AVmail

It was a bomb, only a bomb could do it, and there are motives for a bomb and then it's not anybody's fault but the bad guys, whoever they are. And a very exciting story.

It will be a missile when acknowledged it went down in W-15, an area of naval ships with missiles on board, must be cover up by US Navy. And even more exciting.

It will be fuel tank explosion as soon as singed bits of wreckage are identified, must be God's fault with static electricity. Boring.

Soon, the enemies of Egypt with motives for terrorist attack will be revealed.

Soon the conspiracy angles of cover-up or assassination of important people on board will start to circulate.

Soon the stories of heroic efforts and impacted emotions of those heroes recovering the wreckage will appear.

Soon, the officials will be thanking everyone for their interest in aviation safety, and to not speculate and cause unnecessary grief, because they are doing the best they can and it will take years to have an answer and any internet stories just hampers the investigation.

Soon, the manufacturer will be saying what a safe airplane it is and flying is much safer than driving.

Soon, the government oversight agency will issue a few Airworthiness Directives, throw some blame around, and file a few lawsuits to show they are working hard to mollify the people.

Soon, the condition of the inside of the engines, the radar plots, the wreckage debris pattern, the maintenance records, the weather and winds, the FDR, the CVR, the cargo manifest, photos of and access to the wreckage reconstruction, will all be classified, be hidden, be hard to access, and be distorted or cropped.

And of course, days after event, it could be all those above and possibly many more. The confident keep thinking and modifying their hypotheses as facts arrive by the minute, while the scared and ignorant want to silence the conjecture and hide and wait and hope all the activity just goes away and things can get back to normal.

I enjoyed AVweb's Brainteasers quiz #22 on emergencies. I do have a question though.

On a recent flight to Williamsburgh, VA (JGG) I was flying on an IFR flight plan and talking to Washington Center. A 172 came on asking for immediate vectors to the nearest airport as his engine was missing badly. The controller vectored him to Ahoskie and he was about 15 NM from Ahoskie when all this started. Center asked if he wanted to declare and emergency and he said "NO". When he got to within 6 NM he saw that he could not make the airport and indicated he was going to land on a nearby road. Again he was asked if he wanted to declare an emergency and again he declined. The controller had a Baron fly over the area to relay communications for him and apparently he landed alright.

I was telling this story to a flight instructor friend of mine and indicated I was surprised he never declared an emergency. His response was that it would not have helped the situation at all since he was going to a uncontrolled field and ended up landing away from emergency facilities.

What a fascinating discussion thread on ATC delays this is in AVweb.

My experience of ATC and its problems is that of a frequent flyer with over 100,000 miles worldwide each year. I appreciate the prime function of ATC is safety and I am very tolerant of delays because the end result is I reach my destination alive!

I have some friends working in ATC here in the UK and do have some understanding of the problems in the industry. I am also responsible for contracting a traffic spotting fixed wing service (Cessna 310) on behalf of the radio station I work for and I make sure there are seats on board for ATC staff any time they wish to come with us.

But two major causes of delay astonish me in this high-tech world of communication.

The first is the inability of the FAA to establish a realistic method of flow control given the technology that is now available. I was amazed to learn here on AVweb that when a congested airport like EWR has flow restriction operating for traffic heading towards it, all the sectors which have EWR bound traffic are not fully in the picture. The controller who explained his problem of having to hold or vector flights in his sector because he had a restriction of EWR traffic but the sectors feeding him had no restriction should never have been put in that position.

Every aircraft with a flight plan should be registered in a central flow control computer on departure then all the constantly changing factors like weather and route congestion updated in real time so that each sector handling a flight is able to give it the optimum service so the sectors just outside the congested area do not get this problem. Seems simple enough to me and the costs would be recovered by virtual of the elimination of holding patterns at lower altitudes which invariably burn up more fuel.

The second cause is the crazy scheduling by airlines of departures and arrivals in excess of runway and air route capacity. I was glad to read here that Northwest has finally realized that bad scheduling can be a major cause of delays and increased costs to airlines. I hope their cooperation with ATC bears fruit.

Communication is the key to progress in this matter. Rather than looking for who to blame, all the major airlines should be looking for who to talk to and LISTEN to. By working it out together with ATC, the airlines would be able to rebuild their schedules to eliminate a large part of these delays.

I have a great respect for the good work carried out by controllers who do their best in very difficult circumstances but always keep safety as the number one priority.

Last month, Sept 29th, I was on CO 157 due out of EWR at 1650 local. After pushback at 1715 we were on the taxiway for TWO HOURS before we finally took off. I noticed on the departing runway that aircraft seemed to be restricted to one every six minutes. When I finally reached SFO I missed my connecting flight and had to take a hotel overnight at a cost of $240. Despite this annoyance, I was still grateful that the flight had reached SFO safely but was puzzled at what combination of circumstances had led to such a delay. EWR was working under clear visibility and SFO also had good weather. It could have been some form of equipment malfunction in the ATC system that led to such a restriction. The end product was a safe flight and that must always be the priority.

For me there are two sets of unsung heroes of the ATC system.

The first are the approach controllers at busy international airports who manage to filter complex traffic mixes into an orderly queue of arrivals. The knowledge of the capabilities of every aircraft type and required safe separations combined with communicating with pilots whose first language is not English is a task I do not envy.

The second are the cool characters who handle multiple cross runway operations like at SFO looking after both departures and arrivals. I was on an NWA 747 going into SFO on the morning of October 16th when we had to execute a go round. I know it happens quite a bit at SFO but I do appreciate safety is always paramount -- so no big deal.

I know I am in safe hands when ATC is operated at the sharp end by people who care with passion.

Is the need for more controllers simply understood and not stated, or do outsiders not understand how critical the shortage is?

I don't know if the aviation industry understands what that means on a daily basis. It means that more and more ATC sectors are being worked by one person instead of two (or three). It means that when you need a second person to handle the traffic that they are late in getting there or they don't show up at all. That means there are more and more "unable" to requests and more "say again, I was on the landline." In other words, we get behind the power curve more often and stay behind longer.

My major concern about this situation (of course) is the safety aspect. Safety is (and has been) degraded. It's as simple as two controllers working a sector are safer than one working alone. But if I can't get people excited about that, I will gladly take the opportunity to push for two controllers per position for efficiency's sake.

Absent a major recession, the demand on our nation's airspace infrastructure will push the ATC system even farther past its original safety design limits. And worse yet, with more errors and delays comes the frustration and the pressure to do something, anything. Sadly, actions taken under this type of pressure have, and will continue to lead to the inevitable -- catastrophe.

It is clear to me that those responsible for ATC system oversight (DOT, GAO, Congress, airlines, etc.) must stop telling FAA what they are doing wrong, and begin telling them what to do right.

The real problem with the ATC system is simple -- FAA's complete lack of vision.

From MLS to AAS, and now to GPS, ADS-B and NAS 4.0, FAA continues to prove that its vision is seriously flawed or nonexistent. They continue to spend billions ($27 Billion since 1982) on R&D and unproven technologies in an ill-fated attempt to squeeze a few more years out of the current ATC process, yet we are losing the one thing that we cannot afford to lose -- time

In the interests of safety, it is incumbent on the airlines and others to look outside FAA for a different vision of how to fix the chronic delays, operational errors and equipment problems inherent in our 40-year-old ATC system.

As I have stated in the past, I have the vision to fix the ATC problem within three years while increasing safety and capacity for less than $1 Billion. But without a change of direction by FAA, it won't happen. FAA wins; the airlines, the flying public and the taxpayers lose.

I don't know if you quoted this directly from some source, or pieced it together, but unless the word "amateur" is a direct quote, I'm surprised you'd let that slip into AVweb. I don't see that as any different than if you described a pilot other than airline as being an "amateur pilot" (such as the "common" media is so likely to do).

Having sky-dived myself, and having a friend who's an owner of the largest DZ in Colorado, I would think that they would rather not be referred to as amateur jumpers...

I would be interested in hearing John Deakin's opinion on the recent Lear 35 accident involving Payne Stewart. I know at this point he would be speculating, but we will take that into account. My own speculation. based on 25 years with USAir, is this:

1. Do most business jet Captains preflight their oxygen system prior to departure and do they do it correctly? Having an explosive decompression happens so seldom that most pilots do not really give it serious consideration therefore perhaps the Ox system does not get checked properly!

2. Even with the airlines I observed many pilots that simply toggled the Ox system to the 100% level and then flipped the switch that let the Ox flow a bit. Never even try on the mask. Might mess up the hairdo. I have found on a few occasions, after pulling the mask down to put it on that it was "Disconnected". I have found valves in the manifold set to the off position. (Previous maintenance was done on system.)

3. There should have been enough time for the pilot to grab the mask as I am sure he was taught, however I suspect (and here I go speculating) that there was something wrong with the oxygen system. It did not work. Even if the cabin pax had gotten to the masks in time, their supply of oxygen was probably from the same bottle.

The oxygen system in aircraft that fly in the Flight levels, especially above 25000', have been taken too lightly. Maybe now this will change. I cringe when I think about all those guys flying at 25000 to 30000 with nothing but chemical canisters. In the early days of Malibu sales even the canisters were an extra-cost option that some pilots did not opt for.

Okay, John, what's your take on all this?? Thanks!

Regarding the tragic crash of Payne Stewart's plane, I wonder if I could ask a couple of questions about depressurization?

If at that altitude -- about 39,000 feet -- sudden depressurization occurs and there are only 5 to 10 seconds to put on an oxygen mask, if you were able to get the mask on, wouldn't there be a pressure conflict from what your body is breathing to the outside pressure which is nil ? Is that why they have an emergency decent procedure? What psi is the oxygen going into your body through the system? Also, shouldn't one flight crew member always be on oxygen at that altitude for safety?

I think that AVweb has a chance to really point out some facts here. As we are all pro-aviation, the recent rash of celebrity crashes seem a pending doom. People will remember John Denver, JFK Jr, and Payne Stewart and point to GA as the problem. Some will point out the recent helicopter accident involving Harrison Ford, or stunt pilot Wayne Handley. All are minor in the grand scheme of things.

I think that the press misses out on the fact that quick-donning oxygen masks are required at those flight altitudes. In addition, everyone is using FAA numbers for useful time post decompression. They are saying 10 to 15 seconds. These are best-case scenarios. Most likely it's 8 to 10 seconds. Without a quick-donning mask on, there is little chance of a crew being able to interpret what happened, grabbing the mask, and pulling the oxygen flow valve prior to hypoxia. FAR 91.211 provides the clear loophole for not wearing a mask:

Since there were two pilots, they need not have the quick-donning mask on since they were under FL410. Who knows, speculating like the press is, maybe the crew was not familiar with the location of the masks, the pressure loss caused them to lose their breath, and within seconds they were suffering from hypoxia. Who knows. We probably will never know the exact cause after the horrific crash that ensued.

I don't believe many pilots have been able to experience the effects of high altitude. I've gone through an FAA-approved course once before, and am already in the process of planning for an additional course in the January time frame at Edwards Air Force Base. The Air Force, along with the FAA, have this course available to all pilots. Why don't commercial pilots use it as well? It includes ground school, decompression simulation in an Air Force altitude chamber tank and exercises to show the effects of hypoxia. VERY, and I stress, VERY educational. When you can't write down your own first name on a simple question test because you can't comprehend the question/don't understand what your name is, it's kind of spooky.

The FAA leaves a nice note on our licenses, "Safety is no accident, it must be planned." I'm planning for the future, forcing myself to experience it first hand. I'm practicing, getting myself ready, is the rest of the community ready? If not, WHY NOT?

I thought I'd throw in my two cents' worth about the contract tower program.

My background: I am a former Marine Corps airfield services officer (aircraft fire-rescue and airfield matting/lighting/arresting gear). I've been an airport fire chief at three military airfields and one civilian airport, and I'm currently an airport director, so I've had the pleasure of dealing with many air traffic control folks on various issues. Also, I was the Safety Chief (fire/rescue, operations, and law enforcement) at the airport in Albany, Georgia, when the tower went contract (it had previously been FAA-manned). Truth be told, I viewed the idea with a rather jaundiced eye (I'm from Missouri -- show me!). I knew nothing about the track record of contract towers at other airports and I was quite skeptical about having non-FAA people working with my Safety Officers, especially when an aircraft emergency or mishap was in progress.

But I'm now a believer that contract controllers can be are just as competent as FAA controllers (hell, pretty much all of them are FAA or military trained). The ones at Albany certainly were. I could not tell any difference in the proficiency between either group (as it should be).

And the contract controllers were a LOT friendlier and easier to work with than the FAA controllers were at times. One of the latter, in particular, was a real pain. He had terrific mood swings and regularly acted as though pilots passing through his airspace and vehicles on his AOA were an imposition. He was well-known throughout the local flying community, and the pilots (and my Safety Officers) had little use for him. Everyone could tell the difference when the FAA controllers left and the contract controllers came in, and our traffic numbers started to go back up. And I regularly heard favorable comments about the contract controllers from the pilots I associated with at the airport and EAA meetings.

Why the difference? There's one big incentive for the contract controllers -- they know that if the airport doesn't like the service they've been getting, it will let the FAA know loud and clear. It doesn't matter to the airport which company comes in and works, as long as they do a good job. On the other hand, the FAA controllers have the union and government work rules to protect them. They have to be competent -- but they don't have to be customer-friendly.

A further incentive -- the benefit/cost (B/C) ratio for a number of the airports with contract towers hovers close to 1.0, which is the break-even point. If the traffic numbers go down, and the B/C goes below 1.0, the airport has to pay the difference. In Albany's case, while the FAA controllers were there, the airport received a two-year letter notifying us that the B/C was below 1.0 and if it didn't go up, the tower would have to close (this was before the FAA instituted the cost-sharing program). After the contract controllers came on board, the numbers started to rise, we saw an increase in activity, and the B/C went back up over 1.0. Was it entirely due to the friendlier attitudes of the contract controllers? They certainly played a major role, if the comments from my fellow pilots and EAA members were any indication. There's a heck of a difference between an abrupt "Contact Center, xxx.x," and "Contact center, xxx.x, y'all come back now, y'hear?"

I can hear the anvil chorus now -- "That's anecdotal evidence, don't judge all FAA controllers and contract controllers by what you experienced at one airport." True enough. However, almost all of the other airport directors I've talked to (and I've talked to a BUNCH of them) have had very favorable experiences with the contract controllers. And if the contract controllers were unsafe, why would the FAA stick its neck out by giving them passing grades on their evaluations? I know that the Albany contract controllers did just fine in their evaluations -- it didn't appear to me that the Feds fudged the evaluations or cut any slack to the contract folks, and that's as it should be.

If there is a problem with the program, it's in the staffing (as has been pointed out by NATCA). The FAA does indeed need to make the contractors toe the line to meet staffing standards, and we (the airports) will help them monitor the contractors if they give us half a chance. When we asked the Feds to give us the necessary information to do just that, they said they couldn't, as that information was part of each contractor's bid, and giving it out would compromise the confidentiality of their bids. But they did say they would look for ways to help us keep tabs on the contractors' staffing and adherence to the contract.

In summary: I went from being a hard-nosed skeptic to an eager believer on the subject of contracting Level 1 towers. I don't know enough about contracting out anything above that level, I'll leave that debate to those who have a dog in that fight. And I'll be happy to listen to arguments against the contract towers. But if those arguments focus don't focus heavily on the safety and customer service aspects, it'll be tough to get me to change my mind, based on my experience and the comments I've heard from other airport folks.

So thanks a lot, AVweb! My wife will now be the finest-outfitted pilot at FFZ. Meanwhile, I'm still flying with my ten-year-old headset, and I may not be able to afford avgas much longer. Guess I'll be lookin' for that second job soon.

Regarding your "QANTAS DECISION PAR FOR THE COURSE" story and the comment that "Qantas has never lost an aircraft and isn't about to let this bogey be the first" ...

The truth is that Qantas has had over 60 aircraft accidents since WW2 including at least 15 where the aircraft was a total loss, five with fatalities and at least four with no survivors.

My source? Wings to the World -- the story of Qantas from 1945 to 1966 by Sir Hudson Fysh.

The authors credentials are excellent. Not only was he one of the founders of QF but Chairman of the Board (CEO) for many years until his retirement in 1966.

Appendix 8 is titled Accidents to Qantas aircraft 1946-66 Excluding accidents to light aircraft (the capital E is in the official title). This lists most of the heavy aircraft accidents however the text and photographs include several more including one with no survivors.

One should remember that although QF has not had a fatal since January 1970 it must be remembered that QF is a very small airline -- just 44 aircraft before the merger with Australian about 5 years ago.

While United has had four fatal accidents since 1970 it has operated over 15 million flights in that period giving it a fatal accident rate of less than 1 per 3.75 million flights.

QF has operated less than 1.1 million flights in the same period. Assuming the same rate of operations this means QF needs just one fatal before September 2068 to have a worse fatal accident rate than United. (The math is 3.75 / 1.1 x 29 plus 1970 = 2068.86.)

So it would be very interesting to read a test of good quality passive headsets in AVweb. After all, the passive ones are quite a bit cheaper than active ones. And as Mike Busch stated in his review of the latest LightSPEED active headset, most active headsets do not improve the silencing capabilities that much in active headsets compared to passive ones, at least not in headsets up to $400.

I figure, many guys like me rather want passive quality headsets, than low end active ones. They will probably serve us longer and take the beating of being transported in a bag, being moved from one rental plane to another.

It appears as though Continental has increased the price of their crankshaft from $2,600 to $5,000 dollars.

I realize that they set their price at $2,600 to make the necessary change not hurt so bad. However, even with the shortage, is there any way to get them to reduce the price of a new crank back to the $2,600 dollar range?

Your choice of fruit in the headline "NATA Squeezes an FAA Lemon" struck me as curious. Given that you quote NATA vice-president Andrew Cebula, and that "cebula" is Polish for "onion," perhaps you might have considered something along the lines of "Repair Stations in a Pickle."

Brings tears to your eyes, doesn't it?

Consider Part 103, the Ultralight Regs. The original idea was simple and philosophically sound: You can, under 103, do many things with no regulation, but only if you fly a single place aircraft and put no one else at risk. The last part is addressed by limiting operations to uninhabited areas.

Over time, enterprising people turned the UL into something close to a small airplane. They weren't hang-gliders, and the opportunities to 'teach yourself' were getting into the realm of pure lunacy. It would be a little like going out and renting a 152 to teach yourself. If I wanted to teach myself, I'd certainly rather rent than own.

But, the fundamental reality of Part 103 remained that of a single place airplane. The resolution came by coaxing the FAA to adopt certain training exemptions to Part 103. Now there are Ultralight Trainers with two seats, plus some additional fuel and weight. There are UL instructors who can haul around a student who, we are told, is not a 'passenger'.

EAA faces a somewhat similar problem. Most experimentals are 'different' from the Cessnas that people train in and rent or own. In some cases, the high performance end, the differences can be significant-- risky. There may be certificated aircraft that are similar, but as you combine elements like high performance and tailwheel, you may not get 'close enough'. You may not get the person to do enough training, anyway.

Obvious solution: if you want to buy a high performance experimental, why not train in the same model? Because aircraft with that category of airworthiness certificate are not supposed to be used for commercial purposes. For the most part, this limitation makes sense, given the limited purpose that cert provides. If you want training you may still find dealers, manufacturers, or other owners who will help without 'compensation', at least directly. But clearly, letting people use private aircraft, experimentals, for training, would be easier if you could pay them.

It might work, may work, but it probably will be messy. The UL exemption for two place immediately created a lot of flight instructors and a lot of 'trainers'. It seems obvious that there have been abuses. The FAA has seethed. Aside from this, the exemption process creates a lot of inequities and difficulties.

Two people could build exactly the same aircraft, a two place. One could register it as a homebuilt experimental. This airplane would have an airworthiness cert. The other could register it as a UL trainer, in which case he wouldn't deal with the FAA. Rather, he would go to one of the UL orgs and get an exemption, which he would carry around. Because there are two paths, several differences are possible along the way. The homebuilder has to actually do the building. The UL 'instructor' does not. He can have a dealer or the kid next door build it.

In a year, both the owners might decide to sell their aircraft. Assuming the construction was similar, these aircraft are physically the same. But one will have an airworthiness certificate, so any certificated pilot might fly it. The other will qualify for an exemption as a two place UL, but only for someone with an instructor rating, a UL instructor. If the aircraft with an airworthiness cert was sold to a UL instructor, that instructor would not be able to instruct in that aircraft because it had that piece of paper attached to it. He can't have a UL if the aircraft has an airworthiness certificate, though he might choose to un-certificate it and get the exemption. It would be difficult to go from an exempted trainer to a homebuilt experimental, under the regs.

The UL training programs have been quite successful. No one is arguing that. The only question is whether the process of regulation through exemption created rules that did not fit in terribly well with other rules.

Anyone who studies the history of UL's will find that many of the regs that really affect the sport are actually exemptions. The primary UL org, the US Ultralight Association, has been quite adept in advancing the sport through exemptions. Given the high level of competition and tension between USUA and EAA, it is interesting to see EAA moving down their sister orgs path.

USUA basically maxed out the exemption process, by trying to pile exemptions on top of each other. The Malone petition attempted to expand the privileges of those who trained under the training exemption, by giving the students another exemption for larger, or two place, aircraft. The FAA said "No". In part, this led to the formation of an ARAC committee to produce a new set of regs. That is embodied in Sport Pilot, a simplified airman certificate. Sport Pilot is a very hard sell because the exemption process and the abuses, have made people impatient with the cumbersome process of making 'real' regs. The exemption can be instant gratification. The exemption process prevents nasty comprehensive examinations of the regs. It protects what the orgs have, while offering a chance for more. Some regs may be over TBO.

In terms of EAA's request for an exemption to allow commercial use of experimentals for 'type' training, it certainly sounds good on the surface. But you do have to wonder how people may try to abuse this. What's going to prevent 'regular' training from taking place in experimentals? If experimentals are acceptable for one type of training, why not for another, anyway? The FAA may end up appearing to say "Well, they're not safe enough to train in, unless not training in them is more unsafe." Which begs the question: "ARE they safe to train in, and under what circumstances?"

EAA has almost complete control of the experimental aircraft scene. They have been heavily involved with the FAA. They also have a clear agenda -- high performance. EAA should certainly have to defend its position, at least relative to other interests. It is far from clear that the exemption process allows this to happen.

If EAA is granted an exemption, there may be abuses and there may be requests for more exemptions. The issue that EAA is addressing really suggests that where they have taken the sport has outstripped the original regs. The regulator should ask if this solution is a 'Band-aid'. EAA wants to push for high performance. That probably suggests other issues, in addition to flight training, deserve a second look. Is the aircraft certification adequate for homebuilt turbines? Flight training is part of 'safety' and that makes it a good issue, tactically. The tendency has been to try to expand the exemptions, away from the easily justified, into areas where it would be 'convenient'. But the 'exempted' use can be very hard to define. It also can create identical aircraft with different sets of paper attached to them, and pilots with different kinds of certifications, medical requirements, etc, doing exactly the same thing.

If the exemption process is sloppy, that creates other hazards. The only time the regs really matter is when things go very wrong and the legal liability is piling up. At this point, the lawyers and insurance companies will certainly become familiar with the letter of the law or regulation. If the regulations are not comprehensive, if they don't reflect the evolution of the sport, it is the little guy who will pay, but maybe only in that extreme case.

You can go to many airports and see the heavily regulated GA aircraft with regular airworthiness certificates. Next to them are the far less heavily regulated experimentals. Next to them may be completely unregulated UL's. There certainly are tensions here, and there isn't a lot of middle ground. The FAA hasn't devoted many resources to the non-commercial side of aviation. It's easy to see the abuses and the problem areas. The FAA probably needs a regulatory process that is more flexible than regular rulemaking, without using the 'emergency' exemption process.

A reference that I have gives the ceiling of the C-130 as 41,000'. I'm not sure if your "58 degrees" above is Celsius or Fahrenheit, but a standard temperature and lapse rate would put the temperature at 41,000' at -64 degrees C (-84.5 degrees F). Today's actual temperature over Indianapolis at 41,000' is -51 degrees C (-59 degrees F).

Couldn't I use FE Personal Edition as "quasi radar" in the airplane itself, if I find a way to connect a laptop to a data cable and that to a cell phone and dial in to an internet service provider, and then use FE?

Do cell phones work up there?

Fair enough, there are technical reasons not to use a cellphone aloft. But does a cellphone ENDANGER the operation of the aircraft? What about a GPS, or a laptop, or a CD player? That is a very different problem involving FAA rather than FCC.

In my opinion, if an aircraft system can be upset by a cellphone, that aircraft system can be upset by a great many signal sources and is of very questionable safety in the first place.

You don't have to be an electrical engineer to understand the relationship. Things with tiny batteries can only produce tiny signals. Things with bigger batteries can produce more. And things with big thick power lines coming in can produce a LOT more! If an aircraft system responds to a one-watt cellphone, think what it might do with a million watt TV station. What about all those high powered RF induction heaters and EDM machines and electroplaters and other electrical processes being used in the industrial area under the approach?

Today our world is full of signal sources. Most of them are far more powerful than a little cellphone, and many are less regulated. If that Gameboy in coach class is a hazard to flight, the only sane answer is to ground that aircraft until better systems are installed. And if better systems are not available (which in most cases they are not), then we had better be asking FAA some serious questions. Safety of flight is far too important to trust it to some kid playing with his toy.

On the other hand, if the FAA has been doing it's job properly and the certified aircraft systems are safe, then FAA ought to have faith in them and quit telling everyone to turn off their gadgets below 10,000 feet.

A brief note on my experience with the AIM SAS-696D carbon monoxide detector recommended by Mike Busch in his AVweb review article. My flight instructor brought his detector to the airport to demo it in my Cessna 150. We took off, climbed, cruised, turned cabin heat and air off and on, and landed. All of this with a detector reading of zero. At this point, I was beginning to question the utility of the detector.

As we taxied out behind another aircraft for a second takeoff, the reading rose to 15. We departed behind the preceding aircraft and the reading went to 25. As we turned to a heading different from the lead aircraft, the reading slowly decreased to zero and remained there for the remainder of our flight.

However, I was disturbed when I read his article. He may have gotten interested in this kind of theory independently, but my friend Gale Craig has been working on Newtonian lift theory for many many years. He finally published a book in 1995 called "Newtonian Aerodynamics Fundamentals" ISBN 0-9646806-0-2. Since that time, work suspiciously similar to his has appeared in several places. One author even published an article with material lifted directly from Gale's book! I am not saying that this has happened in this case, but I do think it bears investigation. You can get in touch with Gale at gcraig@iquest.net.

I hate to be the bearer of this kind of comment, and I realize that you had no way of knowing about this in advance. But, I do like to see credit where credit is due.

I enjoyed your Mike Busch's article in AVweb titled Flying Real-World Weather. I began wx-flying in 1972(?) when I got my multi in a Beech D-18 and the owner promptly sent me off on a trip to N.Y. or Chicago (escapes me now). I didn't like the weather forecast -- tried to back out of the trip and he said, "Fine, Joe'll take it" -- I went. My boss continually admonished me that "it's never as bad as they say." He wasn't always right, but for the most part I've found that to be the case, just as Busch said.

I don't fly the night cargo runs any longer, I fly my well-equipped 1968 Cessna 180 some 250-300 hours per year. Like Busch, I don't have to cancel many trips because of weather -- I say "many" because I do cancel occasionally when there are just too many storms, too much ice (or freezing levels too close to terra firma), etc. And, I don't fly through much bad weather because it just ain't there most of the time!

Anyway, I really enjoyed the article and forwarded it on to several of my students.

As the continuous flow of BS comes out of every "liberal" politician, America sinks deeper and deeper into the quick-sand of socialism with its accompanying long lines and congestion caused only by the lack of proper government services.

Our airports, roads, and bridges crumbling. They are not crumbling because Americans do not pay enough of their hard earned dollars in taxes to fix them. They are crumbling because the politicians would rather use those tax dollars for buying the votes of the people who "want what someone else has."

Proper government services are being displaced by social programs that simply transfer money from one group and hand it over to another group in trade for their vote at the next election. The average American family today pays $15,400 in Federal taxes, and fully half of that is "transferred" to other families instead of being used to provide adequate proper government services for all American families.

Americans have become a large flock of sheep that are being herded down the wrong path by politicians who "need" their jobs, instead of politicians who are asked to serve by their piers. They get $145,000 a year, $800,000 to run their offices, and a 2.3 million lifetime retirement after serving two terms. They promise more and more to whatever special interest group will listen and vote for them. And they deliver more and more with more and more transfer payments.

If your neighbor cannot come into your home at night and steal money off of your dresser because he thinks he needs it more than you, then why can a politician come into your home through your tax return and take the money and give it to your neighbor because he thinks the neighbor needs it more than you do?

If campaign finance reform gets by the Supreme Court, it will be over for America as we knew it.

Airports that do not expand should be restricted to a set number of travelers and aircraft that can be safely served! If the public hates airports in their back yard, then let them ride the busses or trains or drive on the bumpy superhighways.

I'm not a pilot, but have loved aviation all my life, and was in the USAF during the Korean War. I'm deeply involved with the "Save Richards-Gebaur Memorial Airport" movement.

As you may know, the city of Kansas City. Missouri has entered into a sweetheart deal with Kansas City Southern railroad to close RG and convert it into a rail/ truck/ freight hub so as to cash in on NAFTA! They want to lay rails on our 8700 foot runway, which will destroy the airport!! There have been a number of secretive, closed-door deals made between these two entities, and closing dates have been announced several times.

So far, we've held them off. We even made them bring it to a public vote, but they set it up so the people least affected could vote on the rail hub. We lost by a mere 3000 votes. Thanks to the good offices of the AOPA, the FAA has taken another look at it. We may be like Chumps playing Stud Poker, but we're still fighting them. At this point KC declares they will close RG on 12/31/99.

I have two safety-related questions:

1. I am considering searching for and purchasing a used 152 (172 is too expensive at the moment) and certifying it for IFR flight. This could be accomplished on most 152's simply by doing the required checks and calibrations, since they already have gyros and one VOR. I called a local avionics shop (Priester Aviation at PWK) who said it would cost $5000-7000 to put in a 2'nd nav/com/gs, marker beacon and DME...perhaps used. I have noticed that most 152s are flown VFR only. Is this because they are not safe IFR aircraft, or because they are too slow and don't carry enough weight for most pilots needs? My mission is primarily local, solo VFR flights with 200-500 mile IFR trips in reasonable weather every few months.

2. There are many articles in AVweb on the value of FlightSafety and other recurrent training. For single pilot IFR in a low-performance, simple aircraft such as a 152 or 172 with no autopilot, is FlightSafety type training appropriate, or am I safe with an every-three-months instrument proficiency check from a CFII?

There is no reason a 152 would not be a safe aircraft to fly IFR, provided you are careful to stay out of icing conditions and weather capable of producing strong up- and downdrafts. If you're thinking of spending $5000 to $7000 to add a second nav/com/gs and DME, it might be worth considering installing an approach-certified GPS/COM instead.

What you failed to include in this notice was that AFSCME (American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees) also submitted petitions to become the exclusive bargaining unit. What makes this real interesting is that AFSCME had over 400 votes from the Air Traffic (ATS) community while NATCA had only 20. Hmmm... This leads to a lot of questions. Isn't it just a little strange that a non aviation union can gain a solid foothold in the FAA so easily? Why didn't NATCA get the 400 votes? Is there something wrong with NATCA's approach??????

Why don't you run an article on why FAA employees feel the need to organize now? An insider's take is that FAA employees are feeling very threatened by the new Core Compensation program. This may result in many employees bailing out of the FAA because they can see serious storm clouds ahead...

That's horrible news. It essentially means that cadets at the USAF Academy and in many ROTC units will learn about flying from CFIs rather than military pilots. The CFIs know flying, of course, but have no way to answer cadet questions on what they may be getting into and CFIs can't be military roll models. Between a quarter and a third of the pilot qualified cadets initially turn down pilot training -- partially because they have bad rumors on what a pilot's life is like.

I fly right seat in a Citation in corporate service. Both the Captain and I have found that when cellphones are activated (i.e., ring, place a call, etc.) both in flight and on the ground, they set up a powerful interference with the headset. The amount of interference is dependent on the distance of the phone to the radios, but in a smaller jet, the noise created in the headset is definitely between noticeable and ungodly loud. Pagers do this to a lesser extent. You can hear the same effect by sitting in front of your computer speakers and activating your cellphone

Case in point: we were on approach to VNY, talking to SOCAL Approach, looking for traffic when someone's cellphone rang. Both of us heard this shrieking/buzzing sound in our headsets (worse than your worst case of frequency heterodyning), prompting us to remove them until it stopped. If that doesn't count as a distraction, I'm not sure what does.

1. FAA Air Traffic Control management is playing political games; deliberate slow downs and inefficient flow of air traffic to justify increased funding and additional personnel. This is not just my idea. I have confirmed this with line ATC controllers. With absolutely clear weather I have been given 30-40 minute holding patterns when arriving at major hub airports.

2. This Administration is also playing political games. By causing delays they are attempting to justify additional "user fees" to bolster the budget requests. They want to charge the airlines a fee for each radio transmission. They want to charge general aviation pilots a fee for weather briefings, flight plans, and ATC services. But user fees are already being paid. A percentage of each airline ticket, and a percentage of each gallon of gasoline purchased by general aviation users, goes into the Aviation Trust Fund. There are billions of dollars in that fund right now. But they can't be spent to modernize the ATC system because when they are spent they are accounted for on the federal budget. This is just another attempt by the Administration to covertly raise taxes.

3. FAA management attempts to fly the airplanes for the pilots. Re. the article's paragraph, "Give the FAA's air traffic command center in Herndon, Va, greater authority over rerouting planes during weather problems and other events that slow air traffic." ATC admits that their weather radar is not as good as on-board radar on the aircraft. But when weather moves over a route, ATC attempts reroutes, rather than allowing pilots the latitude of their own diversions around or through weather. This unnecessarily increases congestion and delays throughout the system.

I offer two solutions:

1. The GAO or NASA, not the FAA or Dept. of Transportation, should study the nation's air traffic system and make recommendations. It really is broken, and is in need of fixing, but the FAA cannot be trusted to be other than self serving.

2. I encourage all citizens, especially those who travel by air frequently and experience delays, to write their Congressman. Encourage Congress to support pending legislation to remove the Aviation Trust Fund from the federal budget. Free up these dollars from the political maneuvering of the Administration.

All internal USAF documents conclude there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the airplane. The Test Flight Center at Edwards did extensive testing on unmodified aircraft. That report praised the aircraft as is. One of many Broad Area Reviews is available on the USAFA web site, and gives a lengthy history of Flight Screening, the three accidents (and how the primary cause was instructor pilot inexperience, not the aircraft), and recommendations to solve existing problems. The more dramatic of which was to turn the Academy flying over to civilian IP's. The engine stoppages included a majority on the ground after trying to start a cold engine, with only a handful of in-flight stoppages, most of which occur during a spin entry with low airspeed and yaw on a lightweight propeller. Most of this information is public record. The IP corps at Hondo had utmost confidence in the aircraft and its mission and continue to be numbed by this latest turn of events.

My speculation is to focus on GEN Mike Ryan (COSAF). He refuses to talk openly about his reasons. With men like this in power, it's no wonder we can't fight a war below 15,000 feet. It's easy to understand that this was not his program, but to set back pilot training below achievable levels is not in the best interest of the USAF or the country. It might however, be in the best interest of Mike Ryan. Sending SUPT-bound pilot-trainees to local flight schools has been done ad nauseum in the past, yet the current people in charge of the USAF fail to look at their own history--quite a stragic blunder if this is indicative of their myopia. Their praise of this current flight training program is sickening at best.

When I instructed, we received all types of background trainees, from zero-timers (which the program was designed to handle) to commercial and instructor types. For me , I would prefer a zero-timer to a low time Private Pilot. Being able to fly straight and level meant very little, and that Private Pilot was as likely to get airsick as anyone else. I feel for the T37 IP's, who for the last two years have not had students with any clue of military flying. No wonder the attrition rate has soared, as it has on downstream, including advanced training in F15 Eagles. At maximum capacity with no attrition, the USAF cannot meet its requirements. Why in the world would someone want to sabotage the future of the USAF? Maybe to save their retirement, or to promote UAV's? The answers do not come easily, but I would like some real answers.

Here's the rest of the story:

The concept of cellular telephony assumes that the range your cellular telephone can transmit is very limited. If you're standing on the ground, you will not be able to send a signal much past the nearest six or seven cells. These cells aren't all that large, ranging in size from maybe a square mile to maybe 50 square miles in sparse rural areas... Once you have a cell or two between you and another site, the radio channels can be reused.

All this falls apart the moment you are more than a few hundred feet in the air. As anyone who has tuned in Unicom knows, even at 1000 AGL, you'll hear other aircraft several hundred miles away.

So what happens? A cellular telephone used in flight would saturate the one channel it is on for several hundred miles in every direction. THAT is why you shouldn't use one in flight. The problem is on the ground with the cellular telephone companies -- not in the air. That is why the FCC wrote the regulation regarding the use of a cellphone in flight.

It has nothing to do with protecting the aircraft and everything to do with protecting the cellular telephone companies on the ground.

So if anyone chooses to use a cellular telephone in flight, just remember this: You'd better have a bona fide emergency or you'll face a cellular telephone bill you'll never forget!

Not three minutes later, the needles again went to 45* off center. This time, the Captain directed me to confront the naughty passenger and tell him in no uncertain terms that cellphone usage was prohibited and that it was interfering with our primary navigation systems. Again, as soon has he disconnected, the needles returned to normal.

The timing of the needle malfunction in both instances was simultaneous with his cellphone usage; it left no doubt in our minds that one was the direct cause of the other.

After four months of excuses and promises that it will improve, it's only getting worse. When I called to see what their excuse was this month, they told me that they could not send me cards at all because not enough people are returning the expired cards for re-programming. So after $20,000 in avionics expense and another $600 for updates, I'm up the river.

It's scary to consider that this is the organization I rely upon to keep my butt out of the trees when I'm shooting an IMC instrument approach.

Perhaps this person was trying to save some of us in his own way.

I finally have refused to fly on these, after years of following the situation re 737 rudders. I flew a USAir 737 into Pittsburgh about an hour after the crash there, and have been very interested in this issue ever since.

I also believe that there is probably no risk to the airplane and avionics systems from cell phone usage, but that is not a reason to allow their use on aircraft. From a purely technical point of view, the cell phone network was designed for use by ground based mobiles, not airborne ones. It is very easy to jump to conclusions about the fact that there is a monetary interest on the part of the communications networks and airlines but the fact remains that the network that is available in aircraft today is designed for use by aircraft and the cellular phone network is not. The cellular operators are quite justified in not wanting to offer the use of their network to users in aircraft.

Regarding the statement:

This is absolutely correct. The cell network operates by measuring the relative signal strength of a mobile by various ground stations to determine which one should route the call. As the mobile moves, the signal gets weaker at one base station and stronger at another, a "hand off" is performed and the next base station continues the call. When a mobile is 30000 feet up in the air, many base stations on the ground will "see" it with equal signal strength and the system won't know how to connect the call properly. Add to this the fact that these many base stations may belong to various cellular service providers, and you can have a call bouncing across 3 states and 5 providers in a matter of minutes. When the caller gets his bill and sees ridiculous roaming charges for one call, he will call customer support at his cellular provider and complain.

Another problem is that to be able to receive a call at a mobile, the system has to be able to "locate" the mobile in a specific network and inform the rest of the network of this location so calls can be routed to the mobile. If that one mobile appears in those same multiple systems, it is very difficult or impossible to connect the call. Customers will experience dropped calls or be out of reach when they expect to be reachable, again causing complaints.

I had the displeasure of visiting the FliteStar booth at Oshkosh '99 and talking to one of the "passionate" FliteStar team. When I asked why they were not offering a product for the Macintosh computer his response was unprintable.

By the comments I have read here and elsewhere I guess they have done me a favor by ignoring the tens of thousands of Mac aviators. I suspect that the type of customer service exhibited by their attitude is responsible for the quality of the product and service offered by FliteStar.

Mr. Laurin's response also smacks of "attack the complainant and ignore the complaint"!!

Just a quickie here from Canada. Testing was carried out up here and found that the only way cell phones could cause a interference with navaids was if along with eight other scenarios on board happened all at the same time. These include:

a) a portable device radiating over the limit at which receiver disruption can occur;

b) a location in the worst case position in the aircraft cabin (i.e., in a seat with a window near the aircraft antenna);

c) the portable device is orientated to maximum peak radiation in directions from minimum path (signal) loss (i.e. normally out the window);

d) reflection paths offered by objects outside the aircraft (i.e., wing, control surfaces, etc.);

e) the frequency of emission from the portable device falls within the aircraft receiver system operational frequency band;

f) the frequency of emission from the portable device falls with the receiver pass band;

g) the characteristic of emission is suitable to cause receiver disruption which may or may not be observable by the flight crew; and

h) a receiver system is operating at near its minimum signal level.

Because these conditions are independently variable, the RTCA concluded the chances of all occurring simultaneously are very low.

The info is in our AIP COM ANNEX B1-1 regs. The report was done in 1988 by the RTCA Special Committee 156 (SC-156).

This theory is based on the fact that the network software assumes that the phone talks to only its nearest cell relay station, which hands it on to the next relay as you move.

From altitude, the phone may "see" dozens of cells, and the software would be totally confused and possibly crash the whole system.

Perhaps a specialist in cell phone technology could say if this theory is correct.

Never fear, Paul. Use of a cellphone aloft is extremely unlikely to cause a crash of any kind.

The network software is quite robust enough to deal with phones hitting multiple cell sites, otherwise folks using cellphones on 13,000-foot mountain peaks (which is completely legal) would be crashing it daily.

Almost any kind of electronic device may cause some problems with aircraft navigation. We know that our VHF navcoms may interfere with our GPSs, for example. The policy and practice of airlines is to avoid use of electronic devices by airline passengers during critical times of departure and approach. In the air, during cruise, a cellphone presents little more risk to navigation or other aircraft electronic systems than a laptop computer.

The use of an ordinary cell phone (analog or digital) in an aircraft is prohibited by the FCC if the aircraft is not on the ground. This prohibition is not related to safety of flight of the aircraft nor is it directly related to economic issues of the use of phones designed for in-flight use.

The problem is directly related to the design of the terrestrial cellphone network (as opposed to the design of the in-flight phone system -- which is also a cell-type system). The terrestrial cell phone network was explicitly and only designed to work properly with the cellphone subscribers being on the ground or in buildings. The cell sites have to share frequencies with each other. The same is true with the cellphones themselves. The frequencies are valuable and have to be shared in a careful manner.

When a cell phone is lifted significantly above the ground (as in a flying aircraft) that phone is then able to 'see' (communicate with - because these frequencies are, excepting some reflections, only line-of-site-based systems) many, many ground-based cells and other cell phones that it would not otherwise be able to 'see'. This can cause problems for the system. The frequency pair that in-flight cellphone and its ground-based cell are using to communicate with is then either interfering with or causing to become unavailable that frequency pair over an area of hundreds of square miles. Whereas the cell system can normally allow that frequency pair to be in simultaneous use, without interference, in large numbers of cases across a city, when the frequency is used from a plane, suddenly that frequency pair does not have its ordinary availability across the whole of the city.

The cellphone system exploits the power of the ground and its obstructions (especially in cities) to prevent communications over long distances. Use of a cellphone from the air may present the same burden to the cellphone system as a hundred individual subscribers, but with additional complications and interference. The natural barriers of the ground (trees, buildings, hills, earth curvature, etc.) to long distance communication have been removed by effectively giving the airborne cellphone user an antenna height that lets his cellphone 'see' every cellphone and cell in the entire metropolitan area. Cell designers often slightly point their cell (not the cell phone) antennas toward the ground or even put the antennas in valleys to deliberately prevent them from transmitting or receiving from too far away. (This is in metropolitan areas.) A cell area in a city is very small compared with a cell in the country to accommodate the greater number of subscribers per square mile in the city. Cell phone systems in a large city will not work properly at all unless many, many users in that city can simultaneously share frequencies -- they can do this by being blocked from line-of-site contact with each other. They are separated from each other by obstacles, which if removed would allow interference.

Yes, the cellphone will 'work' in an aircraft in the air. They work too well! However, the user may have no idea of the problems he has caused other uses, whose calls may have been dropped or otherwise interfered with because the natural terrestrial barriers are not present when the phone is used from the air.

The coverage in AVweb News (AVflash 5.41) thus does a disservice to all telecom users, especially ordinary cellphone users. A reader of the article might reasonably draw the implication that there is no legitimate interest served in obeying that law. (Who really wants to give the airlines more money for use of their phones, when the cellphone you are carrying in your briefcase will likely work perfectly well?)

There is a large fraction of the airline-traveling American public that believes that the only reason to use the airline's in-flight phone is to generate revenue for the airline and the phone system operator. You just confirmed their prejudices!

All in all, the article fails to clearly indicate what the significant issues are. (I grant you it is a very brief note that you are essentially relaying!) You covered two of them (aircraft interference and the economic interest the airlines have in passengers using airliner-based in-flight phones), but completely failed to note anything about the terrestrial cellphone system and how it is disrupted by in-flight use of ordinary cell phones. It is this last point upon which the law prohibiting in-air ordinary cellphone use is based. There is an FCC fine of up to $10,000 for use of an ordinary cellphone in the air.

Of course, if there is a real emergency and proper in-flight phones or other communication systems are not available, use of an ordinary cell phone in flight becomes another matter.

Keep up the good work in aviation, but consult with outside experts where appropriate so that your reporting of aviation-related matters does not resemble typical mass media reporting of aviation!

We are aware of the technical reasons for not permitting cellphone use in aircraft. If you go to the web site and read the full text version of the story in Newswire you will note that we did mention that the FCC outlaws aircraft cellphone use, not the FAA, and the reason why: interference with ground-to-ground transmissions. For space reasons, we can not provide all the details in AVflash that we include in Newswire at the AVweb site.

The point we were trying to make in the AVflash version is that the airlines are telling us that we can't use our cellphone because it could interfere with aircraft systems, when there is not data to support that statement. In fact some airlines are now permitting passengers to use their cellphones while the aircraft is still on the ground. Maybe airlines should just say that the FCC bans aircraft cellphone use during flight and leave it at that.

What got my attention in Mike's response was what seemed to be a hostile belligerence toward the FAA and its inspectors. I know that most of us are leery of the bad apple inspectors, none of whom I have met but have tracked their exploits in these pages. Busch states that if you get ramp checked you would have to display the logs, but if you don't have them then you agree to do so at a mutually agreed time? Why does this matter? There should be nothing in the logs that will change from the time until you get them to the inspector, and if they are properly up to date (as they should be whether or not they are in the A/C) then there is nothing that an inspector should find fault with.

I am quite familiar with the accounts of capricious and vindictive nature of some FAA personnel but I cannot believe that they are the rule else there would be many, many more accounts of such things. The immediate adoption of an evasive attitude may indicate that there is something that the inspector should try to find out about hence the experience is likely to be much more unpleasant.

I do understand that we are the "customer" for the FAA and it is incumbent on them to change according to our wishes, but at what point does this convey on us as pilots and owners the right to be jerks to the FAA? Why must we adapt such a combative attitude? If you have nothing to hide, then DON'T. If you do, you shouldn't be flying in that aircraft as you are endangering others as well as yourself and you should be hammered for it. You might say that you have to do this to protect yourself from the unscrupulous FAA inspectors, I respond that in the rare event that you find one, you are probably going to get hosed either way. However you might forestall it by being (wonder of wonders) forthright, up front and courteous. For the combativeness between us and the FAA to move towards a more cooperative attitude has to start somewhere. For us as pilots to say "Well the FAA started it!" such statements belong on grade school playgrounds, not among mature adults. Why can't we take the lead in smoothing the troubles? Maybe the powers that be would be more receptive to us if we took a less hostile attitude.

I'm going to get excoriated for this next one: I do not own an aircraft at this time, I am a renter. This will undoubtedly lead to those saying "how could you possibly know what you are talking about." I respond thusly: with regards to the vagaries of the full legal aspects of ownership I don't. But I am talking about attitudes and common courtesy in an attempt to lessen the belligerent relationship that many people have with the FAA. I count among my friends and teachers several current and former FAA inspectors. I have known them to be a professional lot trying to do a difficult task made more difficult by their less professional colleagues. I have been ramp checked twice, once during a solo cross country and once during a $100 cheeseburger run. Both times I was courteous and honest with the inspector and displayed all the info he asked for and gave him the contact info for the Flight school and FBO to obtain the records for the stuff I didn't. In both cases we chatted a bit about planes and flying and went our separate ways. I know this is not representative of all ramp checks but was of mine. To sum up I will say this: Being courteous and helpful to an inspector may not make things any better, but assuming a hostile attitude WILL make it worse.

I would like to comment briefly on the article about cellphone usage in aircraft. While the article was technically accurate insofar as reporting the case history of cellphones interrupting flight instruments, and it was also correct in insinuating the financial advantage that airlines enjoy by forcing their customers to use the onboard telephones, the implication that we could realistically turn our cellphones on and happily chat away in the air is completely impractical.

I don't know if you have ever tried to use a cellphone in flight in spite of the rules, but I have. Actually, I never have tried to make a call with one, but I have left mine on countless times while flying (I am an airline pilot for a major airline). The idea of being able to use a cellphone while flying is completely impractical. Once through about 10,000 feet, the thing is useless, since you are too high and moving too fast (and thus changing cells too rapidly) for the phone to provide a signal. It drops into search mode. While at cruise altitude, I have occasionally noticed that the phone will acquire a signal when over a large metropolitan area, but never for more than a few seconds at a time.

Your article was technically accurate, but the point was made moot by the unusability of a standard cell phone in flight. The FCC could rewrite the law and everyone would celebrate for about a day -- until they actually tried to use their phones, in which case they would quickly sigh and pull out their credit cards for the onboard phones once again.

Chris, I believe it depends on what kind of cellphone you're using. My state-of-the-art tri-mode (digital/analog) Nokia 6200 is absolutely useless aloft, just as you said. If I turn it on, it remains in search mode and never reports service available.

Also, I do believe that there are an increasing number of NASA ASRS reports about cell phones causing EMF problems, but without searching the database, I can't be positive.

Hilton Goldstein says in his letter [AVmail 04-Oct-1999] that Roger Long is wrong and he uses the example that airfoils create lift even at and angle of attack (AOA) of zero. Roger responds to that saying that airfoils create no lift at AOA=0, and uses an explanation that does not follow conventional definition used in aerodynamics, and should be considered wrong. Roger, you might want to grab any aerodynamics textbook and look up the definition of angle of attack (which is the angle between the relative wind and the mean aerodynamic chord of the airfoil), and of the coefficient of lift, which is a function of AOA. Most standard airfoils have a lift coefficient greater than zero at AOA=0. As an example, just take a look at John D. Anderson: "Fundamentals of Aerodynamics", McGraw Hill, New York, 1999, Fig. 4.5, which shows the lift coefficient as a function of AOA for the NACA 2412 airfoil. Its AOA for zero lift is -2.1 deg.

Roger, just ask any aerodynamicist about this. They have been designing aircraft with lift coefficients greater than zero at AOA=0 for a while now, and those aircraft are still flying...

Yes, it is difficult to visualize the concept of lift, and the pressure distribution over an airfoil is not as easy as the standard pilot textbook wants to make us believe by stating the Bernoulli concept. That oversimplifies matters to a point, where the "lift doesn't suck" discussion comes in too often. Bernoulli's law has so many conditions, under which it can / should be used, that the standard pilot textbook just can't cover all these conditions, which might cause the confusion to many pilots. Let's all rest assured, that both Bernoulli and Newton keep our airplanes in the air, but they need help from a whole lot of other scientists, who discovered the physics behind airfoils mostly in the first 30 years of this century (there is Kutta, Joukowski, von Karman, Prandtl, Euler, d'Alembert, just ask any aspiring aerospace student who is studying for his / her aerodynamics exam...).

Dr. Zube, I may have misunderstood Mr. Goldstein's letter because I thought he was referring to angle of attack as being the angle between the flat bottom of the wing and the airflow, a common misconception. I tried to point him toward the concept that angle of attack is the angle between the mean chord and the relative wind without getting into the full explanation, assuming relative wind level, etc. I also pointed out that, as you say, coefficient of lift will not be zero at zero angle of attack for all airfoils. Perhaps "all" should have read "most."

The airfoil you are referring to, due to its shape, is producing circulation and lift when the mean chord is aligned with the relative wind. Aircraft designers need a standard, geometric reference for angle of attack. There is also a functional angle of attack which would be -2.1 degrees for the airfoil you cite. I am inventing a term here but I am trying to clarify the physical processes for the layman, not cover aerodynamics 101. -2.1 for the airfoil in question is the angle at which circulation ceases; there is no difference in flow speed or pressure between top and bottom, and no net displacement of air to one side or the other.

This is a simplification, of course. There may be some circulation and will certainly be areas of higher and lower pressure. Air will be moved up and air will be moved down. The key point is, at this functional zero attack angle, there will be no net displacement of mass to create a reaction forcing the wing in the opposite direction.

The -2.1 degrees is a fudge necessitated by the fact that no simple geometric description can predict the actual behavior of a wide variety of shapes subject to complex interactions with the airflow. My article was intended to move readers towards a fuller understanding of what keeps planes aloft, not provide a complete and rigorous explanation of the science of aerodynamics. After all, what's 2.1 degrees among friends?

The complete explanation of lift could occupy a full doctorate course of study and the total understanding has not yet been achieved by the discipline as a whole. Any short and simple explanation of the basics will inevitably be incomplete. There are also a number of chicken-and-egg questions in lift and it is a challenge to keep the reader aware of when you are discussing cause and when you are simple describing what can be observed. This is especially difficult as authorities disagree about some of these issues.

Incidentally, there's a fascinating discussion going on about my "Lift Doesn't Suck" article with 90 messages already posted.

Obviously there was an incomplete preflight and then as he gives his engines full throttle and receives no input on his airspeed indicator he continues to take the plane down the entire length of runway and still not liftoff which I imagine anyone capable of flying that type of plane should be able to do without an ASI (of course he should have aborted very early in the roll). But being that he missed the pitot tube cover, what else did he miss? Three people had to be seriously injured because of this pilot's negligence. It's a shame...

As someone who once started a takeoff roll in a twin Cessna with the pitot cover in place (and an FAA employee in the right seat ... long story), I tend to be a bit less judgmental when I hear about accidents like this. Let he among us who has never done anything stupid in an aircraft cast the first stone.

I am delighted they take notice of criticism. They might find more useful information if they listened more closely. Specifically, I have spoken to their representatives about the new, and "click intensive" data input their FlightStar revision requires. The "Wizard" requires innumerable data entries and boxes while refreshing the screen each time. Although the information may help pilots plan an extraordinarily complex flight (such as stopping at various airports without refueling, refueling at others, passing directly overhead a third set...perhaps to drop a banner...) the complexity of data entry hardly justifies the benefits.

Still, all might be forgiven if the darn thing simply worked. It dos not. It generates incorrect flight plans. It conveys incorrect airport information. It is dangerous and unusable. The "patches" that Jepp. has offered on the web do not fix the problem. In fact, you can make the case that they are harmful in the sense that they might give users a false sense of security.

One of the prime directives of all aviation information purveyors (of which Jepp. is the largest) is clearly accuracy. Accuracy is directly related to safety. And FlightStar is not safe. It is dangerous to use and to rely upon.

I am disturbed that the Mac version has been discontinued. But had Jepp. modified the Mac version as well as the PC version and delivered a similar "mess", my comments and criticisms would be the same.

In AVflash 5.41, you reported:

The Confederate Air Force is not a certificated air carrier, never has been and doesn't want to be. We are not a 121, 125, or a 135 operator; we are a WWII Flying Museum.

PLUS, when the voluntary questionnaire was received last April, the CAF did fill it out and return it as requested. What happened to it after the envelope was entrusted to the U.S. Post Office is anyone's guess.

As soon as I received word that the FAA did not have the survey, I faxed it to the appropriate office.

To my knowledge, the "safety issue" regarding such use, has never been a serious concern.

FCC CFR 47, Change 1 of 10/01/92, paragraph 22.911 (A) (1) states as follows:

Note that this regulation even includes use in balloons, which clearly suggests that this is not the "stuff" of concern or regard to interfering with electronic equipment operation in IFR conditions.

This rule is in place because of FCC concerns for interference in the operation of the cellular telephone land based system...which, as the name implies, operates in a complex system of radio coverage "cells" controlled by a central computer system... all of which is designed on the premise of individual cell phones being operated at ground levels.

The use of a cell phone while airborne, runs a significant risk of being able to electronically reach two or more ground sites which are assigned the same frequency, which may disable the system in part...and in the very least, render the user unable to obtain service.

Thus FCC regulations are more about technical concerns of operating the cell phone system...NOT safety in aircraft operations.

I once observed a B727 charter crew attempting to check in with their operations from FL330, using a cell phone. After several attempts, they gave up... believing "it must not be working." It may be possible, in random circumstances, to actually complete a call. I.e., it's desired you will not do so, for technical reasons.

The FCC prohibition against in-flight cellphone use is an entirely different subject.

The Wall Street Journal article and RTCA study that were cited in AVweb News concerned itself with airline and FAA policies with regard to cellphone use. The WSJ article indicated that a 1996 RTCA study commissioned by the FAA failed to find any evidence that cellphone use in airliners presented a hazard to aircraft systems.

The article further stated that although the FCC prohibition against in-flight cellphone use is routinely violated on a daily basis, no one has ever been prosecuted in the U.S. for such a violation.

In the section entitled "Obstacles," John states that the best way to achieve obstacle clearance is to keep the aircraft on the ground until the last possible moment and then lift off and climb over the obstacle with decreasing airspeed and then lower the nose.

My question is: Does keeping the aircraft on the ground create more or less drag than perhaps using the technique he calls the "Real Short Field Way"? If, on an obstacle clearance take off, the aircraft was lifted "six inches above the ground" at just above the stall and then accelerated in ground effect before beginning the climb over the obstacle, could more speed/shorter distance be obtained? I would guess that at least on grass fields (long grass?) where there is a fairly large rolling resistance compared to paved surfaces, lifting the airplane off at the earliest possible opportunity would decrease the overall drag at this point, but what about on a paved runway?

Paul, thanks for your comments, which show you already have an excellent understanding of the issues!

Essentially your question boils down to whether "rolling drag" is greater than the induced drag at minimum airspeed. On a hard, smooth runway, I believe rolling drag (which is negligible) is a good deal less than the induced drag imposed by the lift it would take to fly at low speed in ground effect, so I believe you're better off to "let it roll" while building airspeed.

Once you get away from hard, smooth surfaces, the picture changes, and it becomes much more difficult to determine which is better!

You indicated a nose gear failure may have been related to the overrun. But in the series of photos taken by an SIA pilot, the last photo showing a detached landing gear is not from the nose. The nose gear of the 747 is a two wheel arrangement while the wing and body gear have two trucks or four wheels. Considering the tilt angle on the gear shown, it is the wing gear from the right side. It may be that the nose gear did not extend.

Prior to the 747-400 program, there had not been a single case of a nose gear failing to extend. It was decided then that the manual nose gear extension system would be removed. Since the first commercial flight of the 747-400, there have now been three nose gear failures. Two Qantas and one United. The United case was a maintenance-related problem (some tool or something else in the gear mechanism) on a 747-400. The prior Qantas case was a 747-200 purchased from Singapore Airlines (SIA) and that was a partial extension.

$2.22 million over thirty seconds of turbulence!?!?!? Who are these turnip heads?? I fear for my life commuting to and from the airport every day on the highways and I'm not suing anyone. Maybe all passengers should get a nice big warning that airplanes occasionally encounter turbulence stapled to their idiotic foreheads prior to boarding. Oh well, I just had to vent.

Why does aviation always attract these blood-sucking suits?

However, these particular aircraft were not carrying their maintenance logs with them. Bummer!....'cuz I need them to sign off the repair/repairs as airworthy. Unfortunately, 1 set of logbooks was in Illinois, and the other in Washington.....but I'm in Colorado.

I know it can be a pain to haul the logs around, but you really need to have them with you when you fly....aircraft don't always experience problems at your base airport, in fact, Murphy's Law says the aircraft only breaks down when you are as far as possible from home.

Remember, the FAR's state that the logs must be presented to an official upon request.....and these officials don't always just hang around your base airport. I need to sign for the work that I perform, and the flight crew/owner needs to ensure that I have signed for the work performed. Without logs in hand, we are in a "sticky wicket".

I am more than happy to help make everyone's trip more enjoyable by getting their aircraft back in airworthy condition....but I need to sign the logs as I am required. I want to keep my license intact 'cuz I love aviation...and I've got a family to provide for.

Please ensure that your logs are onboard the aircraft so we can make your trip to the Yampa Valley safe and enjoyable.

Gerard, thanks for your note. You raise an interesting subject, because there are decidedly two sides to this issue.

If you ask almost any aviation attorney about this, you will probably receive an unequivocal recommendation that pilots and aircraft owners should NEVER carry their pilot logbooks and maintenance records when flying, for precisely the reason you mentioned: If confronted with a ramp check or other surprise inspection by an FAA inspector, the pilot/owner is required to present the logbooks to the inspector ... but only if they have them handy! If they don't have them, then the inspector can be put off until a later, mutually-agreeable time.

As an owner/pilot myself for 35 years, I NEVER carry my maintenance records with me when I fly. I further recommend that such records not be kept at the maintenance shop, hangar, or anywhere near the airport for that matter. If confronted by an FAA inspector, it seems to me that you want those records to be as far away and inaccessible as possible.

As an instructor, I recommend to my aircraft-owner students that they do the same.

In the unfortunate event that I require unscheduled maintenance while on the road, there's no problem. FAR 43 and 91 require that such maintenance work be recorded and signed off, but there's no requirement as to the physical form such maintenance records may take. It's perfectly legal for such maintenance entries to be made on the back of an envelope ... or more realistically, on a piece of paper (or preferably a self-adhesive sticker) that can be incorporated into the maintenance logbook after the pilot/owner returns to home base.

AVweb columnist Rick Durden reminded me of another disadvantage of carrying logbooks in the aircraft: It makes it a far more attractive target for thieves.

FliteStar, the new release (8.X), was shipped with so many bugs that it was taken off the market. A "complete rewrite", 8.3, was posted last week to fix some of the problems and another maintenance release is due out in "a couple of weeks."

I am writing to you in hopes of getting the FAA privacy position reversed. The Airman data base is very important to the aviation community at large and this cannot be overlooked. I am a California Highway Patrol Officer and CFI, and I have no objections whatsoever to having my name and address published. I am just as much a privacy advocate as the next person, but I think the FAA decision has gone too far by not giving the airman, etc. the chance to opt out all together, or just use a business or other address. There is a happy medium which I feel can be reached with little effort or cost on the FAA's part. I would ask that each and every time a student pilot, airman, etc. fill out a DOT/FAA form, there be a place to put a P.O. Box or "other" address such as a business address, and make it clear that the address will be used for publication in the data base. This should suffice for most people that are fearful of unsolicited mail, stalkers, or others from finding their homes. I am sure you are aware that if someone wants to find another person or their address for evil or unscrupulous reasons it can easily be done with or without the FAA data base being public.

General aviation is already in serious trouble as you know. I think this ill thought out policy is only going to make this situation worse. If General Aviation is to move forward and thrive, mailing addresses will have to be available to AOPA and others who rely on it to attract future pilots. Local airport associations will have a much harder time reaching local pilots. Sponsors of pilot safety seminars will have difficulty notifying pilots in the area of the event. When Phil Boyer holds his Pilot Town Meetings, notices may wind up being sent only to those pilots in the area who are AOPA members.

I think that if there was sufficient notice and comment, airmen would overwhelmingly support this change that I propose. I cannot believe there was no NPRM, no public comment period, no consultation with alphabet groups...just a unilateral decision by the FAA lawyers. This is not the way the FAA should operate. I think that this kind of summary judgment by non pilots is just the kind of thing that perpetuates the attitudes that the FAA is the "bad guy".

As far as I'm concerned to H$%L with the mass mailing and junk mail

I attended the Cleveland Air Show with my son on Labor day, celebrating the 50th year since my Father and I attended the last Cleveland Air Races in 1949.

The Cleveland show was great and held safely over the waters of Lake Erie until the Blue Angels put on their show. I enjoyed the wonderful capabilities of the F-18 and the skill of the pilots until they began to fly through and among the buildings of Cleveland's city center. I mean below the tops of the buildings!

Passing among and below the tops of those buildings may have been spectacular. I cannot believe it was worth the risk of a crash into one of those buildings. It proved nothing and could have cost the Navy and the city of Cleveland too much to calculate.

I mentioned that my Dad and I attended the 1949 National Air Races in Cleveland. This was the Thompson race in which Bill Odum crashed into a house in Beria. This crash caused the National Air Races to leave Cleveland forever. As I watched this display by the Blue Angels, I wished, hoped, and prayed that the tragedy of the past would not be repeated. It wasn't this time

The event was widely published a the time, and a report was published in the Spanish edition of Reader's Digest.

Pilots and refueling crews were held not responsible for the incident, and rather the government office in charge of the units and measurements were charged with negligence, because a national change of the system of measurement from inches to metric had taken place just before the incident, with sloppy procedures.

Since then, I've been hearing of planes full of people taking off with pilots knowingly taking chances as the one of the fuel gauge instruments. I recently flew a Twin Otter during one hour, with the pilots taking frequent looks at the T5 gauge of the starboard engine, which was nearing the red mark from the beginning of the flight.

I'm not a pilot, but my son flew Twin Otters for a time and I grew familiar with the plane, which I fly frequently in.

I don't remember the details of the Canadian incident, but I think AVweb could report again on that case, which gains new opportunity because of NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter metric-inches fluke and could be of interest to your readers.

I tried to calculate the lift of a Piper Archer wing based on the momentum change caused by moving air downward. Using some estimates that would tend to exaggerate the amount of lift generated, I can only account for one quarter of the lift needed for an Archer to fly.

The article explains that the pressure drop above a wing is because air cannot expand quickly enough to fill the space left behind the wing. It follows that there should be a region of higher pressure on the leading edge of the upper wing up to the topmost point, where air would be compressed, then the pressure should drop past that point as the air expands. However, the plots of pressure profiles over airfoils that I have seen show that there is typically a region of high pressure along the leading edge, then a region of low pressure that extends up to the top of the wing and on back to the trailing edge.

Allow me to attempt to answer the question of why everyone keeps prattling on about Bernoulli. The physical laws of gas dynamics are known, but the equations are so difficult that without a computer most problems are unsolvable. Bernoulli figured out that if some assumptions are made, the equations become simple. Even better, the errors caused by differences between his assumed world and the real world are usually small enough not to matter, especially when doing the math by hand.

In its simplest form, Bernoulli's equation states that for a tiny volume of air, the static pressure (pressure that it exerts on the things around it) plus the dynamic pressure (pressure that it exerts when it runs into things) are constant. When the tiny volume of air speeds up, its dynamic pressure increases. Faster-moving air blows things harder. But according to Bernoulli, when the dynamic pressure increases, the static pressure must decrease.

By Bernoulli's principle, the leading edge of the wing would experience both the static pressure, which acts in all directions, and the dynamic pressure, since the air is running into the wing. But behind the leading edge, where the air is running more over the wing than into it, the wing would experience only the static pressure. If that static pressure is reduced more on the top of the wing than the bottom, some lift is generated.

Finally, if ground effect causes an increase in the pressure below the wing, then that pressure should act upward and aft against the lower surface of the wing. This would increase lift, but it would also increase induced drag. Perhaps instead the ground causes air to flow around the wing in a more efficient pattern.

Regarding your attempt to calculate the amount of air moved downwards, i.e. lift, by a Piper Archer:

"Downwards" is a rather loose term for the general direction of movement, the air actually goes in a lot of directions at many different velocities. The lift is the sum of all these products of direction and speed. Do you have a Cray computer in your den? No? Then the calculations you are doing are hopeless. What we do know is that the sum of the mass of air moved times the velocity of its disturbance squared is exactly equal to the weight of the airplane.

Bernoulli is real and there is indeed a difference in pressure between the top and bottom of the wing. The average of these pressure differences times the area of the wing is exactly equal to the weight of the airplane. The pressures close to the wing surfaces are created by differences in flow speed and can be predicted by the laws first described by Bernoulli. The differences in flow speeds are caused by the circulation process that was first described long before I came along. Several respondents dismissed my article by saying there is nothing new here. To them, I say, "I would certainly hope not." I am simply trying to provide a clearer explanation of things already known and observed but not widely understood.

Your discussions of Bernoulli are a consistent extension of what my article was thrusting at. It is the overall difference in pressure between top and bottom that is significant so pressures in localized areas can be, and are, reversed. The excellent John Denker web book, to which other respondents have provided links, provides good coverage of these issues. This is the book that got me thinking about all this and I owe a lot to it. Its only weakness is a confusing discussion of circulation, a lack which prompted me to write this article.

You say, "Finally, if ground effect causes an increase in the pressure below the wing, then....".

It doesn't.

Then you say, "Perhaps instead the ground causes air to flow around the wing in a more efficient pattern."

Ah, you got it. Ground effect, by reduction of upwash, and other flow modifications, lets you have the same amount of lift at a lower angle of attack. Lift is perpendicular to the wing; thus slightly backwards. This is induced drag.Lower angle of attack, not as much backwards component to lift, less drag.

Except for skin friction, antennas, landing gear, etc.; the distinction between lift and drag is just a thought convenience. Lift is really just drag directed upwards by a lot of complex processes various aspects of which have been described by Newton, Bernoulli, Denker, and others.

Different than how it may appear on a news thread, we do listen to our customers and especially to those who "flame" us. However, as you can imagine, we can get little worthwhile information from a comment such as it is not "user friendly." Without specifics, it is difficult to take steps to correct and improve the product. We strongly encourage data-rich comments regarding our product. Moreover, based upon quality comments from other sources we have recently released FliteStar 8.03 that addresses many of the issues identified. This "service release" is free to all customers via a web download. We will continue to enhance and refine this product as our customers demand.

Our team here in Oregon has a passion for flying and developing high performance software for the aviation community. Often this requires our customers to change and as you know some pilots don't like change.

The introduction says: "It's neither wing curvature nor the difference in path length of air passing over and under the airfoil." Wrong - if the top surface did not 'produce lift', why then, does a typical airfoil produce lift when AOA=0? (AOA being defined as the angle between the chord line and the relative wind) Clearly the top surface contributes to the wing's lift.

The next sentence says: "...it has much less to do with Bernoulli and suction than it does Newton..." Wrong. It has *exactly* the same amount "to do" with Bernoulli as with Newton.

The author says: "First of all, lift has nothing to do with the curve on top of the wing." Wrong - example given above. How can the author claim this? He then claims that since flat planes can generate lift, the top surface doesn't help at all! This is (obviously) seriously flawed thinking. The Cl depends completely on the airfoil shape, both top and bottom.

Just below, he says: "Airplanes, birds, whatever, are not "sucked" up into the air except during tornadoes." without defining the word "sucked" rendering the statement highly ambiguous. The word "suction" gets thrown around a lot in this article to try prove a point, all the while leaving the reader more confused as to what the author believes this "suction" to be.

"Airfoils, wings, barn doors, plywood sheets, hands sticking out of cars, all can create lift but only when the air is striking them at an angle (of attack)." Wrong. See my statement (AOA=0) above.

The article later says: "The inertia of the air that goes over the top of the wing tries to keep it moving in a straight line, while the pressure of the atmosphere tries to push it down towards the wing's surface." Wrong. The word "inertia" implies the author does not fully comprehend "relativity" and/or 2D motion.

About Bernoulli, he says: "But this is only a small part of the story of lift." Wrong again. This is 100% of the story of lift, just as Newton too is 100% of the story of lift. Bernoulli does not provide part of the lift, and Newton the other part. Their theories both describe 100% of the lift. Airfoils satisfy *both* Bernoulli and Newton all the time, irrespective of AOA or any other parameter. Describing things in terms of cranes and hooks is boggling - to me at least.

Referring to the air below the wing, the article claims: "The air below the wing is moving slower than it would if the wing were rotated to move edgewise and stop the circulation process. Therefore, it is pressing harder on the wing." Wrong again. There is no reason for the pressure below the airfoil to be above ambient, and in fact, it may well be below ambient during very high speed flight.

I believe the statement: "The difference between ambient pressure and the pressure on top of a wing is generally greater than the difference on the bottom." to be a typo. Otherwise what does: "...greater than the difference on the bottom." mean?

Later on, it says: "Modestly powered aircraft seldom operate like this, and then only near maximum speed since minimum lift is being produced." leaves me asking the question "Does the author known anything about the coefficient of lift?" At the maximum speed, minimum speed, or anywhere in between, the wing will be producing *exactly* the same amount of lift (ignoring the effects of vertical thrust etc). This begs the question of: "Does the author full understand aerodynamics related to the coefficient of lift". Yes, at high speed, Cl will be at a minimum (again ignoring engine effects), but Lift certainly will not be, as claimed by the article.

The geometric definition of angle of attack to which you refer in your second paragraph is the angle between the MEAN chord line and the relative wind. Take a sketch of the classic, flat bottom, airfoil and draw a line from front to back that is midway between the top and bottom at each point. You will then see that the front is slightly higher than the back. The shape creates an angle of attack while the bottom is aligned with the relative wind.

True, if you draw the leading edge out to a very sharp point, the ends of the curve will be at about the same height. However, the aft part of the foil, where the air is swept out to create the low pressure that accelerates the flow over the forward part, will still be at an angle to the relative wind. You are not describing zero angle of attack in your letter.

If you walk around the tie downs, you will not see any wings with sharp leading edges on subsonic craft. Many will have an upwards slope to the lower surface just behind the leading edge that brings the mean chord line up. Guess why.

Surely you realize that if you keep tipping the leading edge of the wing down in the airflow, it will start "lifting" towards the earth. In between, there is a point where there is no net force in either direction. This is the true zero angle of attack and will not coincide exactly with the geometric definition for all wing shapes. By this more exact definition, there can be no lift at AOA=0.

The heading with the sentence "it has much less to do with Bernoulli..." was actually written by an editor and I did note it before publication. You didn't realize it but, you are *exactly* agreeing with my article in this paragraph of your letter.

The amount of lift (coefficient) is completely dependent on the airfoil shape (assuming equal air density). Curvature is not required however for there to be some lift.

On suction: Yes! I plead guilty to flip statements and throwing words around in order to engage the reader. I promise to do better. If anyone is still confused about what suction is, please email me and I will try to break the suction between my tongue and my cheek and make it clear to you.

Your paragraph: "The article later says: 'The inertia of the air...'" Well, any single sentence statement about something this complex is always going to be "wrong." This was an article; not a book. Again, if anyone else is still confused....

I am pleased to see you agreeing with me 100% in the next two paragraphs. Read it again carefully and perhaps you'll understand why you are. "Small" was poor word choice in "small part of the story of lift." Note however that I was referring to the importance in the explanation; not the magnitude of any forces.

"Greater than the difference on the bottom" means that a barometer in cabin will usually vary more from one placed just above the wing than from just below it. (The barometers on the wings would have to be very small and close to the wing.) True, there can be negative pressure (relative to the cabin barometer) over some of the wings underside. It is the difference between top and bottom that is important.

Since I am not an aerodynamic engineer, I did await comments on this article with some trepidation, dreading a big "GOTCHA" that really made me feel silly. So far, there has only been a small one and to you goes the credit. The sentence, "Modestly powered aircraft seldom operate like this, and then only near maximum speed since minimum lift is being produced" clearly should read "minimum coefficient of lift." To avoid discussing coefficients, it could also have said something like "minimum lift per knot of airspeed." I am left feeling less confident about my writing than my grasp of these physical principles.

Several other respondents asked about boundary layer. I will be going on to do further articles covering boundary layer, stalls, and other topics in which coefficient of lift will figure prominently. Readers will be better able then to judge my understanding of these topics. My writing hopefully will benefit from this experience. My thanks to all who posted responses. Stay tuned, stall is not so much loss of lift as it is loss of the wing's stability in the air stream. Get your keyboards ready.

I called AOPA only last week to see if they could do anything about my medical. I have been a CFI for over thirty years now and recently took time to take some cancer treatments. I have been certified as clear and clean with no side effects by my doctors. I sent the required statements to the FAA in OKC. A week later I called to see what the hold up was.

Seems that it takes at least three weeks just to get your name into the computer. It takes another six weeks for their examiners to get to the bottom of the pile where my medical lies. If any personnel take a vacation I can expect another month delay. My friends make snide remarks about how a prostate problem should not affect a pilot who uses a yoke.

The three year FAA program to computerize the medical program is making it necessary to slow up the usual paperwork program while employees learn how to use the system. Hence, the delays are now worse that ever before.

In the meantime I have had to hand a student, only three flights from taking his flight test, over to another instructor. I cannot begin with two other students. For years I have heard the horror stories of FAA treatment of medical applications. Now I am getting the full treatment. AOPA can't act quickly enough to suit me.

Incidentally, I have a 500,000+ word web site containing what I have collected about instructing over the past thirty years. Another 200,000 additional words going up soon at http://www.whittsflying.com.

Gene, I can empathize with your problem. Unfortunately, depending on the type of cancer and how long ago you finished you treatments, you may not have even needed to be deferred to OKC at all.

With a cancer patient who has been out of therapy for more than three months (with certain exceptions like melanoma), and letters from your treating physician stating you are in good health, in remission, and do not have residual effects, your AME could have called the Regional Flight Surgeon to ask for permission to issue right on the spot. If your AME was lazy, he just deferred you application leaving the work for OKC and you waiting.

As a member of the EAA's Aeromedical Council, I have seen this as a recurrent problem from many pilots in similar situations. Even the FAA representatives representatives at Oshkosh agree it is a problem which makes more work for them also. Hopefully, with the new computer system which went on line October 1, the delays will shorten significantly.

While it is very important to have the support of the pilots and users of an airport, they are actually a small minority in most communities. Their support is best put to use is in lobbying the non flying members of the community to support the airport, rather than lobbying the politicians directly. We should encourage the use of the airports as a park where you can picnic at picnic tables and watch the planes or any other use that might have a broad community appeal. I find it very gratifying to see a family with small children (a non flying group that appreciates the open space and airplanes) come to eat their lunch, and enjoy the surroundings. With so much concern about open space, communities should be made aware of how much undeveloped ground an airport and its approach surfaces can save from future development.

In order to garner majority support, you've got the get the rest of the population behind you. This is best done in a low key, behind the scenes way, rather than at public meetings. Take the time to let the local politicians know that the airport is a asset valued by the majority of their constituents, and anti airport initiatives will never get off the ground. It should also be done long before there is a problem, so that the community support is available at those meetings, should they ever occur. By the time an issue gets to a public meeting, its fate is probably already sealed. In other words, airports require preventative maintenance just like airplanes.

The loss of reliever airports around cities may be the biggest problems GA faces in the US if we can hold off user fees. Wouldn't you hate to be in Austin Texas?

My home base, Norwood Mass has an anti- airport group SNAG- Stop Norwood Airport Growth. We don't have an equivalent pro airport group and we need one. I've tried to find an AOPA airport representative- there supposedly are AOPA people assigned to airports, but the effort seems ineffective. AOPA's approach is top down, pre Internet thinking and here's where AVweb could play a part- Mike, I know you are aware of Grumman users group, Grumman Gang. This is an e-mail group of Grumman owners who share information, answer questions, etc. It is self-running with volunteers serving to keep it going. I know more about my plane through this than I ever thought possible thanks to the gang.

If we all had an e mail group for our home airports we'd be far more effective as a counter lobbying group. We care a lot more about keeping our airports than neighbors but they live there and are geographically more informed- we pilots are disbursed but the Internet eliminates that problem. What if you sponsored this concept, provided the servers, helped AOPA set it up-I don't know exactly how but having AVweb do something may kick it off the ground. It would be the most critical empowering factor in saving airports IF EVERYONE KNEW ABOUT IT! Besides, the e-mail groups are fun and you get to know lots of interesting people.

What do you think?

My question is... I have flown a total of about 5 hours with the unit. The first 2 hours were on a cross country flight and the alarm did not go off. The highest reading I noticed was 100-125.

The second time I used it was on the return, two-hour flight. On that flight, the alarm went off about 15 miles from my destination. Again, the digital readings were in the 100-125, but spiking up around 150.

Then, tonight, I took the family up for a brief flight around the local area and it went off after about 30 minutes in flight. The peak reading was 161, I believe.

According to the manual, the alarm shouldn't be going off at these levels unless they remain at these levels for an extended period of time. That's why tonight's alarm is a mystery. After only 30 minutes, the alarm went off. But when I hit the Test/Hush button, it only showed a peak of 161. Do I have a defective unit?. Are CO levels of 100-175 for 2-3 hours harmful?

DO NOT FLY YOUR AIRPLANE until you've ascertained the source of the CO contamination and corrected it! CO levels above 100 PPM are definitely a very serious safety hazard.

In my judgment, any level above zero is a cause for at least some concern, and I would make an effort to find where it's coming from. Various public safety agencies (OSHA, etc.) have established levels between 35 and 50 PPM as the maximum allowable in a workplace. However, that's based on being at zero feet AGL, and considers only physical hazards, not mental impairment. The adverse effects of CO poisoning and altitude-induced hypoxia are cumulative, and the requirement for peak mental acuity while flying is obvious, so logic dictates that the maximum allowable CO level in an airplane cockpit should be lower than it should be in the workplace.

Interestingly enough, the FAA has no standards on this, and has done no research that I can find on the effects of low-level CO contamination on pilot performance at altitude. I would like to see the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City launch a study on this subject, and publish some guidance, but so far they don't seem to be very interested.

I found out about this site from the weekly AVweb AVflash newsletter. I visited Vrotate and discovered incredible deals on all sorts of charts and pubs. Imagine being able to buy sectionals for $5.75! Approach plates and instrument charts can be as low as $3.45! Shipping charges are unbelievably low.

I ordered a collection of sectionals, terminal area charts and low alt enroute charts just to see how the system worked. My order was filled immediately and I had the package by Priority Mail in 2 days! I decided to see how responsive their "support" email was so I dropped them a note at 11:00. Evidently, they live next to the computer because I had an answer 15 minutes later! What a treat!

I would like to provide a testimonial for the AIM SAS-696D carbon monoxide detector. I recently purchased a 1957 Cessna 172 and joined the Cessna Pilots Association. I began receiving their emails and visited their Web site.

One of the articles mentioned the importance of having a CO detector in the airplane, and mentioned the AIM unit sold by Aeromedix.Com. I deliberated about spending the money and decided, based on the article, to purchase one. I put it in the plane and it read zero PPM, but because it was summer, the heater was off.

About a month later, I was flying around and, curious, turned on the aircraft heater to see if there was detectable CO levels in the cabin. With the overhead vents open and the heater on, the reading went up to 70 ppm! I didn't try it with the vents closed. Of course, I took the plane to the mechanic and he replaced the heat exchanger seals. The reading is now down to less than 20 ppm with heater on and vents closed. I shudder to think of what would have happened this winter if I had not purchased the detector. It may have saved my life and that of my family or friends.

As a long-time FAA employee, sometimes I feel like just crawling under a rock and hiding and admitting to no one that I work for the FAA.

I was encouraged to read Brent Blue's brief summary of the importance of oxygen use at even moderate altitudes. He stated that masks are required above 18,000 feet. I am considering some turbonormalized certified aircraft as well as the possibility of building an experimental with very high altitude capabilities. What altitudes are achievable with what different types of oxygen systems? What is the maximum altitude that a human can fly using oxygen in an unpressurized aircraft?

Phil, the FAA requires masks above 18,000 feet. There are a lot of pilots who use cannulas with pulse oximeters above that altitude, and can maintain their O2 saturation in the desirable range with them. It's not legal, but it works.

Most people would use 30,000 feet as the maximum altitude for non-closed, non-positive-pressure supplemental oxygen system. However, I think, given the extremely short time of useful consciousness as such altitudes, I would not go above 25,000 feet in a non-pressurized aircraft.