Boeing Technical Pilot’s Trial Under Way

12

The trial of Mark Forkner, Boeing’s former chief technical pilot on the 737 MAX, got underway in Fort Worth last week with prosecutors claiming he lied to regulators about the significance of changes to the flight control system and his defense alleging he’s being scapegoated. Forkner is the only person to face criminal charges resulting from investigations into Boeing and the FAA’s handling of the certification of the MAX, two of which crashed, killing 346 people. Forkner was a main point of contact between the company and the agency during much of the certification process and the implementation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System into the jet’s flight control system. He has pleaded not guilty to four fraud charges. He originally faced six charges but two were dropped.

The prosecution intends to introduce scores of emails and other documents to prove that Forkner intentionally misled FAA representatives on the implications of adding MCAS, which was intended to provide electronic dampening of the aerodynamic effects of adding much larger engines and repositioning them on the aircraft. MCAS was cited in both of the crashes, one in Indonesia and one in Ethiopia. In both cases faulty data from attitude indicators prompted the system to push the aircraft into dives the pilots could not arrest. The prosecution argues that Forkner minimized the impact of MCAS because Boeing wanted to certify the aircraft without the need for extensive retraining of pilots. Forkner claims he was kept in the dark about significant changes made to the system as certification flight testing continued.

Russ Niles
Russ Niles is Editor-in-Chief of AVweb. He has been a pilot for 30 years and joined AVweb 22 years ago. He and his wife Marni live in southern British Columbia where they also operate a small winery.

Other AVwebflash Articles

12 COMMENTS

  1. I feel bad for Captain Forkner. I’ve been reading about him for a while now, and the scapegoat scenario seems to be the most accurate one in my opinion. Seems like within Boeing the left hand (certification liaison office) didn’t know what the right hand (engineering development) was doing with or changing about the design. I don’t think Forkner ever deliberately deceived anybody. I think he himself was not properly informed, so he did his job as best he could under that circumstance. From what I’ve read and seen, the real blame is much higher up the food chain at Boeing, at the executive level, for creating an atmosphere that rewarded only cost savings and prevented bad news from being communicated to leadership.

    • BS. He was an active participant in trivializing the effects of MCAS to the FAA. Should heads higher up the chain roll? Yes. But he knew exactly what was happening and did nothing to correct it.

        • How high is the “Chief Technical Pilot” in the Boeing chain of command? Is he completely unsupervised? Did he conceive the idea of a new AC with new systems that does not require new training?

          Unfortunately, the way the government pursues justice in corporate malfeasance cases always leaves the public with a sense of injustice. We get it, this is the guy who was careless enough to send text messages and emails that are now available to be used against him in court. Skilled corporate players only generate documentation that absolves them of responsibility whilst they push cost cutting that is rewarded with bonuses and stock options.

    • No doubt other upper managers were directly responsible for knowingly withholding information, and they should be charged too, but they’re also likely to get away with it as upper management folk often do. However, the information I’ve seen so far suggests Forkner knew something was up with MCAS and thus holds some responsibility. I just hope others who were responsible also get held accountable.

    • Well, the DOJ produced a slide deck to Forkner’s defense where an FAA employee characterized Forkner as a “Scapegoat” and further said “The 737 MAX accidents were caused by a failure of the Engineering processes, but the public/media focus on “training and publications” aspects (including the Forkner indictment) is not only incorrect and misguided, it is distracting from the real lessons that SHOULD be learned.”

      This FAA slide is reproduced on Document 51 that was filed by the defense on 12/13/2021. The document is accompanied by a request for the DOJ to make the relevant FAA employee who made those statements available to the defense.

      In this filing, the defense claims that the DOJ is constantly minimizing the FAA’s role in essentially everything related to this case and the underlying circumstances, including blocking the defense’s access to potentially relevant FAA employees.

  2. According to the various filings in the case, the DOJ acknowledged that Boeing disclosed the changes/expansion of the MCAS features to the FAA people who were responsible for determining that the Max met the airworthiness standards. Forkner is accused of withholding this same information from the FAA people on the evaluation group/team. One view, and certainly his defense position, is that the DOJ seeks to punish him for allegedly not telling the agency information the agency already knew. A bit circuitous.

    Hairs will be split (e.g. was the scope of what Forkner was required to disclose to the evaluation group entirely co-extensive with what Boeing disclosed to the agency separately? was there active deception?), but in the end, the DOJ has to prove each element of the wire fraud statute. A key element is whether anything Forkner did or didn’t do caused the invoiced airline to lose money or property. If the DOJ can’t prove that one element beyond a reasonable doubt, the wire fraud charge fails. This part may be the DOJ’s biggest lift.

  3. Chief Technical Pilot is almost executive level. They seem to think so anyway. Did he let his management skew his advice? Probably.

    Meanwhile, who is being held accountable at the FAA?

  4. ” faulty data from attitude indicators prompted the system to push the aircraft into dives “?
    I thought it was faulty data from an AOA vane. No?

    • Yes, the faulty AOA sensor with lack of redundancy with only 1 of the 2 installed AOA vanes connected to MCAS.

  5. It’s unrealistic to think a single decisionmaker in the chain of management is responsible for Doing It Wrong. All those who had a hand in what amounts to a coverup which had fatal consequences need to be prosecuted.

LEAVE A REPLY