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Standing off to the side of the plane, it is ducted up through the bottom of the cowl and I let it cook for about 30 minutes. The rising heat is sufficient to provide powerful air movement. While I never run it wide open, the heater is capable of 250,000 BTU. I let it cook until two things happen: the engine temp is in the green arc and all the moisture is cooked off the top of the engine. The starter usually turns about four blades and the engine is running, after which the oil temp drops. Admittedly an overcoat for the engine would make things faster and more efficient, but I can buy a lot of propane for the cost of an engine cover. I have thought seriously that an engine cover would be a good investment, it could double as a sleeping bag is I had to go down in some remote location. Your point about retaining heat while at a destination is a point well taken and is enough to convince me. This past summer I had the 0-320 majored and I continue to use the preheater which stays at the plane until late spring.

On a trip I carry adapters which allow me to use three or four disposable propane cylinders which I can usually buy at a hardware store at my destination. The disposable throw a ways are the most expensive way to preheat, even at $10/$12 for a preheat, it's still a bargain.

For your consideration, the following scenario:

The relief pilot, alone in the cockpit (for some unjustifiable reason) thirty minutes after departure, suffers a heart attack. He prays, and slumps forward on the controls. The aircraft experiences zero, or even negative G forces as it is screaming toward it's watery demise. The pilot finally makes his way back to his station, assesses the situation, and shuts down the engines of the over-speeding aircraft. In his attempt to recover from the nose down condition, he ultimately over-stresses the craft, and an airframe section fails.

I didn't know Dr. Jacoby but his recent death and loss of family members saddens me a great deal. Perhaps I am personalizing a bit since I am a student pilot with just a few tasks left to complete my licensing. I must say , however, that my resolve to finish is shaken when I read that even the most accomplished and safety oriented GA pilots like Dr. Jacoby die in unexplained crashes. (The loss of a gyro seems an unlikely explanation for a sudden, uncontrolled descent.)

Does it appear to anyone else that a remarkably high percentage of our best pilots are involved in fatal accidents? Perhaps you could help my perspective if you reported more cases of crashes occurring due to extreme recklessness, intoxication or a guided missile. Maybe then I wouldn't feel so vulnerable.

Regarding the attitude of the some people involved in the investigation of EA990. Unfortunately the idea of a crew member committing the unthinkable, in an aircraft, in flight has to be looked at as very possible, if not probable, in this day and age.

In the '50s, a Delta DC-6 or -7 was blown out of the sky by a passenger that set off a bomb in it's lavatory, now it's considered a part of life with bombs, people and aircraft. In the '60s a Pan Am 747 was hijacked in Saigon, RVN, the pilot of that A/C passed a gun back to one of the military persons on board, who shot the hijacker. The hijacker's body was thrown off the A/C, pictures in Life magazine, everyone was horrified (some over the way the hijacker was treated), now it is considered a part of life with hijackers and A/C.

It seems to be a race to "one-upsmanship", who can make the biggest statement. So reality is setting in, that when you have people, with problems, involved with mechanical objects (guns, planes, bombs, cars, etc.) the unthinkable can and will happen, when those persons want to make a statement no matter how obscure or hidden it might be.

Maybe, if the accident was pilot-induced, there was another reason beside pilot suicide. Maybe, there were people on board who required terminating, as they say in the movies.

There's much more to this crash than a suicidal copilot. I hope all the premature leaks and such misuse of the information will be put aside so the real investigation gets a chance...

On another subject, concerning your story about the "out to lunch" Northwest Airlines captain who left his flight stranded on the ground for 90 minutes while he went out to eat: Maybe the hungry Captain didn't handle it well, but then I get grouchy too when I haven't eaten. In my reading of the air regs, if I fly when I know I am "below par" due to lack of nutrition, then I am actually breaking the law.

If we take such care to provide our "silicon assistants" with exactly the correct electrical volts and frequencies, and with fans to keep their operating environment within specific parameters... etc etc. etc... then is it unreasonable to expect the same level of care and attention for the needs of the "sentient carbon-based units"?

Flight 990 did not have a video recorder, never will, fait accompli. The past has its own particulars etched in stone that can never change no matter how we imagine things to have been different. We cannot rewrite the true history.

There are so many variables: cameras can malfunction, people can block lenses intentionally or otherwise, images can be less than clear from smoke and other factors, equipment can be damaged, destroyed or not found. I am concerned with the idea of establishing the use of cockpit video recorders to attain the certainty the senator spoke of. That simply would not happen.

However, I do think the suggestion valuable in that cockpit video cameras could provide potentially useful data. It certainly would take elaborate engineering to make such a device effectively crash protected, however, we humans are very innovative in that way and I'm sure the product already exists.

--only 12 individuals made over half of the 792 complaints over a two-year period.

--One of those individuals lived 7.5 miles from the airport and lived closer to Hawthorne and to Los Angeles airports than to Torrance. A second individual lived over 3.7 miles from the airport.

--The Torrance resident who made the most complaints in that period was an Airport Commissioner, appointed by the City Council.

--Even if each of the remaining complaints were made by separate individuals living in the city, that would represent only 0.3% of the city residents.

--31% of the complaints about noise or curfew violations were not supported by recorded noise monitoring data.

--56% of the complaints were about perfectly legal and safe normal airport operations in which the aircraft were operated in accordance with all applicable FARs and laws. Most simply recorded that an aircraft flew over their home.

--Only 6% of the complaints were validated by recorded data.

--Since the City of Torrance permitted anonymous complaints, the number of complaints per "noise violation" has more than doubled.

--Complaints from the area where several of the 12 frequent complainers live have INCREASED 105% in the last year. Complaints from all other areas surrounding the airport have DECREASED by 57% to 89% in the last year.

For example, just this morning (Monday, November 29, 1999) American Airlines Flight 2382 experienced major delays. This aircraft (a Fokker 100) was scheduled to depart Amarillo (AMA) at 06:15AM and arrive at 07:21AM at Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW). An acquaintance of mine was at DFW to pick up her son who was flying in from AMA. Upon arriving at the airport, she checked the arrival monitors and discovered that AAL2382 was not due to arrive until 08:26AM, over an hour late (the total delay ended up being over three hours)! She went to the gate and asked the American Airlines gate agent the reason for the delay.

"Air traffic," was the reply.

"What do you mean by 'air traffic'?" asked "Mom."

"There's some sort of air traffic control delay" she was told. Having noted on her way into DFW that the weather was clear, my friend was curious as to what the delay might be. So, to make sure the first agent had not mistyped the flight number when checking for the reason for the delay, my friend went to a second gate agent and again asked why AAL2382 was so delayed. The answer was again, "air traffic control."

Well, this might have satisfied the curiosity of most of the Moms and Dads, sisters and brothers, cousins, co-workers and friends waiting to retrieve passengers from the Amarillo flight. But not my friend, Sandy. You see, Sandy is an Air Traffic Controller at the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control Center. Fort Worth Center covers both the AMA and DFW airports (and many, many others from central Texas to Oklahoma and from New Mexico to Louisiana and Arkansas). In fact, Sandy regularly works aircraft into and out of the DFW airport. So Sandy called the Center and spoke to the supervisor of the sectors responsible for controlling traffic inbound to DFW from AMA.

"Are you guys holding DFW arrivals?" Sandy asked.

"No, nothing," she was told.

"Are there any ground stops or anything?" Ground stops are sometimes used by the Traffic Management people to equalize the traffic load when the system demands are predicted to exceed the airport capacity (in other words, too many planes are scheduled to land at or near the same time).

"Nope, everything's running smooth," she was told.

So Sandy went back to the gate agents and asked to speak with a manager. After much discussion, it was discovered that the reason AAL2382 had not yet departed AMA was because the fog was too thick and the airport weather was below American Airlines' take off minimums! In other words, the delay had absolutely nothing to do with air traffic control, but was due solely to weather!

But anyone waiting at the American Airlines gates was told it was an air traffic control delay. Anyone calling the American Airlines reservations system was told it was an air traffic control delay. But American Airlines was lying to its customers.

"LAX wracked up 13 runway incursions last year."

According to the NY Times story, he had just departed Linden Airport in "fog and rain" and crashed just a few minutes later. The story went on to note that the mayor of Linden commented: "The man, his wife and daughter took off after being advised by two linemen not to do so."

I hope you are not defending what this lying, cheating, master manipulator (did I mention carpetbagger?) for campaigning on taxpayer's equipment (numerous trips) and taxpayer-paid staff, etc., etc., and not spending a dime of her own campaign funds yet?

I didn't think so...

I am tired of paying for it

Like so many ill informed members of our government, you speak out on a matter in which you have little knowledge, namely the cockpit of airliners flying today. I'm a retired Captain from a previously major airline with over forty years of experience on 747s, 767s, 757s, and a number of other aircraft. I also was an ALPA member during most of my flying years and I can flat tell you video cameras in the cockpit will go over just about as well as one placed in your office to record all your conversations and actions. There is really not much difference between the decisions I make and those that you and your colleagues make, since many deal with the way people live. Maybe pilots decisions are felt a little quicker, but the ones you make affect generally many more folks and some feel just as adversely as death or injury.

I would not fly with one looking over my shoulder, wondering what the information was going to be used for or which part would be taken out of context to jeopardize my career or impact my family. Who would determine what event would trigger its use, an FAA gentleperson, a company employee, a divorce attorney, you?

The video camera would also be subject to all the problems of the other two black boxes, namely maintaining power and getting what was being viewed to a recorder to keep that information.

Then in the long run, it just might be further incentive for a deranged person/s to use the video to record for posterity the final actions they are taking in killing two, three or four hundred people, knowing every CNN, ABC, NBC, FOX, CBS and etc. news reporter will ultimately get their hands on it to be viewed worldwide. NO THANKS!

For decades, any General Aviation avionics installation, whether a single added 'goodie', a Navcom upgrade, or a whole new 'stack' required only a properly completed FAA Form 337, signed by either an Approved Repair Station or an A&P holding an Inspection Authorization, certifying the installation to be in accordance with the appropriate installation references from the manufacturer and, most commonly, A.C. 43-13. Add a statement confirming the equipment list and weight & balance data were amended, make a log book entry referencing the 337, and the happy owner was out the door. No more........ The FAA has now mandated that ANY GPS Installation requires, prior to use, (read: prior to purchase or installation, if you are a 'by the book' aircraft owner/operator) an Approved Supplemental Type Certificate, with, depending on the mood of the FSDO Avionics Inspector, all it's associated engineering and test data.

Although this data has been previously generated by the manufacturers, and approved by the FAA, the reason given for this 'Giant Step' seems couched in the FAA's 'suspicion' that the GPS manufacturer "generated their data with only their own airplane, and not every airplane to be equipped with" their GPS. Ya think?

Other than this Euclidean Logic, the only other justification offered for creating a major speed bump in GPS usage, was an occluded reference to GPS being "the primary navigational aid". And no, the presence of a VOR receiver labeled 'NAV #1' does not exclude you from the new rule: We judge others by our own values: If they are not to be believed, neither are we.

I am waiting for my FSDO Avionics Insp. to provide me with the FAA Prelim. A.C. on the subject. In the meantime, every pilot/owner about to write a check for a completed installation may be in for an unpleasant surprise if his installer doesn't hand him a completed FAA Form 337 with the FAA "Approved-One Time STC" stamp already on the front of the document (which traditionally means the alteration was approved before it was done), and an FAA Approved POH Supplement, and............ANYTHING else the FSDO Inspector feels he needs...

Well, you get the picture. This FAA knee-jerk will cost the owner more in paperwork and time than the GPS!

A short story on practical application of "stuff I've learned" from AVweb. I'm not a career pilot; I'm an engineer working in a 6 story office building in Anchorage. Flying is for fun on weekends or the occasional boondoggle during the week.

After worrying about the exhaust system on my "new to me" C-182, I read Mike's AVweb article on the CO detectors and bought two of the AIM units; one for the house and one for the 182. When the package arrived here at the office of course I had to open it up and see what the darn things looked like. I was a little concerned to see the unit giving me a reading of 15 ppm CO sitting on my desk later in the day. After a bit of checking and talking to our building manager, I'm now embarked on a $30-50,000 upgrade to our heating/ventilation system to fix a fairly serious CO problem in our 30 year old building. As an added safety measure we have installed a dozen of the AIM units throughout the building.

At this time, no major airline has been granted an extension beyond the December 12 compliance date. In a November 12 letter to Nick Lacey (Director of Flight Standards Service, AFS-1) ATA requested an extension based on FAA's failure to provide guidance to both their field inspectors and to the industry on what they intend to enforce on 12/12. We understand that FAA will reject that request notwithstanding the fact that guidance has still not been issued.

On an interesting note, FAA intends on granting a blanket extension on the compliance date for Part 135 operators. This is puzzling since it was a 1991 interpretation issued on Part 135.267 (b) that triggered the entire reserve rest controversy in the first place. Part 121 operators were included only because the language in Parts 135 and 121 are the same.

ATA has always acknowledged that there is a need to improve certain flight time limitations and rest requirements regulations in order to better protect the pilots, and the public, from the effects of flight crewmember fatigue.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your outstanding coverage of the aviation industry.

This is not a new idea. During the early '70s, after about a year in battle with it's pilots' union, American Airlines installed video cameras in the cockpit's of its then-new DC10s, fed to cabin video screens so the pax could watch the takeoffs and landings. So an installation such as this is in the files somewhere. Just change the feed wiring.

The pax started to complain about the security inspections and questioning and one by one the ex FBI dudes in Dallas and the "Mossad" advisors disappeared.

The security consciousness had disappeared from the minds of the travelling public.

Even after Lockerbie PA109, the security operations did not reach previous levels.

The whole thing was scaled down and the "security" was scanning bags in a false color x-ray.

Since you surely travel a lot you must have experienced the farcical arrangements at airports with private security companies competing with the state employees.

Body searches with a magnetometer don't keep bombs from planes. Even I with my limited knowledge could ___________ that the bored and underpaid security guys would not see on the x-ray. So what about the professionals and the nut cases out there?

Just don't think about it.

1. Sudden electrical problem in the bus panel

2. Inability for both pilots together to assess situation, access emergency procedures manual, and apply appropriate remedy.

3. There were structural weaknesses in the tail assembly due to manufacturing deficiencies

4.The requesting of the backup copilot to take over the flight while still having ample off duty time. (suspect behavior considering the current issue of pilot relief time issues in industry.)

5. The pilot in command leaving his command seat so early in the flight and not in the transatlantic segment of flight.

We also concluded that this particular disaster is going to have a tremendous affect on: Boeing, the NTSB, the Clinton Administration, Egypt-U.S. relations, NAPA, and the relationship between NTSB-FBI-ICAO, and the investigation will remain suspect in the minds of the air traveling public due to already conflicting reports and erroneous disseminated info by the NTSB Chairman. In terms of careers and dollar costs, tremendous.

It's no wonder the aircraft industry is stagnating. How can any court system allow a suit to be filed against a manufacturer of an aircraft in spite of all evidence to date indicating no expected mechanical failure what so ever. The latest suit filed in the EgyptAir 990 crash is pure "ambulance chasing" by people (attorneys) looking to get stinking rich on the misfortunes of others.

So while a lot of those 420 customers still face a long wait, it won't be anywhere near as long as your comments suggested.

From an article in today's New York Times, "EgyptAir Crash Puts Focus on Mental Fitness for Pilots" by Christopher Drew:

The article identifies Dr. Pressman as:

Earlier this year, I spoke with Ray Bean, CAP Director of Cadets, about our partnership and he indicated that due to staff restrictions CAP might not be able to supply the names of Orientation Flight Cadets as they had in the past. He assured me this did not mean that CAP was any less supportive than they had been in the past, but reduced staff levels would make it difficult to get us the names before the end of the year.

In writing the original piece for Flight Leader News, I made the mistake of citing the on-going problems between CAP and the Air Force as the reason. This was an incorrect assumption on my part and has led to this misunderstanding.

What was supposed to be a call to invite pilots to fly more Young Eagles has caused people to question CAP's commitment to our program. Nothing could have been farther from my mind when I wrote the original article. CAP is a great partner with the Young Eagles Program.

Since the original article was distributed, Ray and his staff have been able to supply the names of the Orientation Flight Cadets from January through September. His dedication to our partnership made it happen.

I would like to apologize to Ray Bean and all the dedicated volunteers who make CAP possible. I was mistaken in my article. I was only trying to make sure the Young Eagles Program continues to be a success.

The Civil Air Patrol has been a great partner since 1995. I look forward to working with them for many years to come.

If you have any questions on this issue or on anything relating to the Young Eagles Program, please don't hesitate to contact me.

I'd like you to know that I'm not some sort of "nut" or "crusader!" I've been contacted by so many of them over the past three + years who want to ride on our coattails that it makes me ill. I come by my convictions out of necessity, not desire. I try to let the documents speak the language that will make you understand and I see no need to carry on feverishly as some half-baked zealot might. These are just for your perusal, Bob. Nothing more, nothing less. I'm simply a dad who lost his child and doesn't want to see another father go through the same thing because there was no prior "warning" pertaining to a dangerous situation. I couldn't live with myself if I didn't try. I've been pretty quiet thus far because I believe that there are better and brighter people who are charged with such responsibilities. Now, I wonder.

The following are cut from another letter and are in a difficult form, I know. I have a letter from December 17th, 1963, authored by Leon H. Tanguay, the head of what was then called the 'Bureau of Safety', now the NTSB, that addresses the fact of fuel flammability and ullege volatility following an explosion of a Boeing 707 which killed all 81 people aboard, over Elkton, Maryland. In it he raises 6 critical points and number six begins with, " Finally, it is recommended that every effort be expanded to arrive at a practical means by which flammable air/vapor mixtures are eliminated from fuel tanks."

The FAA had a working "inerting" system, a method to introduce non-flammable gases, installed on a DC-9 sometime around 1970. It worked very well. The airline industry stopped it. In 1977, a company called Parker-Hannifin, who as you know is a major manufacturer of inerting systems then and now, and who contracted-I believe-for the C-5 and C-17 systems, wrote a letter during a public comment period on an NPRM that the FAA had issued that year. In this letter, which I have a copy of, they stated that they could install a viable inerting system on every aircraft in the commercial fleet for the cost of the loss of ONE wide-bodied aircraft.

Beginning on Tuesday, the 14th of June, 1977, an FAA hearing began to examine the potential of installing such an inerting system in response to their Notice of Public Rule Making, to do just as they had experimented with in the late 60's early 70's, which was installing an inerting system on commercial aircraft, i.e. the DC-9 system, the Parker-Hannifin system.

The Air Transport Association (ATA) was represented by three men: an engineer from Boeing, Don Nordstrom, one from Lockheed, and one from McDonald-Douglas. The International Air Transport Association(IATA) was also represented. The NPRM was withdrawn. I have all 632 pages of transcript from the hearing. I also have a letter dated October 19th, 1978, from the Airline Pilots Association(ALPA), entitled, "Why Withdrawal", expressing their dismay at the blanket withdrawal of the NPRM and almost pleading with the FAA to adopt many of the safety regulation contained in that NPRM. Nothing happened. Except more people died as a result of the inaction. Murder by omission maybe?

I am completely convinced that my daughter and her dear friends would be alive today if not for the deliberate actions on the part of the manufacturers to save a nickel and allow people to die as an end result. The inerting system weighed around 900 pounds and wasn't perfect, and you have to consider that they didn't want to lose space or weight for about four passengers per flight in order that the others survive. Potential lost revenue is why the changes were never instituted! I have had this material for well over a year, some for over two.

I know the chief engineer who designed the inerting system for the Air Force's C-5A very well and he also designed and implemented the SAAB, SA-39 Grippen fire prevention and explosion proofing systems while working for the Swedish government for 5 years. He was in attendance at the 1977 hearings and knew all the "players" very well. To say that he was dismayed is to put it mildly. Brookley Air Force Base is named for his father. If you obtain a copy of the Federal Register from April 3rd, 1997, you will see, detailed in the DOT, FAA NPRM 'Fuel Tank Ignition Prevention Measures Notice', every one of the TWENTY-SIX fuel tank related explosions that have occurred since 1959, in both the military and civilian sectors. Thirteen in each and by my count, 538 people have lost their lives in the civilian sector alone! The military deaths, apart from a few cases, are not documented in the NPRM.

One of the military explosions that killed all aboard the KC-135A, was found to be caused by the co-pilot "keying" his microphone as they completed a roll out after landing. The UHF wire which went to the UHF radio, ran near the right aft wing root. The wire was melted because of an electrical short and when he keyed the microphone, it shorted again and ignited the fuel vapors within the wing. All the crew were lost as was the aircraft. TWENTY-TWO of the fuel tank explosions were Boeing aircraft, three McDonald-Douglas and one Beech.

Naturally, all of these had various causes, and you had JP-4 being used in a number of cases, but as has been so horrifyingly shown-almost ANY petroleum-based product is flammable-given the right conditions and that certainly applied to our case. I will be very interested to see what happened in Mexico Taesa flight-IF they ever really know.

I obtained the FAA documents from guess who, the FAA, some very nice gals in the documents office helped me a lot, and some of the other material is part of the evidentiary discovery in our cases.

I know, I know, who asked me...

While the majority of our current breed of crew members probably were career motivated by money instead of the thrill of flying, there are still a few crew members who actually love to fly. They take every opportunity to hand-fly the airplane and pit their airmanship skills against the computers.

If pilot Gameel El Batouty was one of those who still love to fly, then with enforced retirement in the near future, it's certainly reasonable to believe he'd want to fly earlier than scheduled in the rotation, and that he'd disconnect the A/P to hand-fly the airplane.

It may be pure coincidence that after he took control, an unexplained (thus far) event occurred which ultimately led to the destruction of Flight 990.

Until proven otherwise, we owe pilot Gameel El Batouty our respect as a dedicated professional airman.

The FAA spent tax dollars on buying UK-built anti-blocking equipment, both air and ground, for evaluation over 4 years ago -- and this equipment is collecting dust in Atlantic City. You, or some one else, may want to look into this.

In a message on Linda Pendleton's "When Humans Fly High," Susan Mahoney on 12 Nov 99 began her comment with the statement, "I am not a pilot, therefore not a member of AVweb." My initial reaction to thtis statement was, "What difference does that make?" This got me to thinking about the general perception of the aviation community, and who is or should be part of it. After all, I'm not a pilot either -- if you have $4,000-$5,000 just laying around, donations toward my flight training will be gratefully accepted -- but I am an AVweb member and have been for over a year.

Should you only be a member of AVweb if you're a pilot? Absolutely not!!! You don't have to be a pilot to have an interest in aviation. For that matter, you don't have to be a pilot to be concerned about issues affecting aviation. And it really doesn't matter why you have an interest either, because the reasons for getting into aviation to any degree in any area are at least as diverse as the people involved.

I just finished reading the piece by Greg Amy on AVweb -- excellent article. And I posted some stuff here on the HID landing light topic kicked off by Don Mitchell. And I've read the follow-on discussion. One of Greg's points was that due to the FAA nonsense, he understands why so many are tempted (driven) to go the homebuilt route. And a lot of years ago I started down that path myself with a VolksPlane II. The problem of course, is the enormous amount of time it takes to complete such a project. five or more years is typical, with 10 or more, not uncommon. (Ask Bob Gibson how much time he's spent on his "homebuilt").

But one of the biggest advantages of homebuilts is that they can use current technology, and they can be kept current. If you own a homebuilt and want to spend $500 for an HID landing light you can, and you can install it, no questions asked. In the certified category you get to pay someone like LoPresti $2,500 for exactly the same device, and then have to shell out whatever it costs for a certified mechanic to install it and complete the necessary paperwork, maybe another $250. Is the HID lamp better than the 4509, I think so. But for $2,700, most people, me included, will say, "I'll live with the old one".

On the other hand, newer technologies, not just HIDs, but all sorts of newer technologies can contribute to the overall pleasure and safety of GA. So why do we tolerate an environment where we can't enjoy them? I just finished paying Fletcher $500 for an STC to put high compression pistons in my Cheetah. But what did I really get? A piece of paper! Yes, that piece of paper represents the work Bill Scott did to get the FAA to approve the change, and I certainly don't believe Bill isn't entitled to compensation for the work he did, nor do I quarrel with the price.

It's back to what Greg pointed out as the nonsense. In the homebuilt world, I could have installed pistons from a Honda. So, since our planes are so much better "regulated", they must of course be much safer. But that's not what the safety statistics of homebuilts vs. certified GA show. I think that contrary to what is apparently popular belief (in the FAA), homebuilders are not a bunch of crazies who don't care if they die, and therefore build their airplanes from lawnchairs and old coat hangers. The engineering being done these days in homebuilts far exceeds that which was possible when Tigers and Cheetahs, and AA-1s were being designed. The problem is that we are not allowed to take advantage of the advances. Advances that would benefit us all.

There are almost a hundred of them, in all sizes, still on active, operational status in the United States, mostly at museums, tourist railroads and operated for their nostalgic value. In fact, Union Pacific, the nation's largest railroad, still maintains two of them in operating condition for publicity purposes. There have been several accidents over the past few years involving questionable maintenance and overhaul practices, and DOT needed to completely revise such standards to bring them into line with current technology. It's something that's been a long time in coming.

AVweb's readers completely understand the nostalgia bit...look at the attention piston-engined aircraft and warbirds get at air shows. Steam locomotives are the same thing...just heavier, noisier, harder to maintain and quite dangerous in the hands of the untrained.

One thing which I think we cannot leave unsaid about Col. Stapp: he was responsible for introducing Murphy's Law into the vernacular. Yeah, no kidding.

In 1977, Arthur Block published a great book called "Murphy's Law and Other Reasons Why Things Go Wrong". (Price/Stern/Sloan) The preface to the book contains a letter from George E. Nichols, which I'll type in its entirety, below.

So, there you have it! And I had it, first-hand from Col. Stapp, whom we will miss.

With over 10 years experience buying and selling light aircraft for a major aircraft sales firm, I could tell you of absurd decisions regarding "airworthiness" of an aircraft and its components. This applies to both ends of the spectrum. I've seen an inop instrument light listed as an airworthy item as well as the "If it flew in, it'll fly out" syndrome.

During a pre-purchase inspection to whatever degree the mechanic and buyer agree on, the mechanic should list all discrepancies, point out the ones the aircraft manufacturer states are below acceptable standards, and EXPLAIN to the buyer why every other item was listed and the potential for the problem to interrupt a flight or lead to a failure in the future. For that, the buyer should be familiar with the mechanic's and/or shop's experience with the type of aircraft being inspected.

On the CVR, the pilot stated he was sleepy. He also more than once had sluggish responses to the aircraft, ATC, and most importantly to a callout from his co-pilot to "Go around." At least one pilot on the KAL aircraft said on the CVR that the airline was pushing them hard and/or to the pilots' limits. The left seat pilot's day was scrutinized. He'd awoken about 6 am, had a mid-morning/early afternoon nap at a time all the experts agreed he would have been unlikely to get any sound sleep, and then had to fly to Guam, to arrive around 1:45 am and then fly back to Korea. Perhaps the crash would have been prevented had there been stricter laws in Korea on what a "duty day" really means, or if union pressure got better duty day hours in the pilots' contracts. Without these CVR statements about sleepiness and being pushed hard, the NTSB would have had difficulty finding as they did that the pilot's fatigue was an official factor in the accident since there was tremendous pressure from many to find that the pilots and their airline were not causal factors in the crash.

The way KAL checks the proficiency of its pilots on non-precision approach skills was found to be an official factor in the the accident. Before the accident - but I don't know about now - KAL only tested for non-precision approaches by having its pilots "repetitiously" (and the NTSB staff kept harping on that word) do the DME approach into Kimpo. That approach has the DME on the airport, thus the pilots were pre-programmed that flying directly down to the DME is the way to do safely a non-precision approach. They were never expected ever to demonstrate proficiency in a DME or NDB or ILS-with-the-glideslope-out approach where the final navaid fix is not co-located at the airport.

At Guam, the night the KAL 747 crashed, the ILS's glideslope had been out for a month and would be out for another month. It had been removed from its shack since the shack was falling apart. Before leaving Kimpo, the accident aircraft crew got and read the NOTAM about the glideslope. They heard the ATIS and ATC info about it as they neared Guam. They discussed it in the cockpit -- but it never really sank into either pilots' brains the fact that since it is out it MUST be ignored - even the so-called "spurious" glideslope signals they referred to in the CVR.

Why this sink-in did not happen was clear to the NTSB staff. The pilots were mentally and physically only prepared for a visual approach that night. KAL used a special Guam teaching/briefing video from JAL which dealt mainly with the visual landmarks which the pilots reviewed before flight. The video did not discuss the fact that Guam's VOR/DME is not co-located at the airport as Kimpo's DME is. The pilots were probably able to see the lights of Guam 150 miles out the NTSB staff reported since the rain clouds were scattered. They deviated to fly around cumulo nimbus as they approached Guam. The pilots were able to see the airport environment as they got close to Guam. The ATIS reported 6 miles visibility even though there were clouds off the airport to one side, so the pilots were planning a visual approach...

...until they descended and found themselves in a rain cloud, at night. This should have been no big surprise since Guam is in a tropical area with frequent localized rain showers and the pilots had already flown around towering clouds over the ocean to stay visual. But, the pilots were surprised to be in a rain cloud. (The contract controller had not told them of wx on the approach since he was not required to do so, and besides, just as the KAL flight approached the island, one of the two controllers working the approach facility that night took a break leaving one controller to watch both the long range and the short range scopes.)

One of the pilots turned on the windshield wipers. They started thinking they might have to do an instrument approach. They had crossed the beach under 2,000 feet and were descending at 950 feet/minute - a constant rate they maintained until the crash. They pulled out the approach plate for the ILS 6L with the glideslope inoperative. The pilot said "MDA 560" correctly and ordered the co-pilot to set the altitude bug at 1440 - which was the penultimate stepdown altitude. Twenty seconds after the bug was set, a warning sounded that the plane had busted the altitude, but neither pilot reacted. Neither pilot seemed to notice or care they just busted the step down altitude!

This was quite different from a recent flight the left seat pilot did into Guam when instrument conditions were expected. Then the pilot came to the departure airport early and went over in detail with the co-pilot for 20 minutes the approach procedures - figuring out exactly who would do what and when. The ILS to 6L with the glideslope out is one of the more complicated non-precision approaches. Most major airline pilots only do one or two such approaches a year. It called for intercepting the localizer at 2,600', then a step down to 2,000, then the beach would be crossed, another step down to 1,440', cross the VOR/DME, then step down to 560' for MDA and count up for 2.8 miles from the DME to find the airport or go around.

So here they are, in the rain, in the dark, fumbling around to set up the nonprecision approach. They had already crossed the beach by the time they started to try to set up the approach. They crossed the beach at 1,700', below the 2,000' step down for that area. Had the FAA's local MSAW been activated, they would have been warned then - 64 seconds before their crash that they were busting minumums. But, they continued the constant rate descent even though their altitude alarm began sounding. They still talked about the glideslope being out but don't seem to accept that as fact since they talked nearly up to the final seconds about whether or not the glideslope was indicating properly.

So they plowed through the 1440 before crossing the VOR/DME on Nimitz Hill which would allow the final step down to 560 feet. They confidently glided DIRECTLY down to the VOR/DME thinking perhaps - "Hey, this is just like all the non-precision practices into Kimpo... no need to do step downs or monitor the DME since we just count down to zero as we descend to the DME at the airport." As their ground proximity warnings started, they were in heavy rain at very low altitude, and the co-pilot finally called out, "Go around" after a gentle, "Let's go around" fails to get the pilot's attention....but, the captain still continued down. By the time the pilot starts the go-around, it is too late. They hit the ground within feet of the VOR/DME on Nimitz Hill. The whole sequence struck me as not being merely "behind the aircraft," but not being "in the aircraft." A classic of controlled flight into terrain.

Many other issues about the Guam crash were discussed by the NTSB such as the "mismanagement" as they said of the FAA in allowing the MSAW system to be deactivated for YEARS which if activated would have given the pilots 64 seconds advance warning from ATC that they were busting minumums. That FAA mismanagement was found to be an official factor in the accident by the NTSB. But, none of these issues negate the KAL pilots' nondelegatable duties to be proficient in all instrument approaches.

Union? New laws? No, this was primarily a case of pilot unproficiency with non-precision approaches which was exacerbated by an airline which was not very realistic in how it tested its pilots' proficiency, and perhaps was playing fast and loose with duty day laws. One of the NTSB conclusions was something like requiring ALL pilots who think there MIGHT be a chance of encountering IMC at arrival to prepare fully for an instrument approach before launch. The NTSB has also frequently directed the FAA to get some more realistic regulations on duty days and daily flight time for the airlines and other carriers, especially in light of circadian rhythms.

By profession I'm a graphic designer and copywriter, and on more than one occasion have been tempted to write to you and inquire about the possibility of freelance work. That is not my purpose in writing today, however.

First, let me give me a brief introduction: I'm a 54-year old female who has taken flying lessons on and off for the past two years. I've logged over 14 solo hours, am preparing to take the written exam, and fly a solo cross country. When my instructor got a job with a commercial carrier, I was left scrambling for a replacement. Last week, I had a numbing experience in the left hand seat of a Cessna 152 with a CFI (and FAA flight examiner). It was my second--and last--lesson with him. While he didn't violate any rules that I know of, he did intimidate and humiliate and criticize me unmercifully 3000 MSL. In short, he said I would never become a pilot and should give up the quest for a license. He caught me totally off guard, as I had never been criticized as a student pilot like that before.

My professional background also includes a 7-year instructor position at University of Louisville, so I do know something about appropriate behavior in a teaching environment and the value of positive reinforcement.

Specifically, my question is: Can I file a complaint with the FAA regarding this man's inappropriate teaching behavior? Or is the FAA unconcerned with how instructors are going about their business as they train student pilots?

I was caught so unaware by his cruel tactics that I have not flown for over a week, and at this point, have yet to recover from his verbal attack. I am not one to give up, and that is why I write to you for advice.

Would there be a market in an aviation magazine or internet site for an article about my story? I don't want anyone else to have to go through what I experienced last week.

Yes, it is a pity. And yes, to a very large degree, Mark Ward's hands are tied. But then again, he IS the ATM and his word should carry a lot of weight when budgets are discussed at levels far above him. More to the point, what is passed as information, through the multitude of layers that qualify as a management system in the FAA, is often watered down, softened up and diluted to the point that no one in the upper echelons of the FAA and the U.S. Government understands what is happening at the facility level. I believe that this is a major problem within the FAA. There are so many people in so many layers that it is impossible to get the "bad news" to the top for fear of being the messenger that gets shot. Well, the bad news is that the bad news has been trying to get to the right ears for years and now the situation is really bad.

The bad news is that there are no meaningful efficiencies left to gain. We have done all the "more with less" that we can do. We simply don't have enough people to function. Furthermore, the most inefficient thing in government is a "work group". We feel that it's best to concentrate the few resources that we have in the area where they count; keeping people safe.

In many cases, controllers are going to be hurt. And we know it. The most obvious is the schedule. I'm sure you are familiar with the crazy shifts that controllers work. Having a controller build the schedule injects a lot more sensitivity into the process and allows us a large degree of flexibility. But if it comes down to working on the schedule or working airplanes (and it has) we'll choose working airplanes.

Bob Marks is correct. All of these activities do not directly affect day to day operations. You are also correct Mike. These activities do affect the long term. We see that we are being painted into a corner, so we've decided to stop helping them paint.

It boils down to the same question I've been asking controllers for a while now. With no increase in staffing, and no new technological advances (and DSR isn't), how many airplanes can we work in a day before "safety is compromised" ? We passed 9,000 last year. We passed 10,000 this year. Can we work 11,000? 12,000? 15,000? There IS a limit. We don't know what it is but we're getting real nervous that we're getting close to it.

The overriding concern in all of this is staffing. It takes about five years to "make" a controller. We very well could be expected to 15,000 ops a day in five years. With what? Where are the trainees ? I believe we have two coming to my area. We've got seven that are eligible to retire NOW. We'll have dozens eligible in less than two years. What are those of us that are left going to be stuck with ? In that I'm one of those people, I think about it and I don't like what I see at all. Record numbers of operations, staffing worse than ever, I'm over the hill and burned out and now I'm supposed to train somebody while working traffic levels that have never been seen before.

I don't intend to spend the last days of my career explaining to a jury why I couldn't keep two airplanes separated under the above conditions. I don't plan to spend my retirement recovering from a heart attack or stoke either.

I'm not the only controller that can see what awaits us. ZTL is full of controllers like me, that will be left to pick up the pieces when Ward, Koehler, Morgan and company will be long gone.

Violation of FAR 91.119 -- low flight over congested area. I flew to an area of numerous fields -- the start of which was a baseball field behind a church. In the FAA's EIR, a picture of this field was in the file as an appropriate landing area. During trial, Inspector Bassolatto of the PHL FSDO changed his testimony to say that the baseball field was not an appropriate landing area. I missed the field due to a "concerned citizen" waving frantically trying to get my attention. What he wanted to know was where I was going to land since he was on a cell phone to the police department. I assume that he interpreted the folks bailing out of the balloon as an emergency situation and called 911 with a message as such. I continued my flight at the same altitude. At this point, six squad cars started following the balloon. They pulled onto a street as my chase crew was on the same street to keep underneath me (King James Road in Williamstown, NJ -- check it out on the map). My chase crew asked what I wanted to do since the police were there with lights and sirens (I was traveling less than 3 mph). I made a judgement call to land and answer police questions since there were no cars on the road (except my chase crew), the street was quite wide with lawns between the street and the houses and without powerlines. In other words, I interpreted six squad cars with their sirens and lights as a signal to halt. My crew was there to assist in the landing; therefore, I let out the drop line. The FAA stated that the use of a drop line was part of the careless and reckless operation since I transferred the control of the aircraft from the pilot (me) to the ground crew (there is a spinnaker shackle at the end of the line for quick disconnect). There was no accident, incident, close call or even cause for alarm. The FAA finally dropped this argument since there was no support of this from the officers. The FAA deemed this an inappropriate landing area and held that directives by the local police are no excuse for landing in an inappropriate landing area. The police testified that there were no cars on the street other than those generated because of the general excitement that a balloon caused on a sleepy winter Sunday morning in rural New Jersey.

Violation of FAR 91.15 -- careless and reckless operation of an aircraft. The FAA stated (and the NTSB judge upheld) that the careless and reckless rule is a "collateral" violation that did not attach to any specific operation since there was no danger to the "life and property of others." The careless and reckless is invoked because (as the reason) if you violate an FAR you are obviously operating the aircraft in a careless and reckless fashion. The reason the FAA attached this violation was to knock out the NASA immunity granted through the timely filing of a NASA report. I made a timely filing of a NASA report.

I had no previous enforcement history in my 23+ years and 5,000+ hours of flight time. As you guys know, this affects all of my certificates (ATP, ASEL, AMEL, LTA, ASES, CFI, CFII, CFIME). In his ruling, Judge Fowler stated that I exercised "bad judgement" and that I was being held to a higher standard since I am an ATP. The 30- day suspension sought by the FAA was reduced to 20 days. My attorney said they usually do that in order to threaten me with something in case I thought of filing an appeal (i.e. if I am going to appeal, they are going to restore the 30 day suspension).

During my testimony, I stated that if I am convicted this will send a message to the aviation community that if a directive is given by an officer of the law to do something that is safe and a prudent judgement call but violates an FAR, the airman will not be excused from prosecution. This is a very strong statement. I will couch this in stronger terms -- if given a directive by a local law enforcement officer to do something that you will be held accountable for by the FAA, disregard the officer's instructions or face sanctions by the FAA -- i.e. flee the situation and the officers. Further, the FAA will impute a charge of "careless and reckless" to any FAR violation so that the NASA immunity cannot be invoked regardless of whether or not you "endanger the life or property of others." Also, the FAA does not have to rely on fact in order to convict. A simple statement by any law enforcement officer will do no matter how ignorant or uninformed that officer may be. Your informed testimony (no matter how well-documented and forthright) is unimportant to the proceedings of administrative law.

There was no dispute as to the facts of the case. My testimony agreed with all of the other witnesses. The officer's testimony about the parachute drop stated that he wasn't sure exactly where the parachutist landed or exactly where the drop took place. He stated that "it looked to me like it was over the school." None of the other officers in the numerous squad cars saw where the jumpers landed. They live in the community and they could not produce anyone who saw where the jumpers landed.

I am not sure what lessons were learned yesterday other than Inspector Bassolatto didn't like my attitude and wanted to teach me a lesson. I don't think that yesterday's hearing was about aviation safety -- it was about the low esteem which I hold for the FAA's enforcement process. And yesterday's hearing was meant to change that attitude [I guess].

The transcript of the hearing will be available in about three weeks. Please warn your readers of this. I know how I will react next time I am faced with this situation. My mistake was that I was entirely honest and forthright.

This enforcement process is out of control. The inspectors have a complete and unbridled ability to try, convict and sentence pilots without substantive evidence and with hearsay or flat out lies. The only way that this will ever change is for all of us to stand up with one voice to say "enough is enough."

I plan to appeal and continue appealing until I am out of appeals options.

In regard to AVweb's story about NATCA's protest actions against understaffing at Atlanta ARTCC (where I am Air Traffic Manager), let me toss out a little tidbit that no one locally seems to want to talk about. In this identification of "short staffing," it should be noted that due to previous agreements -- when the facility had 50 more people to get ready for the Advanced Automation System (AAS) that didn't happen -- we have been guaranteeing 35 people per day on vacation ... that's about 20% of the work force. Name another company anywhere that allows 20% of its staff to be on vacation every day, year round. Now, do we have short staffing, or mismanagement of the existing resources?

I do agree that we need more people (now) in Atlanta Center, but for the future. I see we will be losing about 15 to 20 controllers a year through attrition, and I don't see us getting the replacements now to support that. It takes three to four years to make a full performance level (FPL) controller, so accordingly we will need to hire 45 to 60 people today to allow for the attrition.

I won't comment on the letter from the NATCA local. I know its purpose. But I thinks its like cutting off your nose to spite your face. I want to see controllers involved in the decision making that affects their day-to-day lives. But if they don't want to do that then I can and will make the decisions for them. As a controller myself, I don't like that at all.

I believe you would agree that we have come a long way since 172 Skyhawk serial #1. We remain very proud of our single engine product line and our ability to provide unmatched service to our customers.

In fact, your readers might be interested to know that single engine airplane buyers are choosing Cessna more than 7 out of 10 times (Q3 shipment data from GAMA). Moreover, according to the Fall, 1999 Blue Book, a '97 Skyhawk retails today for $127,000 -- demonstrating a 93% residual value. I believe Bill Dey will be very happy he chose Cessna when it comes time to move-up to something bigger.

While I am a controller and union representative on the West Coast, I am certain the memo did not refer to a job action, but to our voluntary participation on various workgroups and assistance in creating the daily watch schedules.

These optional activities are not directly related to the day to day operations of air traffic control. I believe that now the Atlanta controllers are faced with deciding whether the operation should suffer in order to continue on with the optional activities.

The memo probably referred to the decision to withdraw from accessory and voluntary duties. Any job action (i.e., "work slowdown") is illegal, and there are over 11,000 PATCO people out there to prove that. We do not advocate that route again.

If it was a blatant attempt to destroy the aircraft, I can't imagine the power reduction at the beginning of the descent.

If such a hijacker was knowledgeable of the systems, the start levers would be an easy target.

A friend of mine used to fly for Saudia Airlines and told the story that his local Saudi barber told him that he'd been through 'terrorist school' and with that rattled off the hijacking procedure; letter-perfect. That information is theoretically protected.

Remember that in the incident in which the B-767 which was forced to ditch, the hijacker insisted that the crew had disabled the fuel gauges to scare him. That was an old procedure in the B-747 days. In a digital cockpit, that can't be done, but the hijacker didn't know it, so they actually ran out of fuel.

The high-speed dive would better account for the split elevators, particularly if the split occurred after the pitch-up, when hydraulic pressure was fading. The elevators are each powered by three hydraulic systems/actuators. Losing at least two thirds of the actuating pressure would leave the elevators far more subject to aerodynamic forces.

However, the Boeing manual DOES depict the possibility of opposing forces being able to cause one side to be overridden; thus a split elevator input.

I just read your latest news letter and as always enjoyed it much. However, I must take issue with the writer's rather cynical overtone in the above quoted article on KAL.

I was a ALPA member for 33 years in the service of TWA of which I was an active ALPA officer for 27 years. I can state with no reservation that no other institution in existence is more dedicated to the advancement of air safety than ALPA. The FAA, the NTSB, the DOT are all staffed with many a political appointee or career bureaucrat who, while hard working, may have the burden of some imposed or self- serving political agenda to advance or protect. It's amazing that they do as well as they do. It goes without saying that ALPA is the pilot's advocate. What's wrong with that. If we aren't, who else will be? Aviation safety is expensive. Who else pressures the airlines to spend millions to try to prevent the accident that hasn't happened. The shame is that ALPA is sometimes listened to only after the disaster, not before!

Looking at ALPA, it's very easy to focus on the more visible "political" arm of the union and ignore the the tireless work done by the hundreds of dedicated ALPA pilot volunteers, and staff members who work on numerous safety related matters. ALPA, like all labor unions, of course, devotes much of its resources to the securing and negotiation of employment agreements with the managements of all of the airlines whose pilots it represents.

What is often overlooked and perhaps less publicly known, is ALPA's unmatched commitment to air safety. It was air safety, or the lack thereof, that was the principal motivating factor in the minds of the early founders. In those early days, many of the aviation's early safety lessons were learned the had way. Indeed, by 1982, only six of the original 24 founders were still alive with nearly all of the deceased 18 men having died in air disasters.

ALPA's motto, "Schedule with Safety" is not mere rhetoric. Throughout the industry, hundreds of pilot volunteers and professional staffers are involved in virtually all aspects of aviation safety from flight deck instrumentation, accident investigation, ATC matters, pilot training, all weather flying to flight time/duty regs, humane factors and noise abatement. ALPA pilots provide expert testimony and advise on major air safety topics at the NTSB, FAA and congressional levels requiring legislative and regulatory action. Today's enviable air safety record is due in very large part to these ongoing efforts of the Air line Pilots Association.

In my 33 years I was privileged to know and work with many of my fellow pilots who devoted themselves to safety matters. No one, repeat, no one, is more dedicated to air safety then the ALPA pilot volunteer who works often on his or her own time.

In July of 1996, TWA lost its flight 800. In the ensuing investigation, a dozen or more TWA management & ALPA pilot volunteers worked side-by-side with NTSB, FAA, and FBI investigators for months, often working 12 hours shifts for days on end. The work was grueling, tedious and above all terribly depressing. There is no measuring the emotional toll that will be exacted for years to come. What drives these pilots is certainly not money. You can't pay pilots to do this. Rather, it is a sense of duty and devotion to their fellow pilots, the industry and their profession that sustains and guides them.

As an airline pilot I always felt free to reject an aircraft if I believed the aircraft or operational environment was less than safe. What gave me and my fellow pilots the confidence to do this was the culture that ALPA helped to establish at TWA as well as other ALPA carriers. This is not consistently possible at a non-union carrier.

In closing, I enjoy your AVweb but I'm disappointed that your otherwise fine publication would be so careless with its comments.

I hope that she has written something similar for the general flying public. It definitely makes me want to pay more attention to safety instructions and to question the stewards/stewardesses whenever something doesn't seem right (although I expect that will make me unpopular).

If you have no intentions of doing a weekly, on the highlights, I will have to unsubscribe. A pity, because you have caused me to write my congressman and get involved in controversy I wouldn't even have known about otherwise.

I just read your NewsWire about Avemco's withdrawal from the commercial side of the aviation insurance business. They are dropping all commercial policies as they come due. They are not giving you a chance to renew, I think that is wrong.

Signal Insurance is doing the same thing. It has gotten to the point there are only a few companies that write all of the commercial aviation insurance. Yes, you do have other brokers (better known as the middle man) that write policies, but you have to pay them a commission (more money).

Right now, for a CFI to get insurance, it will cost between $3350 and $4200 a year. Do you feel that is fair? AVweb needs to do a piece on this. We in the general aviation business need help with the insurance companies. The insurance companies are putting the single-plane flight instructor out of business. Do you think that is fair?

I don know if this will help or you may already have this information, but at least I got a chance to say something to someone who may care.

My wife had LASIK surgery last May and an enhancement follow-up surgery three months later. The surgeon was highly recommended and has a great track record. But it didn't turn out so great for my wife. She was promised that she would be able to function without glasses and at the worst might have to wear corrective lenses to drive on dark nights. She was a -10 diopter going into the first surgery and came out at +2. This meant glasses were still required. An enhancement took her back to about -2. But the worst part is that her night vision is still horrible. There are halos and bursts around all light sources both at night and in normally lit rooms. She is still trying to find a solution that will work to restore her dim light vision.

So, for pilots, my personal thoughts are, "if you can be corrected with glasses, do it and leave LASIK alone." You risk losing your ability to see clearly in all but sunny conditions. It may be a 1 or 2 in 100 chance that it can go wrong, but ask yourself, "what if it's me?"

I just wanted to express my appreciation for your support of both Chairman Meyer's efforts to get needed legislative changes in place that made it possible for Cessna to re-enter the piston engine business and the affordability of our aircraft. We in Independence are still shooting for that 2,000 new Cessnas per year mark and believe we will be able to reach that point in the not-too-distant future. We also constantly strive to maintain the lowest possible price for our new aircraft. You accurately pointed out our new Cessnas compare favorably to competitive products on a price/value curve. Our recently announced 2000 pricing, which shows an approximate 2.5% increase across the line, less than the overall cost-of-living/inflation factors being issued, should maintain new Cessnas as the outstanding value they have always represented in the marketplace.

Thanks again for your knowledgeable response.

Just finished reading your Mike Busch's article concerning worth of new airplanes, particularly 172s and 182s. Some of the questions he brings to light were actually asked by me and my partners. We purchased a 1999 172 in May of this year. Busch's justification and amazement at what Cessna has improved upon sounds exactly like the response we got from Cessna tech and dealer reps when we wondered why the new plane did not appear that "updated."

I strongly suggest AVweb survey the owners of 1997 through 1999 Skyhawks and Skylanes. You might be surprised at the number of service bulletins and problems that have arisen. Cessna has not contacted us since we bought the plane to either ask our thoughts or survey our opinions of the product, as most car dealers do as a follow-up. It might be because they already know there is dissatisfaction with their NEW planes.

As for Busch's evaluation of what has been improved, I can only say some of those improvements are in the category of NECESSARY rather than UPGRADE. For instance, materials used inside and for instrumentation are now available and make it natural to include them as an improvement. The fuel injection is a marked improvement and one of the GOOD things. But, as far as instruments, the new planes still have ADF, which is never or very seldom used. (We have not even thought of using it and two of us are instrument students). The Allied GPS KLM89B has been updated, thank God, and leaves much to be desired as to "user friendly" and screen size/etc. Oh yes, did I forget to mention Allied sent an "instruction tape" for the 90B and has yet to respond to our request for a 89B tape. (3 months). Their instruction manual takes about a week to read and another 3 weeks to understand. Of course you can purchase a power pack to remove the GPS for use in learning how to use it for about $200.

Back to the 172. We have already replaced the wet compass in favor of a vertical card type. Cessna could have made this an update, but apparently the on the shelf inventory made this "costly". You mentioned the new switches, but failed to note most of the switches are still in the "old" configuration, such as lights, etc.

The new "fuel pump" switch is located under the yoke with the rest of the lights, etc. and could or should have been more isolated.

Another memorable flight was east bound over southern Texas at 11,000 in a Grumman Tiger, showing 205 knots groundspeed and staying above some really scuddy weather.

Those who never fly above 7500 ft just don't understand.

This line in Busch's article made me laugh out loud:

I had an experience in a Cessna 172 recently where my own reaction to hypoxia is different than the norm. This was CO poisoning, in hard IFR, with light rime, in the mountains, in OR. My first reaction was anxiety and an aggressive attitude. After about one hour, I could only hold a heading on the DG and keep the aircraft upright and at altitude.

I knew something was VERY wrong, and kept asking the controller for lower, to duck out of the cloud base (which was 3,000 feet). The controller kept asking why we could not hold a VOR course, moved a bunch of planes out of the way, and kept correcting us. Towards the end, I could not even tell you what VOR I was supposed to be tracking.

I saw a hole in the clouds just north of Eugene, and took it. Without knowing why, I opened the vents, and the window and proceeded VFR up to Portland. Once on the ground, and after a few days to recover, I started thinking about why it happened I told the mechanics for my friend's plane that they should work on the assumption that there WAS a leak, and find it. It turned out that there was a CO leak in the muffler below a brace that made it impossible to see.

Now that the airplane's repaired, the owner reports that he thinks the problem has existed for years, and that he "feels as good when he leaves the plane as when he got in."

The point is, that in other high-altitude situations, my reaction is always been fear, or anxiety, or tension, not drunkenness. Had other emotional symptoms been discussed in the context of hypoxia, I might have been able to recognize this sooner. I would recommend that the FAA take another look at hypoxia to determine if there are other warning signs, such as the one's I've reported, that could lead to earlier recognition.

In your article about the Allied Pilots Association's attempts to improve the corporate culture at American Airlines, your writer said:

"APA hopes relations will improve enough for the fine to be forgiven in exchange for union concessions."

Give me a break. The LEAST your writers could do is to make one phone call for APA's position before you make a statement like that.

The dispute over the sick-out is far from settled in the courts, and certainly was - and is - merely a symptom of the employee relations war that has been going on for years at AA. APA's recent agreements with AA management are yet more in years of attempts to improve things. To minimize the context of this effort, as your writer did to distort the story, does a disservice to a great many people. You owe your readers a little more effort to tell the truth than I saw in that short story.

I'm wondering if anybody has said anything to you about the possibility of unlawful interference on the flight deck of Egypt Air. Obviously I'm speculating, but it's speculation based on experience, combined with what little info we have at this point. As you suggested to the "AvMail" writer, we should get enough info from the recorders to ascertain what was going on in the final moments of that flight.

Having said that, I'm curious why no comment has been made (at least that I've heard) concerning the lack of (any) communication from the aircraft. Obviously, at least two factors may have contributed to the lack of any communication (other than unlawful interference):

1. The crew were simply too busy to transmit. In the last ten or fifteen years this has been shown to be an exceedingly rare occurrence, as crews need to simply move a thumb to activate a radio transmission.

2. The VHF radio systems were inoperable (possibly due to some systems failure onboard).

To me, the appearance of some form of control being exercised (interrupted descent, and subsequent climb), along with the electronic systems working to a sufficient degree that full transponder data was being transmitted, doesn't fit well with a lack of any attempt at communication.

I understand that,since the TWA debacle, American investigators (as well as media) are reticent to even hint at the possibility of intentional or "external" reasons for an accident. But I'm surprised that there hasn't been a whiff.

I also read with interest the Wall Street Journal article about the aviation industry over-reacting to electronic devices being turned off during take off and landing. I would like to report that the author of that article is wrong - it can and did happen to me!!!! On a return photographic mission south of Indianapolis, IN in our club Cessna 182RG Skylane, I had our 3-axis autopilot engaged when my right seat passenger whipped out his cell phone about 30 miles out of FWA (our home base) to call his wife. As soon as he hit the send button, the plane went into a severe uncommanded pitch up. He is a 200+ pound 6'4" bruiser and I thought he had bumped the yoke. At the completion of his call, we experienced a severe uncommanded pitch down.

Knowing I would be accompanied this past weekend on an upcoming nine-hour round-trip from Hammond, La., to Clemson, S.C., by a friend who is very prone to any kind of motion sickness, I ordered a ReliefBand, made sure she brought her Scopolamine patches, and that I had a backup supply of over-the-counter medications, and crossed my fingers. She was somewhat skeptical, but I encouraged her to read the material about the product I had downloaded from AVweb in hopes it would build her confidence in it. Turns out she didn't have time to read the material, so we just strapped it on according to directions as we hopped in the plane and took off. The Scop patches and other medications stayed in my flight bag.

We had good air at altitude, but the approach to our refueling stop at Gadsden, Ala., was extremely bumpy due to turbulence from nearby foothills. My friend just cranked the dial on the ReliefBand all the way up, and, when we landed, she exclaimed, "This thing really works!" She had absolutely no problems from that point on. She would turn the band on at full power when we took off, then turn it down or shut it off completely while cruising, then turn it up again while landing. She reported that she had no feelings of nausea at any time, an extraordinary statement given her past history.

What makes the ReliefBand such a perfect solution for my friend is the fact that, in addition to being very susceptible to motion sickness, she also has very strong reactions to most medications. Before a previous flight, she had taken some over-the-counter motion-sickness pills. The pills worked, but the side effects were terrible for her, as she felt sleepy, woozy and out-of-sorts for several DAYS afterwards. Now, she can fly without fear of getting sick from either the flight or the medication.

My friend is now thinking about getting ReliefBands for both herself and her son, who suffers from the same susceptibility to motion sickness, to use in other settings, such as sailing, road trips by car, etc.

At Reagan Washington National Airport where I work as a controller, we have two approaches with "LDA" in its name. One is titled "ROSSYLN LDA RWY 19" and the other "LDA DME RWY 19." (Runway numbers just changed recently for those lying in wait to electronically assassinate me!) The two approaches have different localizer frequencies and are titled differently at the top of the approach plate.

I wish I had a nickel for each time someone said "we're not getting the localizer." That's the flag for the that tells us that the wrong frequency has been dialed in, and almost certainly the wrong approach has been briefed. The normal result is a vector so the other aircraft behind you can land while you brief the proper approach. This is no good for either of us: You take longer trying to make schedule, and I have to work you again (nothing personal).

I'm not taking a shot at any of you in particular here. I've been here going on 19 years and the problem has been around that long, at least. Rest assured, if you're reading this and have done what I'm referring to, don't feel alone -- you ain't the only one who's messed up, and you ain't gonna be the last! We sometimes put the frequency on the ATIS just to help out, but that doesn't appear to make any difference. In order to survive when we know it's going to get busy with arrivals, a few of us "old-timers" will include the frequency for the localizer at initial call (despite the fact you've reported the correct ATIS code). It's the surest way to avoid potential problems later.

In jet aircraft, the majority of cabin depressurizations fall into the 'slow' category. These are typically the result of leaking door seals, a defective pressurization control system, a lack of pressurization air supply, known in the industry as 'bleed air,' which is taken, or 'bled', from the engine compressor section, or for other reasons such as structural failure.

Normally, the crew cross-scan will identify the problem long before there is any danger, and take appropriate action. However, if their attention is distracted by routine or other duties, a cabin altitude warning system will alert the crew that the cabin altitude has climbed to 10,000 feet, still allowing them adequate time to deal with the situation.

If a rapid or explosive decompression occurs, however, the clues will be far different. There may be a loud noise; there might be dense fogging of the cabin air. In extreme cases, there may be a terrific airflow toward the hole, such as a blown-out window. The cabin temperature will drop sharply.

Immediately, the pressure drop will cause radical ear-popping; possibly rupturing an eardrum, accompanied by an involuntary expiration of air from the lungs. It's possible to also experience sinus pain.

All of these events will occur simultaneously. If the aircraft is in cruise flight with all things going smoothly, the crew will naturally be startled into a state of alarm.

At this point, the crew's reaction will be extreme alertness, probably instinctively reacting by grasping the flight controls. The automatic mental response is, "WHAT HAPPENED?"

Ideally, the crew will immediately put on their emergency oxygen mask. At cabin altitudes above 35,000 feet, the crew will have only approximately 20 seconds of useful consciousness, known as "TUC."

If the crew isn't on oxygen at this point, they will still be conscious for a short time, rapidly drifting into a dull mental state, possibly experiencing euphoria or simply drifting off to sleep. Their brain will have lost the ability to evaluate the situation.

While military pilots are routinely trained in high-altitude simulators, known as "altitude chambers," on the effects of hypoxia, most have never actually experienced it. Civilian and Army pilots are rarely given such training.

Altitude chamber training provides the best possible training, however, this training doesn't contain the realism of the cockpit, particularly the element of the surprise of effect of rapid decompression.

Any pilot has to rely on mental preparation to execute the life-critical task of donning an oxygen mask automatically when the pilot experiences any of the indications of rapid cabin pressure loss.

Following the pilots' identification of the rapid decompression, the pilots will initiate an emergency descent. During that descent, there will probably be serious distractions which can create serious confusion.

In an emergency descent, there may be sufficient noise to cause communication problems in talking with other crew members or radio communication.

If the crew is not at least mentally proficient in the emergency requirements, they may find difficulty in selecting the appropriate interphone selections.

Ambient noise or other audio distractions may overpower the overhead speakers. If both pilots are not properly set up with earphones at the ready, the problem can easily become worse.

The greatest danger in such situations is the element of distraction from the key element - aircraft monitoring and control. If both pilots are scrambling to establish communications, no one is flying the aircraft.

In such a scenario, the life-death element is that of Cockpit Resource Management, known as "CRM." The fundamental priority is "fly the aircraft!" One pilot has to fly the aircraft, while the other becomes the support pilot, performing the administrative tasks.

Despite the industry "good intentions," all the recent accidents reveal the insufficiency of CRM.

Once the descent is initiated, there is also the remote possibility of a rate of descent so high that the outside, or ambient pressure, exceeding the interior cabin pressure. Should this happen, a relatively low pressure in the cabin will effect a reverse airflow back into the cabin. While unlikely in a true rapid decompression scenario, such would add to any distractions.

If the decompression occurs at an extremely high altitude, the oxygen regulator will automatically effect what is known as "pressure breathing." The regulator senses the extremely low pressure. The extreme of such a low pressure prevents normal lung functioning; therefore, the oxygen regulator continuously tries to force air into the pilot's lungs.

This situation is doubly distracting, as air is forced into the pilot's lungs, requiring forced exhalation. Inhalation will be a function of simply relaxing; the lungs will get all the air they can hold. However, to exhale, the pilot must exert effort, requiring the pilot to also concentrate on his / her breathing; it will no longer a subconscious action.

Beyond the effort and concentration of breathing, the pilots will also have to additionally adapt in order to communicate with the extreme of this situation.

There is little likelihood that pilots will ever go through such a situation in their entire flying career; even the older aircraft are reliable. While rapid or explosive decompressions rarely occur, the crews must still be mentally prepared for such unexpected events.

The maneuver should be well practiced in a simulator or Cockpit Procedural Trainer (CPT). In reality, it's typically "demonstrated" to minimum proficiency as a "check-off" item in the training folder.

In the modern crew-of-two world, the captain should be well trained to automatically put on his / her oxygen mask, put on a headset (volume control set during the preflight procedures), verify the need for the descent, then start the descent, concentrating almost exclusively on flying the aircraft. The first officer should be trained to take care of the administrative tasks such as setting up the interphone communication, checking the pressurization, attending to the checklist, etc. Communication with the flight attendants is also a crucial part, beyond the verification of structural integrity.

There are certain "immediate-emergencies," such as an aborted takeoff or rapid decompression which demand highly trained reflexes. Such requires the 'drill' type of training.

On a slightly different topic, the AME that I used in August has since resigned his AME certificate and moved his office. I had anticipated this as I could sense in conversation with him that neither he nor anyone in his office was not particularly computer literate. I wonder how many more AMEs have opted out of the system for this reason.

In support of the Truth In Budgeting Act, fairness (taxes upon aviation users should benefit aviation users), and fear of higher avgas taxes or new user fees, my suggestion for your AVweb Question Of The Week is this:

So through the third quarter 1999, that's 307 Skyhawks and 636 total piston ships.

That makes only 1,016 Skyhawks since new plant was announced and orders first taken five years ago. Pretty lousy sales, due to high price. About 200 a year, of which 1/3 is overseas. And it looks like another year of less than 1,000 total aircraft shipped out of Independence, compared to 2,000 per year in the plan. Good thing Russ Meyer is retiring soon.

These days, when so many of us have a GPS aboard, what does a controller want -- or expect -- us to do when she or he says, "November 12345, take up a heading of 040 to intercept the localizer ILS 02?" If I'm not mistaken, "heading" means a compass direction, that is, I turn until my directional gyro reads the heading I've been assigned, in this case 040 degrees.

Because of a couple of recent experiences with turning to headings while being vectored in strong cross winds, I've begun to wonder if controllers, when they know we have GPS aboard, actually expect us to turn to a track, rather than a heading. Given strong crosswinds, there can be a considerable difference between following a track and following a heading, and if a track is what the controller wants and expects, I'll be happy to make the adjustment.

In the above example, I turned to a heading of 040, but because of the strong southeasterly winds aloft, my actual track had me intercepting the localizer right at the outer marker. I could tell by the controller's voice that he was a bit chagrined that the vector hadn't worked out quite as he had planned. Had I taken up a 040 track instead of a heading, I would have intercepted the localizer far enough outside the marker to satisfy both the controller and me.

I, like the vast majority of the women and men at RIC, take great pride in the service we provide. I also must be honest and admit the attitudes of many of my coworkers and myself have not been as good as they should be lately. Nevertheless, I am greatly disturbed anytime someone I provide service to has a legitimate complaint.

The problems we are experiencing at RIC are numerous and complex. I am convinced these problems -- such as significant increases in traffic, reduced staffing, equipment failures and airport construction -- are the cause for the negative attitudes and reduction in flexibility by many RIC controllers. These are not your problems. However, they do have a significant adverse impact on service.

I would encourage you to contact me to discuss your concerns. I would also like to explain in some detail the reason you were sent to HCM versus direct JGG. This is actually a requirement Norfolk Approach has placed upon RIC.

Officer Desmond Casey, the pilot who perished along with a mechanic from Aris Helicopters were returning the helicopter from RHV, Reid Hillview - Santa Clara County Airport where it has made a precautionary landing because Officer Casey experienced "Uncommanded Yaw" and mushy control forces in his controls. Officer Casey stated to other pilots at RHV that he was an instant from declaring an emergency.

On the ground it was determined that the automatic "Yaw Stability Augmentation System" which senses tendencies for the helicopter's nose to make unintended turns and applies control force to adjust for them to correct the problem had failed. Ground tests by Officer Casey and the Aris Mechanic determined this to be the case. The system was taken offline by the mechanic and hover tests were conducted by Officer Casey at RHV and Officer Casey and the mechanic "deemed" the aircraft sufficiently airworthy to make it safely back to San Jose Airport for further maintenance.

None of this is speculation, it is factually reported by people who were at RHV, people who conversed with Officer Casey prior to his departure on the ill fated flight from RHV to SJC.

Des Casey was a friend and fellow pilot, a professional, who in his best judgement made a decision to ferry the aircraft back to San Jose Airport (a mere 6 miles away) a decision that his friends, fellow pilots, and brother officers will regret for many years.

As a side note the terrain provided areas that would have provided potential for shock absorption but not with out the risk of killing innocent bystanders. Des could have elected the flat roof of a restaurant or legal office or a local news publishing agency, at his low altitude and quasi controlled descent he could have selected a softer spot and perhaps survived the event. This was not his election in that he steered the crippled spinning aircraft into the center divider of a vacant street ... a selfless heroic act, I think so and the citizens of San Jose California think so.

This bird had over 6000 hours on it in five years. Another point of interest is that the city of San Jose is self-insured, so replacement is going to be a real budget-buster..... The chief of police is in full support of the PD air support program and we can only hope he does something to get his guys back in the air before their skills go fallow....

The China Air..Boeing 747 was 500 miles west, inbound to SFO at Flight Level 39 thousand (or so) on AP/alt/Hold. Slowly the nose rose and a rudder moved toward total deflection as an outboard fan shut down. The pilots weren't paying attention. When it was noticed, rather than continuing AP-engaged with a nose down attitude adjustment, the Captain disengaged the AP. The aircraft reacted rapidly, stalling the receding wing...which caused the Boeing 747 to flip on its back and began a rapid descent, split-S toward the Pacific Ocean. The two pilots couldn't regain control..until they dropped the landing gear ... shedding various parts of the aircraft, including gear doors, with recovery at 5,000 feet. During its rapid inverted descent ... one or more wingtips exceeded the sound barrier.

They brought the 747 up to 12 or 15 thousand but the vibration was too severe. When the B-747 reached an offshore point at the lower altitude where VHF comm was effective, the pilots, apparently, didn't request emergency assistance..but said they had experienced "Clear air turbulence."

As for EgyptAir 990: What if a slat inadvertently was deployed? The aircraft would continue in its forward direction but, arguably, inverted. It's my uninformed opinion that whatever occurred, the pilots gained control at 19,000..but had too little left of workable control surfaces for the aircraft to respond, disregarding the human factors compromised by such a descent and momentary recovery.

With never-exceed-speed ... and stalling speed ranges of 50 knots or less at Flight Level 330, the cruising TAS envelope is even less forgiving -- that is, too narrow to handle untoward events, which so quickly degrade A/S..especially with a modern, big-iron flying machine

These are my thoughts..which like yours, may never be resolved in a timely discovery from evidence so deep a wintry ocean.

I mean, talk about picking the right guy! He's got a King Air for a son! Wow! And apparently he feels a great attachment for his son, having a Beech on hand to go visit him when he's sick (or away at Flight Safety, I suppose..). I also gather that his offspring must be older than 18, as it seems that Kim makes him pay rent ... I guess his wife must REALLY be aviation oriented, too!

I have never experienced such poor treatment as a visitor in a convention city during an event. My wife and I were amazed at the rudeness, lack of caring, and overall poor attitude of 99% of the hotel, restaurant, and transportation personnel we encountered. After reading about the poor treatment the aviation community received at Bader field, and the comments from the Mayor, I am even more aghast!

My wife and I agree that we will never put our feet in Atlantic City again if we have a choice. We love AOPA Expo, but if they choose Atlantic City as a venue at a future date, we will elect to stay home.

This also places you in the same realm as the mainstream news media and I have always considered you above them.

Now with the twice weekly editions, I'm not sure that more is better. Today, for example, extensive coverage of the EgyptAir crash did little to enhance people's understanding, and was if anything less complete than that offered by the New York Times this morning. I would think that AVweb would be in the forefront of not fueling speculation until the facts are in.

The Korean Air findings have been reported elsewhere.

The news on TWA800 was last week's, and offered nothing new.

The San Jose crash although tragic, was trivial as aviation news without insight as to the cause.

Who cares about John Glenn's speculation about his long-ago popularity contest.

Etc, etc

Basically you wasted my time today. Reading the on-line news is done in time stolen from work by many I would expect. You should keep that in mind.

I hope future editions have more substance, in fact I would vote for going back to 1 issue per week, with more selective coverage. I'm surprised that your advertisers/sponsors don't realize that beyond a threshold, repeated exposure gets irritating.

The crash of Egypt Air 990 is an immediate mystery. The only two things which can be certain are that it came down at an incredible rate of speed and that it had electrical power, most of the way down. In all likelihood, the engines were operating.

What, then, can be concluded?

1. If ATC radar Data shows no climb or groundspeed variance, prior to the descent initiation, the occurrence of major structural failure should be suspect (may not have happened).

2. The electrical power continuity strongly suggests a high degree of structural integrity, as a breakup would have TYPICALLY caused a power loss - indicated by the radar transponder failing - and the autopilot 'tripping-off' with a heading change.

3. By virtue of the aircraft design, as a minimum, the left side of the electrical system was powered, either from the generator, or the backup generator powered by the left hydraulic system.

A. If ATC radar data shows no break in continuity of received responses from the transponder, the left generator was probably operating continuously. If the standby generator kicked-in, there should have been a detectable transponder signal interruption.

B. If radar data shows no heading (track) change, it would have almost certainly have 'nosed-over,' straight ahead. The obvious issue is the cause of such a maneuver. If structural failure was the cause, ATC radar should have painted at least a slight track (heading) change. It is unlikely that such a failure could have occurred without a detectable track change.

[Compare the data of the JFK Jr. crash]

That idea brings us to the question of why there was no such track change, with the implied concern that the 'pitch-over' was deliberate.

The most obvious reason for a deliberate pitch-down is a decompression emergency recovery procedure.

In ideal terms, let's look at such a scenario from the pilot's perspective:

"BEEP, BEEP, BEEP" -- The cabin altitude warning sounds. (Major air leak or improperly set pressurization.)

The pilots drop whatever they are doing, donning their oxygen masks.

The typical procedure:

Let's leave the procedure here, to consider what could have gone wrong.

IDEALLY:

The autopilot 'flight-level-change' (FLCH) function should have been used, setting the desired (safe) speed - then closing the throttles and extending the speed brakes (upper wing panels which add 'drag' and destroy 'lift.') The descent rate should have been approximately 12,000 feet-per-minute.

ATC should have been advised.

AT OR BELOW 14,000 FEET, the aircraft should have been leveled off with the pilots requesting a return to New York.

POSSIBILITY #1:

To expedite the descent, the pilot (presumably the captain) set in a higher speed in the autopilot "speed window." At this point, the airspeed could have very quickly become excessive (relative to the altitude vs. speed parameters), additionally setting off a speed warning "clacker." Imagine the distraction of the altitude warning and speed warning.

Particularly if the pilots were slow to close the throttles and/or extend the speed brakes, the speed build-up would have been extremely rapid.

Such a speed increase could have easily produced the reported rate-of-descent.

POSSIBLY #2:

Instead, the autopilot 'vertical speed' (V/S) function was used for the descent. If so, there would have been no speed protection, the aircraft would have simply gone for the deck at the selected rate of descent.

Again at this point, the airspeed could have quickly become excessive, additionally setting off a speed warning 'clacker.' Once again, imagine the distraction.

HOWEVER, this autopilot function would not have produced the reported rate-of-descent, as the autopilot 'rate' function would have limited the descent rate.

Without evidence of a heading change, it is extremely unlikely that the aircraft was taken off the autopilot and 'hand-flown.'

Let's go back to possibility-one. Human factors should not be over-looked. Radical distraction, catatonia (denial-shutting down) or pure panic could have been a major factor. Cockpit 'culture' (captain-is-God) is a well-known and potentially a major factor.

The major question is, "Why didn't the pilot(s) react to recover." Speculation aside, that answer is yet to come.

It is certain that at some point, the aircraft would have started breaking-up from the descent rate alone. Boeing computers are the best source for a probable breakup pattern / sequence.

From here, only underwater camera imagery, the aircraft and human remains, the voice recorder and flight data recorder can tell.

One person's opinion

I fly DC-9s for a living, and was impressed with her courage to describe the FAA and its callous disregard for passenger safety in numerous ways. Sure, it is a huge, and underfunded department with contradictory mandates, supposedly no longer. Here is just a tiny portion of their institutionalized, intentional disregard for passenger/crew safety, due to their cost/benefit analysis, along with their job of preventing our govt. from losing face. The installation of smoke detectors/ext. in our cargo bins should have been done decades ago. 2) The FAA's lack of reasonable duty/rest requirements (i.e. Part 135/121 min. rest with max. 8 flt. hours scheduled-8 hours block to block total-not much of a hotel rest between two 12 hour duty days or nights) have been a sad joke among US civilian pilots for a very long time.

In December, reserve pilots will no longer be required to be "rested" and avail. for several days in a row, 24 hours a day, i.e. no designated rest period, due to dead bodies in Little Rock, AR. The FAA has often done nothing about pilot documentation concerning pilot-pushing.

Frankly, how could they admit that a carrier, which is allowed to have an operating certificate is unsafe, without numerous burned or bleeding bodies? They don't give a *&#* about unsafe operations, unless they need to seek out paperwork, which betrays incomplete tng. records etc, due to a crash somewhere among a regional or upstart carrier. This implies (i.e. KIWI at EWR, which was briefly grounded) that they are doing their job.

My airline told me once at 2200 to fly midnight from MEM to MIA and then back at dawn with no prior notice. I could have used our fatigue policy to refuse, but had enjoyed merely by chance a nap that afternoon. Only due to our union do we have any fatigue policy at all for 0200 thru 0500 ops. Many operations don't perceive the need, or have the courage to join a union. The FAA has always closed its eyes to pilot-pushing.

The FAA's function as the airline subsidy bureaucracy needed to be revealed publicly by someone willing to risk a career: integrity requires this sometimes (according to many veterans of Southeast Asia, i.e. Stephen Coonts, David Hackworth, Jack Broughton, Phillip Caputo and countless others, some of whom I've flown with, the lack of such courage and willingness to risk one's image as a team player among many senior govt. officials/military officers probably doomed thousands to needless death and crippling in Vietnam).

I don't agree with some of Schiavo's blanket comments about regional airlines being necesarily unsafe, if she was quoted in context. Although I haven't read her book, only excerpts, it appears that many of her frank descriptions of our FAA's and some airline mgmts.' policies on safety (or lack of them, i.e. [Value] 'Ghettojet' according to one of my FOs who worked there a while) are decades overdue.

Pardon my crudeness, but it sometimes takes a woman to have the balls to call a spade a spade. If any of your staff has every worked as a pilot for a 135 or 121 operation, then it is much easier to understand the long-overdue need to lift up the rock and allow the light of day (the public's eyes) to shine on the FAA's function as taxpayer-funded airline promoter/subsidy. I'm interested in the views of you and your staff, and wonder about the contents of her book. It just seems to me that without her congressional testimony, the reality that there are airline mgmt. low-lifes aided by govt. collaborators would not have been exposed very much, if at all.

My point in writing to you is that the facts that were stated in the News Wire were to some degree false. I am assuming that the Flight School in question is Daniel Webster College. I won't dare ask about your source because my father is a journalist for Associated Press and I know they are kept some what confidential. I would like to give my version of the events to maybe set the record straighter.

We did receive seven new 172's and they were flown from the Cessna plant to Nashua, NH by the CFI's. The school wanted to provide a certain amount of media coverage and so the Director of the Flight Center/Chief Pilot and the President of the school decided that christening the aircraft was a good idea. There was quite a bit of contention about breaking a bottle over a brand new airplane and many said it was a stupid move. The CFI was asked both by the President and the Chief Pilot to do the honors. The school had called Cessna and asked if any damage would be done and Cessna replied that no, this could be done without harm.

The day when the 172's landed the CFI double checked again with the Chief Pilot to make sure they really wanted to go ahead with the christening. In front of cameras and press the CFI broke the bottle on the trailing edge of the McCauley prop. This did cause some damage but after talking to Cessna the contract maintenance people had it fixed within an hour.

Less than a week later the plane was flown to Bedford for the Garmin GNS 430 installation and the FSDO heard about our little mishap and wondered what specs we had used to file the prop. We faxed them what Cessna had faxed us and the prop remained on the aircraft, no change occurred.

I wanted to set the record straight because this CFI has received much criticism for what he did and I don't believe he had many options. I hope that maybe next week's edition of AVweb's NewsWire might tell a little more accurate tale of events.

Thank you for your time and keep up the good work with NewsWire.

A scenario they did not consider is where the main oxygen valve was shut off as required to do the modulator valve replacement and not turned back on after the repair. The instrument panel pressure gauge continues to show pressure, and the fault only shows up via the checklist test of the oxygen mask. As to what caused the decompression... hard to tell, but it probably wasn't explosive. At 39,000 ft. any decompression would be somewhat rapid, and the crew would certainly be distracted when no oxygen flowed from their masks. It must have been fairly quick, otherwise they would have begun an emergency descent.

Stories like yours help to put the struggle in perspective, and give me hope. Thank you!!

The reason I feel this is needed is one of attitude! I have been in this aviation business for 35+years and RIC ATC takes the case for being the most rude, nonprofessional, and the ones who know the least about the business of moving aircraft safely of any other ATC facility I have ever used.

Let me give just one example:

"Richmond Approach, I would like to use runway 20 if you could work it out."

"508, you WILL use the assigned runway, runway 25!"

Is it just me, or do other pilots have similar problems with RIC?

The best was yet to come. Someone in this government is going to have to sit down with sections and departments. The basic ground rules no longer seem to apply.

Even if the FAA inspectors are the first on a crash site, it is the NTSB that makes the determination on who controls the investigation. On television yesterday, every Tom, Dick, Harry and Mary had something to say. The only person that should have been speaking was the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge.

Yesterday, I saw TV interviews by spokesmen for the Coast Guard, the FBI in New York and the FBI in Boston. And to put the cherry on the cream, The New York Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had to put on a dog and pony show. I understand Mary Schiavo came out of hiding and got into the act, too, but I was fortunate, I did not see her.

I am surprised the two Governors and the Mayor did not get on the tube. A few Senators did. Even the Port Authorities Police Force started an investigation. All investigations, all data, all information, anything related to an aviation accident -- be it mechanical, pilot error, terrorist -- should be coordinated by the NTSB at the beginning. At least until there is concrete evidence pointing a finger.

To have every Tom, Dick, Harry and Mary -- along with reporters that do not have the foggiest idea of the subject they are reporting -- talking on TV is idiotic. All that is needed at the onset is the basic facts. Who, What, Where and How? We do not need all of this speculation: maybes, it could have beens, etc. AND we need a minimum of voices giving this information at the beginning.

Doing an investigation such as this is not a pleasant job. Invariably these people have family and friends, in some cases bombarding them with questions on the little time they get off. They do not need an FBI trying to control the investigation at the onset. Or the Port Authority doing their own investigation. They can assist the FBI and the NTSB but to go out on there own is something else. We saw what happened with TWA 800 when that happened.

Among the various headset vendors, most had a mini sound chamber or tape recorder that played pre-recorded engine sounds for a variety of aircraft. Lightspeed was unique in that they also had a complete collection of competitor's headsets for instant comparisons. Most of the other vendors let you compare just their various models.

Trying to find a qualitative difference between the various brands was most difficult, as any differences were very subjective. While my ears could not discern any difference between the $1000 BOSE and the $300 Lightspeed, there was enough additional noise dampening with the ANR feature to convince me to fly home with the Lightspeed 15K. My son bought the 20K. We swapped halfway home. Neither of us could tell any difference between them.

I had a passive David Clark H10-40 which I borrowed for the flight up, and my ASA HS-1. Again, I could not tell any difference between the two passive headsets. I can tell a distinct difference between a passive and an active headset, and I will be flying with the active headset from now on.

While I could not hear any differences in the audio sounds, there were some very definite differences in comfort between the various brands. Weight, pressure, ear cup shape and wires made a big difference. Trying on everybody's headset is the best way to winnow down the selection. This will be a very personal choice.

If you are going to do a lot of flying, the active headset is much less tiring to wear, and a lot easier on the ears. There is no substitute for being able to try on different brands to check for comfort.

If you cannot find a shop with a variety of brands to try, look for manufacturers that offer a 30-day return policy.

As an AVIATION publication, how can you even mention this ridiculous rumor?

Yes, it was discounted when officials realized that some overzealous media fool didn't bother to figure out that EWR stands for NEWARK not EDWARD'S AIR FORCE BASE!!!!!

Apparently, due to the fog in the NY metro area, the flight had to divert into EWR.

While flying the line yesterday out of BOS, we listened to WBZ AM broadcasting ABC news live with their uninformed commentators spewing forth total crap to take up air time.

When will the media ever learn to hold its tongue until it has some cold, hard FACTS to release? If the legal, political and medical (etc.) news we're getting from the media is anywhere near as inaccurate their aviation news - then one has to wonder if we're getting ANY facts at all!

Hi, my name is Joey Sanders. I found Dr. Brent Blue's articles on O2 use very informative and helpful. I am a DC-10 Captain for FedEx and a Pilot Examiner in Alabama.

I would like Dr. Blue's input on night flying -- specifically, how cockpit heat causes higher cabin altitude.

What little I've seen of the current approach to contracting-out air traffic services so far has been troubling. In particular, about 10 days ago I visited a facility which is about to transition from FAA to contract personnel. New personnel were receiving -- at a maximum -- six weeks of local checkout and familiarization before the changeover, which is scheduled to occur this coming Thursday (4 November). Considering the fact that it takes an average controller at an average facility anywhere from 3-6 months to a year to fully certify in the various tower positions, I have to wonder how ready these folks will be, and whether they will ever be fully prepared to provide the same level of service as their predecessors. Any licensed controller is capable of providing effective air traffic services when properly trained in local procedures and duties; these folks are being thrown into their jobs without the benefit of the over-the-shoulder formal and word-of-mouth training that really makes a difference in how the flying public is served. There will never be a chance of recouping that lost anecdotal knowledge.

The second problem, of course, is that contracting out the Level I facilities is just the camel's nose under the tent flap. The facility I've described above is a Level II, not a I, and studies are underway to try to expand this concept way beyond the current philosophy. Further, another airfield I'm monitoring in conjunction with some recently voiced concerns -- currently contract -- has seen growth well beyond the Level I threshold, but there has been no indication that that airport's "contract tower" status is being revisited for possible return of the facility to FAA staffing... as is supposedly the requirement.