried to back out of the trip and he said, "Fine, Joe'll take it" -- I went. My boss continually admonished me that "it's never as bad as they say." He wasn't always right, but for the most part I've found that to be the case, just as Busch said.

I don't fly the night cargo runs any longer, I fly my well-equipped 1968 Cessna 180 some 250-300 hours per year. Like Busch, I don't have to cancel many trips because of weather -- I say "many" because I do cancel occasionally when there are just too many storms, too much ice (or freezing levels too close to terra firma), etc. And, I don't fly through much bad weather because it just ain't there most of the time!

Anyway, I really enjoyed the article and forwarded it on to several of my students.

As the continuous flow of BS comes out of every "liberal" politician, America sinks deeper and deeper into the quick-sand of socialism with its accompanying long lines and congestion caused only by the lack of proper government services.

Our airports, roads, and bridges crumbling. They are not crumbling because Americans do not pay enough of their hard earned dollars in taxes to fix them. They are crumbling because the politicians would rather use those tax dollars for buying the votes of the people who "want what someone else has."

Proper government services are being displaced by social programs that simply transfer money from one group and hand it over to another group in trade for their vote at the next election. The average American family today pays $15,400 in Federal taxes, and fully half of that is "transferred" to other families instead of being used to provide adequate proper government services for all American families.

Americans have become a large flock of sheep that are being herded down the wrong path by politicians who "need" their jobs, instead of politicians who are asked to serve by their piers. They get $145,000 a year, $800,000 to run their offices, and a 2.3 million lifetime retirement after serving two terms. They promise more and more to whatever special interest group will listen and vote for them. And they deliver more and more with more and more transfer payments.

If your neighbor cannot come into your home at night and steal money off of your dresser because he thinks he needs it more than you, then why can a politician come into your home through your tax return and take the money and give it to your neighbor because he thinks the neighbor needs it more than you do?

If campaign finance reform gets by the Supreme Court, it will be over for America as we knew it.

Airports that do not expand should be restricted to a set number of travelers and aircraft that can be safely served! If the public hates airports in their back yard, then let them ride the busses or trains or drive on the bumpy superhighways.

I'm not a pilot, but have loved aviation all my life, and was in the USAF during the Korean War. I'm deeply involved with the "Save Richards-Gebaur Memorial Airport" movement.

As you may know, the city of Kansas City. Missouri has entered into a sweetheart deal with Kansas City Southern railroad to close RG and convert it into a rail/ truck/ freight hub so as to cash in on NAFTA! They want to lay rails on our 8700 foot runway, which will destroy the airport!! There have been a number of secretive, closed-door deals made between these two entities, and closing dates have been announced several times.

So far, we've held them off. We even made them bring it to a public vote, but they set it up so the people least affected could vote on the rail hub. We lost by a mere 3000 votes. Thanks to the good offices of the AOPA, the FAA has taken another look at it. We may be like Chumps playing Stud Poker, but we're still fighting them. At this point KC declares they will close RG on 12/31/99.

I have two safety-related questions:

1. I am considering searching for and purchasing a used 152 (172 is too expensive at the moment) and certifying it for IFR flight. This could be accomplished on most 152's simply by doing the required checks and calibrations, since they already have gyros and one VOR. I called a local avionics shop (Priester Aviation at PWK) who said it would cost $5000-7000 to put in a 2'nd nav/com/gs, marker beacon and DME...perhaps used. I have noticed that most 152s are flown VFR only. Is this because they are not safe IFR aircraft, or because they are too slow and don't carry enough weight for most pilots needs? My mission is primarily local, solo VFR flights with 200-500 mile IFR trips in reasonable weather every few months.

2. There are many articles in AVweb on the value of FlightSafety and other recurrent training. For single pilot IFR in a low-performance, simple aircraft such as a 152 or 172 with no autopilot, is FlightSafety type training appropriate, or am I safe with an every-three-months instrument proficiency check from a CFII?

There is no reason a 152 would not be a safe aircraft to fly IFR, provided you are careful to stay out of icing conditions and weather capable of producing strong up- and downdrafts. If you're thinking of spending $5000 to $7000 to add a second nav/com/gs and DME, it might be worth considering installing an approach-certified GPS/COM instead.

What you failed to include in this notice was that AFSCME (American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees) also submitted petitions to become the exclusive bargaining unit. What makes this real interesting is that AFSCME had over 400 votes from the Air Traffic (ATS) community while NATCA had only 20. Hmmm... This leads to a lot of questions. Isn't it just a little strange that a non aviation union can gain a solid foothold in the FAA so easily? Why didn't NATCA get the 400 votes? Is there something wrong with NATCA's approach??????

Why don't you run an article on why FAA employees feel the need to organize now? An insider's take is that FAA employees are feeling very threatened by the new Core Compensation program. This may result in many employees bailing out of the FAA because they can see serious storm clouds ahead...

That's horrible news. It essentially means that cadets at the USAF Academy and in many ROTC units will learn about flying from CFIs rather than military pilots. The CFIs know flying, of course, but have no way to answer cadet questions on what they may be getting into and CFIs can't be military roll models. Between a quarter and a third of the pilot qualified cadets initially turn down pilot training -- partially because they have bad rumors on what a pilot's life is like.

I fly right seat in a Citation in corporate service. Both the Captain and I have found that when cellphones are activated (i.e., ring, place a call, etc.) both in flight and on the ground, they set up a powerful interference with the headset. The amount of interference is dependent on the distance of the phone to the radios, but in a smaller jet, the noise created in the headset is definitely between noticeable and ungodly loud. Pagers do this to a lesser extent. You can hear the same effect by sitting in front of your computer speakers and activating your cellphone

Case in point: we were on approach to VNY, talking to SOCAL Approach, looking for traffic when someone's cellphone rang. Both of us heard this shrieking/buzzing sound in our headsets (worse than your worst case of frequency heterodyning), prompting us to remove them until it stopped. If that doesn't count as a distraction, I'm not sure what does.

1. FAA Air Traffic Control management is playing political games; deliberate slow downs and inefficient flow of air traffic to justify increased funding and additional personnel. This is not just my idea. I have confirmed this with line ATC controllers. With absolutely clear weather I have been given 30-40 minute holding patterns when arriving at major hub airports.

2. This Administration is also playing political games. By causing delays they are attempting to justify additional "user fees" to bolster the budget requests. They want to charge the airlines a fee for each radio transmission. They want to charge general aviation pilots a fee for weather briefings, flight plans, and ATC services. But user fees are already being paid. A percentage of each airline ticket, and a percentage of each gallon of gasoline purchased by general aviation users, goes into the Aviation Trust Fund. There are billions of dollars in that fund right now. But they can't be spent to modernize the ATC system because when they are spent they are accounted for on the federal budget. This is just another attempt by the Administration to covertly raise taxes.

3. FAA management attempts to fly the airplanes for the pilots. Re. the article's paragraph, "Give the FAA's air traffic command center in Herndon, Va, greater authority over rerouting planes during weather problems and other events that slow air traffic." ATC admits that their weather radar is not as good as on-board radar on the aircraft. But when weather moves over a route, ATC attempts reroutes, rather than allowing pilots the latitude of their own diversions around or through weather. This unnecessarily increases congestion and delays throughout the system.

I offer two solutions:

1. The GAO or NASA, not the FAA or Dept. of Transportation, should study the nation's air traffic system and make recommendations. It really is broken, and is in need of fixing, but the FAA cannot be trusted to be other than self serving.

2. I encourage all citizens, especially those who travel by air frequently and experience delays, to write their Congressman. Encourage Congress to support pending legislation to remove the Aviation Trust Fund from the federal budget. Free up these dollars from the political maneuvering of the Administration.

All internal USAF documents conclude there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the airplane. The Test Flight Center at Edwards did extensive testing on unmodified aircraft. That report praised the aircraft as is. One of many Broad Area Reviews is available on the USAFA web site, and gives a lengthy history of Flight Screening, the three accidents (and how the primary cause was instructor pilot inexperience, not the aircraft), and recommendations to solve existing problems. The more dramatic of which was to turn the Academy flying over to civilian IP's. The engine stoppages included a majority on the ground after trying to start a cold engine, with only a handful of in-flight stoppages, most of which occur during a spin entry with low airspeed and yaw on a lightweight propeller. Most of this information is public record. The IP corps at Hondo had utmost confidence in the aircraft and its mission and continue to be numbed by this latest turn of events.

My speculation is to focus on GEN Mike Ryan (COSAF). He refuses to talk openly about his reasons. With men like this in power, it's no wonder we can't fight a war below 15,000 feet. It's easy to understand that this was not his program, but to set back pilot training below achievable levels is not in the best interest of the USAF or the country. It might however, be in the best interest of Mike Ryan. Sending SUPT-bound pilot-trainees to local flight schools has been done ad nauseum in the past, yet the current people in charge of the USAF fail to look at their own history--quite a stragic blunder if this is indicative of their myopia. Their praise of this current flight training program is sickening at best.

When I instructed, we received all types of background trainees, from zero-timers (which the program was designed to handle) to commercial and instructor types. For me , I would prefer a zero-timer to a low time Private Pilot. Being able to fly straight and level meant very little, and that Private Pilot was as likely to get airsick as anyone else. I feel for the T37 IP's, who for the last two years have not had students with any clue of military flying. No wonder the attrition rate has soared, as it has on downstream, including advanced training in F15 Eagles. At maximum capacity with no attrition, the USAF cannot meet its requirements. Why in the world would someone want to sabotage the future of the USAF? Maybe to save their retirement, or to promote UAV's? The answers do not come easily, but I would like some real answers.

Here's the rest of the story:

The concept of cellular telephony assumes that the range your cellular telephone can transmit is very limited. If you're standing on the ground, you will not be able to send a signal much past the nearest six or seven cells. These cells aren't all that large, ranging in size from maybe a square mile to maybe 50 square miles in sparse rural areas... Once you have a cell or two between you and another site, the radio channels can be reused.

All this falls apart the moment you are more than a few hundred feet in the air. As anyone who has tuned in Unicom knows, even at 1000 AGL, you'll hear other aircraft several hundred miles away.

So what happens? A cellular telephone used in flight would saturate the one channel it is on for several hundred miles in every direction. THAT is why you shouldn't use one in flight. The problem is on the ground with the cellular telephone companies -- not in the air. That is why the FCC wrote the regulation regarding the use of a cellphone in flight.

It has nothing to do with protecting the aircraft and everything to do with protecting the cellular telephone companies on the ground.

So if anyone chooses to use a cellular telephone in flight, just remember this: You'd better have a bona fide emergency or you'll face a cellular telephone bill you'll never forget!