Last July, the FAA told a Congressional committee that it would not meet the December 31, 2015 deadline mandated by federal law to simplify and streamline aircraft certification regulations-FAR Part 23. The announcement, causing some members of the committee to unload on the unfortunate FAA messenger, had deeper import than just another report that the FAA has an almost pathological problem with meeting deadlines.
The real concern with the FAA’s “can’t do” culture two-fold: it is hampering innovation in safety technology and it is actively supporting light aircraft manufacturers that are based outside the U.S. by pushing new aircraft certification to Europe. While we reported that the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), the advocacy organization for U.S. aircraft and component manufacturers was expressing the concern frustration on the part of U.S. manufacturers and the costs and lost sales they were experiencing because of the snail pace of FAA certification, we alsoreported on two European manufacturers whose response to the FAA news was that it was no big deal-they’ll certify in Europe and bring their aircraft into the U.S. based on reciprocal certification agreements-largely bypassing the FAA.
A Little Background
For decades, FAA certification of aircraft and components set the standard through much of the world for how it should be done. If the FAA approved type certification of a newly developed airplane, the response of other governments was to go through some formalities and approve the airplane based on the testing data used by the FAA.
The FAA certification process has always been tough. Working for a manufacturer, I was aware of some set-tos between FAA personnel and employees of the manufacturer at meetings that were held as a new design went through the process of certification.
Certification was always a shockingly expensive process for the manufacturer, and a major reason a lot of start up aircraft manufacturers folded before their pride and joy could receive a Type Certificate and be put on the market.
By law, FAA employees could not (and cannot) be held personally liable should they say yes to a design and it eventually proves to have a defect that causes someone to be killed in a crash. Yet, over the last 20 years, saying yes to an airplane or component that later has a problem became perceived as a potential career-ender for an FAA employee. In talking with employees of aircraft and component manufacturers and mod shops-none of whom would agree to be identified for this article for fear of retribution by the FAA on projects awaiting approval-as well as former FAA employees (who spoke only on background), decision-making by FAA personnel on certification became increasingly, and unrealistically, risk averse. One comment I received was “it’s safer to say ‘no’ than ‘yes.'” Accordingly, the FAA certification process has steadily gotten slower.
In fairness, I recognize that the FAA is hampered by an inadequate budget and is under-staffed in many areas, but that has been the case for over 40 years.
I also received comments regarding poor communication skills on the part of engineers and unintelligible reports drafted for the FAA in support of certification test data. One employee of an aircraft manufacturer told of having to send poorly written reports back to engineering a number of times for rework before they could go to the FAA.
The Problem Gets Worse
As the certification process bogged down, computers caused an explosion in new airframe, engine and avionics technology, much of which has helped improve safety. Yet, as GAMA president Pete Bunce said in his testimony before Congress on revising Part 23 certification, “FAA policy and procedure hinders the industry’s ability to efficiently develop and deploy new aviation products and technologies.”
Over the last 15 years of writing for sister publication Aviation Consumer, I’ve reported on new aircraft as well as cutting edge mods that have been through the FAA’s STC approval process. The common thread I have heard from the companies, large and small, is that to speed the certification process, the FAA has encouraged them to use the latest technology to collect data, reduce it and present it to the FAA. They spend the money to do so, but then the FAA too often ignores it and does its own testing.
In addition, the FAA encourages companies seeking STCs to hire Designated Engineering Representatives (DER)-people the FAA has vetted to test aircraft and components the way the FAA wants it done and then, if appropriate, certify that the testing shows compliance with specific FAA certification requirements-only to have the FAA ignore the DER’s data and findings.
For manufacturers, the FAA set up the Organization Delegation Authorization (ODA) program to allow a manufacturer that has a track record for being able to accurately test and report on compliance with FARs to submit test data and certify the results in a fashion acceptable to the FAA. An ODA representative I spoke with while preparing this article told me that when data showing compliance is submitted to the FAA, acceptance depends on which individuals the FAA assigns to the committee that reviews it. Some FAA employees will follow FAA policy and accept ODA data and certification, some won’t. Despite the manufacturer meeting all the requirements to obtain ODA approval and then testing in compliance with the program, the FAA too often ignores its own program and either requires more testing or stops everything and assigns its personnel to redo the tests. While doing so as sampling for quality assurance is appropriate, I was told that it happens with distressing frequency.
Similar situations were mentioned by GAMA’s Pete Bunce when I interviewed him recently.
Interpretation
Part of the process of a manufacturer or mod shop showing compliance with FARs includes the interpretation of individual regulations. That is normal and expected. It often involves give and take when something new is being developed. The problem comes when the individual in the FAA office who is in charge of a particular project-new certification or STC-comes up with an interpretation of a regulation that is completely out of line, or even dangerous. That employee has the future of the project in his or her hands-and if those hands are attached to a person with a personality disorder, inability to understand the product or is simply mean-spirited, projects have been known to come to a dead stop or require hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional, meaningless testing or redesign.
For example, when Lancair was developing the Columbia 400, the person in charge of the FAA certification project made the unprecedented decision that because the airplane had a maximum certified operational altitude of 25,000 feet, then a full set of spin tests had to be done at that altitude, at all weights and centers of gravity. There was (and still is) no way to appeal a foolish certification requirement imposed by someone at the FAA in charge of a project. Lancair went out and hired a test pilot who had retired from a general aviation manufacturer and had extensive experience with spin testing and spent a potful of money doing spin testing at 25,000 feet.
More recently, an FAA project manager whom I believe did not understand how a diesel engine worked, interpreted a certification regulation of diesel mod and required the applicant to make a change it argued would not work and was unsafe. The FAA employee would not change his position and there was no appeal. The change was made. His action, in my opinion, led directly to series of engine power losses and forced landings in subsequent testing.
According to one person I spoke with who had dealt with the FAA on certification for over a decade, much of the problem lies with the culture within the FAA. It is overwhelming difficult for a manager to fire a subordinate (either worker-bee or manager), whether it’s for incompetence, inability to get work done on time or irrational interpretations of regulations. Too often, according to the persons I interviewed at manufacturers and mod shops, employees of manufacturers who have those same problems get hired by the FAA after getting fired by the manufacturer. A comment I heard more than once was, “If you can’t make it in industry, work for the FAA.” While I think the comment overstates the situation dramatically, it contains a kernel of truth.
In my opinion, when new technology that will make airplanes safer is delayed due to an agency that exists to improve safety, something is terribly wrong. I do not advocate eliminating the FAA or wholesale chopping of regs-I flew freight out of Willow Run Airport, Michigan, in the 1970s when the FAA office on the field stopped enforcing the regs. As would be expected, the operators engaged in a race to the bottom and stopped doing maintenance or paying any attention to crew duty times. The result was a series of fatal crashes due to pooped pilots, airplanes in crummy shape and illegal mods. In my opinion, sensible regulations applied by dedicated regulators, have saved a lot of lives in aviation.
The Intended Solution
Complaints about the increasing delays and spiraling costs of what should be a tough but fair certification process caused Congress to put pressure on the FAA. In 2011, the FAA created the Part 23 Reorganization Aviation Rulemaking Committee. It was made up of industry and FAA personnel (the names I recognized were serious players in the industry). It held what might be described as town meetings and met with industry personnel who regularly work with aircraft and component certification.
It received massive amounts of information and, within two years prepared a detailed report recommending specific changes to FAR Part 23 that would remove barriers to bringing new, safer aircraft designs to the market. The recommendations in the report are detailed and include removing prescriptive methods of compliance, ensuring safety objectives address future technologies, utilize FAA-accepted consensus standards, develop globally acceptable regulations and implement them as soon as possible.
Congress liked what it saw in the report, and-in a break with the Washington D.C. tradition of throwing well-researched reports from top flight committees onto a shelf and forgetting them-told the FAA to implement the recommendations within two years.
As everyone knows, the FAA has said it can’t do it in time. It hasn’t announced whether anyone has been fired for this slip up-but the smart money is that no one’s FAA job is at risk.
So, the agency that gives zero slack to a pilot who has to accomplish something by a date certain under the FARs, yet refuses to follow those same FARs when it comes to deadlines for it to act, has ridden that hubris to flipping off Congress when it unanimously passes stand-alone legislation directing the FAA to act by a deadline.
Meanwhile, the certification delays continue and more and more, new safety technology is being developed by companies outside the U.S. Because of the FAA, we’re exporting what used to be an overwhelming lead in quality and safety of general aviation aircraft.
According to GAMA, general aviation in the U.S. supports over 1.2 million jobs, provides $150 billion in economic activity and generated $5.6 billion in exports of U.S. manufactured airplanes last year.
As I pointed out above, last week AVweb reported on two European manufacturers that said the delay in Part 23 doesn’t matter, they’ll certify overseas. Besides, with some 50 percent of aircraft built in the U.S. being sold to foreign buyers, why would a foreign manufacturer be too worried about a delay in U.S. certification-it can sell airplanes everywhere else in the world, continue to improve its airplanes and get U.S. certification based on reciprocity. It will be selling a product that is head and shoulders above a born-in-the-U.S. product that offers two- or three-year old technology because it took the domestic manufacturer that long to get FAA certification.
We’re already seeing this in the world of drones. AVweb reported last week that because of continuing delays by the FAA in coming up with rules for commercial operation of drones, Canadians are forging ahead with technology for development and commercial use of drones because Transport Canada has had a viable permit system for commercial drone operation in place for four years.
In my opinion, the FAA’s culture of delay and toleration of internal incompetence is slowing safety improvements in general aviation. Good grief, why are we still using magnetos instead of electronic ignition?
Industry handed the FAA much of what the FAA needs to revise Part 23 of the FARs; the FAA’s own committee then wrote up the details. The FAA’s continuing delays hurt everyone in the aviation community-pilots and passengers are not getting access to the latest safety technology; manufacturers and mod shops face unreasonable costs and aircraft manufacturers in other countries get an unfair competitive advantage.
GAMA is continuing to work to get Congress to apply pressure to the FAA to do its job. In a time when the political parties can’t seem to agree on anything, this is one shinning area in which they stand united. It’s time for Congress to use the leverage it has, speaking with one voice, to compel the FAA to do its job to make general aviation safer.
Rick Durden is the Features/News Editor of AVweb and the author of The Thinking Pilot’s Flight Manual or, How to Survive Flying Little Airplanes and Have a Ball Doing It, Volume I.
