Halladay Accident: Should We Bother With The Unreachables?

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By personal predilection, I’m not wired to butt into other peoples’ business. Personal agency is a thing with me. But there are times when intervention goes with the job and one of those is when giving flight instruction. The pilot approaches you for a flight review and upon being handed his logbook, you see prominently memorialized: “Flew under Skyway bridge.”

This obviously comes from this week’s video, in which the NTSB found that entry in the logbook of baseball star Roy Halladay, who died in the crash of his Icon A5 in November 2017. The bridge flight had occurred 12 days before the fatal crash. So today’s question is this: If you’re a flight instructor or if you’re not, pretend, how would you handle seeing that?

I’m benefiting from hindsight here, but as an instructor, I like to think I would have immediately flagged it. What the heck is going on here? Why did you do that? What were the circumstances and what made you think it was a good idea? Do you think it reflects well on general aviation? And on you? Do you even care?

As I pointed out in the video, the risk of flying under a bridge with 180 feet of vertical clearance and 1200 feet of clear span is small. A student pilot could pull it off with ease. But the only reason for doing it—and it’s the same reason for not doing it—is for the sheer thrill of it. And if that thrill grows stale, do you lack the restraint to seek out a bigger one? We already have the answer to that writ in the bloodless prose of an NTSB report. Halladay died while flying aggressive near-aerobatic maneuvers at altitudes down to the surface of the Gulf of Mexico at a time when he had only owned the airplane for about a month. Not even long enough to make it to the first flight review.

I wouldn’t debate whether this was bad judgment but would rather shift the conversation to the role of flight instructors in trying to prevent it when they see it. I’ve been to enough rodeos by now to know this is probably futile as is writing about it yet again as though we might avoid it the next time. Readers who already know how to avoid such risks don’t need to hear it again and The Unreachables won’t understand enough to favor themselves with a change in thought and act.

In that sense, there’s little of value in the NTSB docket other than to show the airplane was functioning as designed and to add digital legitimacy to what witnesses saw. All the toxicology report showing a mix of drugs in Halladay’s system does is to add another dimension to his faulty risk assessment. We can’t determine if the drugs were a factor but we already know that they were there in the first place is all we need to know.

Nonetheless, no thinking instructor—or even well-meaning pilot—should let something like this pass without engagement, even if it is a tilt at the MT. Some pilots who are craters awaiting a grid reference truly don’t understand the risks inherent in aviation, nor that the risk envelope narrows toward the pointy end elevating the probability of an accident to even odds. Low flying is one of those spikes, as is weather and lack of training. Some of these pilots may be reachable and thus savable. The ones who are both insensitive to real risk and imagining themselves immune to whatever they do sense are the real hard cases. By natural selection, they tend to be a dwindling few.

Whether Roy Halladay was one of those is irrelevant, in my view. He did what he did and died for it. We as an aviation community share some of the responsibility in that we haven’t figured out how to get at people who aren’t aware of their own risky behavior and I sometimes wonder whether some even want to be got at. The thrill of near-death [insert activity of your choice] is its own reward for them.

Perhaps scenario training may be the only way to clue people in who are numb to risk. In this case, OK, you flew under the bridge. But how about next time? Would you fly under an even lower one for a bigger thrill? What about weather risks? How do you draw the line there, or do you even? The answers might be theoretically satisfying, but I’ve been around the houses too many times to expect real behavior changes.

Not that I couldn’t use a little remediation myself. When I was placing the graphics in that video, I realized I said a soft deck allowing 60-degree banks down to 300 feet was perfectly acceptable. Huh? That’s nuts. I wouldn’t do that in the Cub or anything else. We still teach students to avoid steep turns in the pattern because they amp up the risk of a stall or loss of control. I didn’t have time to re-record it, but I should have said—and Icon should say—more like 500 or even 800 feet. I have the pleasure of correcting myself, not having someone else do it from the pages of an accident report.   

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31 COMMENTS

  1. Paul, Your title is thought provoking, a paradoxical question.

    My answer to your question is …yes. Why bother? Because we don’t know who is unreachable? Nor do we know when. Sometimes people are unreachable this morning but reachable this afternoon, unreachable ten years ago, but reachable today, maybe at this moment.

    A logbook entry entry memorializing prior poor judgement should be questioned if noticed by a logbook entry or Fellow pilots witnessing such activity should say something as well. It would be nice to think we can alter someone else reckless behavior by a few words. But behavior change usually comes from a series of events. Since we don’t know what those events or circumstances are today, nor do we have any idea what personal battles a person is dealing with at any given time, none of know when that moment is, nor what provides the tipping point.

    So, I think we have an obligation to say something to be the catalyst, another brick in the wall, or could be the proverbial “straw the broke the camel’s back” that just might make an unreachable…reachable.

    Our problem is our ego can get in the way. We love the judgmental worldview. It is extremely satisfying to the selfish soul to point out someone else’s risky behavior. As an instructor, or as a fellow pilot who has witnessed such behavior, it is another discussion on how any one of us transmits this concern. However, if we don’t…who will?

    • Jim, you make excellent points. We never know when our comments and suggestions will take affect. Ask any parent. As pilots and brothers/sisters in our very special endeavor of aviation, we owe it to every other pilot to make constructive comments, especially in the current world of political correctness, to make the skies safer for all of us. Too often, we say nothing until after the event, which may have been prevented, if we did.

  2. Sadly stupid is forever. There will always be a portion of the pilot population who are wired to make bad decisions. In my experience they usually won’t listen.

    As an instructor there are IMO 2 things I can do to help reduce the number of “those guys”

    1) always set a high example by demonstrating good airmanship and sound decision making and if possible provide an explanation of why you did something so that the student can understand the what and the why

    2) refuse to reach bad students. I have fired several students who were not invested in becoming a good pilot

    • And there will always be some pilots victims of the Dunning-Krueger effect, which would be hard for any instructor to detect before it’s too late.

  3. Courage

    It is important to be courageous.

    It is cowardly to be seen as being courageous.

    While there are exceptions to every rule, suffice to say “the ‘wealthy’ may be often wise, but the ‘rich’ are routinely retarded.”

    Halladay is just a regurgitation of “… that rich kid wrapping his brand new Corvette — that his parents gave him — around a tree.”

    But I digress. Regulations — the reactive mechanisms that they are — are not for the individual involved, but for the innocent bystanders if only because the general public cringes at accident scenes, and they demand from politicians that they be spared the gore. Regulatory aviation agencies are ultimately established to “… stop stuff from falling out of the sky and onto your roof.” Everything else is a secondary concern. And remember that regulations reflect the minimum requirement.

    But some people are hard-wired to have contempt for good practices and procedures. And our prisons and State Hospitals — and cemeteries — reflect that.

  4. Paul, by definition, “Unreachables” are unreachable. Please kill it Paul. Just let it die. I’m tired of reading about it. I’m sure I’m not the only one. Unfortunately, the guy did what a lot of people do in life. He screwed up in a big way. Again, unfortunate, however, it happens all the time and there’s nothing you or anyone else is going to do or say to change it. It’s the human condition.

    • Tom, The term “Human Condition” is the ultimate definition of ambiguity and has no value in solving issues. I am sorry that you feel that way. Either we are problem solvers or we are the problem. Don’t give up. I believe that Paul and most of us won’t give up as we try to inspire the best pilots that we can to make the skies safer and save lives in the process.

  5. Just because you can afford an airplane doesn’t mean you should own one. Like the much maligned Bonanza, of which there are 70 year old examples still out flying around.

  6. Excellent piece Paul. What would Bob Hoover do? There are old pilots and there are……….well you know the saying. Yes, there will always be reckless pilots that never get old. In February, I “legally” flew over the Sunshine Bridge in a 1940 Stearman biplane at a safe altitude. It was thrill enough. I agree wih you. What that man did was stupid and to view it as just, “oh well, he made a mistake” is a cop out. His stupud entry in his log book and snubbing his nose at good judgement without being called out on it is a green light for more dangerous and deadly choices. Pray for his family.

  7. And..it was said, “Had it not been for the Bonanza, the World would have been overpopulated with doctors.” Two near examples of that adage existed at my airport over the last few years. Fortunately, they have given up their Bonanzas and and lived to see another day.

  8. Paul, as usual you’ve laid out a thought provoking piece. As a corporate pilot, my job is to mitigate risk. I don’t know the risk for skydiving but I get the impression that it’s probably an order of magnitude or more riskier than GA. I suspect that skydiving is done “mostly for the thrill of it”. Should we eliminate skydiving? I don’t know the answer for others but I suspect that you have cogently analyzed it and would like to read your thoughts on the value of skydiving and other risky activities versus aggressive flying in something like an Icon.

    Thank you.

    • Skydiving an order of magnitude riskier than GA? Not even.

      Although the units of exposure aren’t the same–hours versus jumps–skydiving has a lower fatal accident rate. Most recently 0.39/100,000 fatals compared to 0.89/100,000 fatal accidents in GA. If you look at it on a participant basis, the directionality is the same: Skydiving has 0.35 deaths per 1000 participants; GA 0.38/1000, on a pilot-only basis, but higher if you include all the bodies. Total population? Skydiving 0.05/1M versus 0.76/1M for GA. (Cars are 110/1M.)

      Pilots, especially those spring-loaded to say things about jumping out of perfectly good airplanes, have a hard time processing this because they judge the risk both inherently and emotionally. Hell, I do the same thing. I know these numbers cold, but my adrenaline is off-scale high when I go out the door of an airplane, but barely off the peg when taking off in one. That said, I still know enough not to fly under a bridge for multiple reasons.

      • Thank you, Paul:

        I stand corrected. Since my job is to move my Company’s personnel around at 300 knots Without killing them I really appreciate the knowledge and perspective that you impart with your articles.

  9. I despise revealing this but here goes. During training for my ppl, my concern, besides avoiding bending metal before my instructor could interfere with “I have control”, are seasonal allergies. The sudden sneezing fits, teary eyes and runny nose scenario. Worried about it, I remembered mentioning it during the first flight physical. The next time I
    visited my flight physician i asked about my choice of otc antihistamines. Regular shots build up immunity but doesn’t cure everyone and I’m one of them requiring occasional otc meds. I did my homework on the FAA website then asked the flight physician. His answer bolstered my thoughts as to which otc antihistamine is acceptable. When both hands and feet are flying small helicopters, there’s little room and time to take your hands off controls to reach for a Kleenex or when a sneezing fit occurs. My personal minimum from the beginning was if I can’t fly with allergies interfering with adm then I would give up. For whatever reason, I never needed otc meds for my allergies during flying and never had allergy attacks while flying. I was mindful of the time each med would be effective before I flew on those occasions when I felt I needed them. Did I mention in my early years with allergies I was experimenting with almost every otc antihistamine and hated every one of them? This was years before fight training. I always came away with either sleepiness or having a fogged head. “Do not drive or operate machinery” accompanied label warnings. My training site is an hour and a half drive each way. The few occasions when I visited my allergist for strange allergy reactions (not from meds) I was given in office treatment of nasal misting and prescribed meds. The best ones were the next day I felt well rested, clear sinuses and eager to work. I think i was high on meds but it quickly wore off the second day (the high) while continuing these meds for the one or two week period. I managed to qualify for a ppl.

    I just happen to like one type of herbal leaf product as the smoke wafts its way around in public. Not realizing this but liking the smell, I never smoked it but do enjoy the occasional secondary smoke whether in a park, ski area chair lift ride or anywhere else. I do despise the secondary smoke from a different brand as it duplicates the acrid aroma of burning circuit boards (experience as an electronics tech). How anyone can smoke this aberration, I don’t know.

    I cannot understand how anyone can abuse drugs whether prescribed for pain control then continue using them illegally and assume they’re not at risk as pilots in command. I can’t stand otc meds for my allergies for the secondary effects so imagining illegal drugs for pain or other reasons and flying with a fogged head seems to me a reason for self disqualifying myself from any flight. Maybe I’m too sensitive about my body and the effects otc or prescription meds does to my one cell between my ears and how it can affect my adm just to buzz the airport.

  10. The “unreachables” is often on my mind as a leader of a flying club, so I’m regularly on the look-out for risky flying behavior by the membership. I recognize that one pilot’s “risky behavior” is another pilot’s “acceptable risk”, so unless it was some egregious event (like intentionally flying into icing or a thunderstorm, or a VFR-only pilot intentionally flying into IMC), one event of what I deem “risky” isn’t something that will get me to say something to that pilot. But a pattern of regularly engaging in “risky” behavior (that is, whatever a prudent pilot would deem to be on the high end of risk-vs-reward) will have me talking to them to at least get their side of things. If in this discussion I find their ADM to be questionable, then it might be time for “the talk” to take place.

    The point is, I think the aviation community (and especially flight instructors and leaders of flying clubs/etc) have a duty to at least try to reach the unreachables. 100% of them will be unreachable if no one ever reaches out to them. Even if we can only effectively reach even 1% of them, that’s still better than 0%.

  11. You touched very briefly on what I believe is the heart of this issue. The more time I spend online, where people can say pretty much whatever they want without having to look you in the eye, the more I realize it’s not a matter of ignorance, poor training, or lack of understanding. It’s a matter of values. Some people believe the thrill is worth the risk.

    Aside from defying death in small airplanes, I also ride a motorcycle. States have made progress reducing motorcycle death rates with sensible laws requiring helmets and rider training, but there remains a cadre of hardcore thrill-seekers, egged on to “ride it like you stole it” by idiots memorializing their exploits on YouTube. No amount of discussion about safety can sway opinions in this group.

    You can’t have a discussion online regarding safety without at least one commentator questioning your manhood. If you can get past the name-calling and chest-thumping stage to really get in their head, the answer usually comes down to something like this: “Flying is about freedom. It’s about having ultimate control of a machine. It’s inherently dangerous. If you want to do anything INTERESTING and FUN in an airplane it’s usually against the rules. If I can’t do anything dangerous, if I always have to follow the rules, where’s the fun in that? What’s the point of even flying then?”

    Unless you can get such people to value their own lives above the thrill, they will never connect the dots.

      • That’s a conundrum, Joe. I am a thrill seeker at 83 years old. I have been a single seat navy carrier jock, an avid hiker/camper, motorcyclist, scuba, offshore sailor, etc. But I have lots of kid, grandkids, great grandkids, over 30,000 hours of aviating with 30 years with dull, boring airlines and now lead a FAASTeam. Thrill seekers are the first risk managers of which the FAA and industry discuss to no end.
        Never once did I or any of my associates believe or even think that we were/are invincible. We analyzed what we intended, planned, then executed the plan and debriefed (usually over an adult beverage). Please rethink your statement. Thanks for your comment, though. It was thought provoking.

  12. Paul, regarding the role of flight instructors in trying to prevent these types of accidents… to your points, a student could have the “book smarts” needed to pass an oral exam, and the flying skills sufficient for the practical test, but has obviously poor judgement. I’ve known a few pilots like this, and ask myself how that person was allowed to get their license/rating/whatever.

    I’m not a CFI, but suspect a CFI could turn that question around and ask “if this person meets all the requirements, but in my judgement their judgement is poor, what do I do besides help them advance?” If I felt really strongly about it, I suppose I could fire a student (like David G), but then another CFI will likely help the student move forward. There’s no red flag in the system for that person, and if there were, I’m not sure what action should taken. What action would somehow put extra scrutiny on such folks but doesn’t needlessly raise the bar for the majority who have sound judgement? Maybe a blacklist, shared among CFI’s, could help in that particular situation – if no one will work with the student, they can’t move forward. But, there would be all sorts of other problems with something like that. I’m not sure if there’s a great option other than just accepting that this is ‘mercia, and the downside to letting people do whatever they want is a small percentage will exercise poor judgement.

  13. The problem with the Unreachables is that sometimes when they die, they take an innocent victim or two with them. And the ironic thing is that the Unreachable’s non-pilot friends invariably comment to the media about what a great pilot they were.

  14. And CFI’s are not exempt. I have lost two. First, the guy with whom I earned the Instrument. He was a brave man. I never saw anybody so comfortable in the air. Leaving our home field, we’d hit that bumpy patch around 500 feet, and he’d say “Yee Haw!”. Turbulence didn’t bother him in the least. One time, we were having a wind storm. My satellite dish was bonking against the house. Bob called me – “Can you give me a lift up to Oregon? I have to pick up a plane there. I’ll give you free instrument instruction all the way out”. I took one look outside – “Hell no won’t go!”.
    Anyway, Bob slammed a Baron into a mountain top in Nevada.

    Then went the guy with whom I did the Private. He was a sober and careful pilot. But not a good mechanic. About a month after he signed off my BFR, he was flying an Apache around the neighborhood. One engine blew, and the other one didn’t have enough poop to fly the airplane. He landed in a railroad yard and died in the post crash fire.

    These incidents have led me to re-evaluate the wisdom of flying at all. These were my instructors, they taught me to be safe. But they themselves were not safe.

  15. This is from the OTHER Jim H. (you mentioned fixing the issue previously) (laugh)
    Another thought-provoking column. You KNOW it is a good column when you find yourself agreeing and disagreeing with respondents on the issue.

    As CFI’s NONE of us want to be the “Narcs”–the “holier than thou” types. On the other hand, NOT speaking up does a disservice to the pilot and to the industry. What to do?

    For years, at our airport, we have had a beer refrigerator. After hours, any pilot around is welcome to sit with others in the back room. A lot of counseling and aviation lore is passed on there. How to keep this “aviation library stocked?” People soloing, or adding a rating are “charged” with buying beer–a case for soloing or a Private license, two cases for a more advanced rating. The OTHER way is for a pilot to observe another pilot doing something stupid. We call it the “six-pack offense.”

    If a pilot fails to secure the airplane after flight, he tells the other pilot “SIX-PACK”–in front of all around. If the pilot does something more dangerous, it is a CASE “offense” (leaving the mags on, or cutting someone out of the traffic pattern.)

    The system WORKS–because offenses are leveled by the pilot’s peers. In effect, it says “I saw you do something stupid–but my silence can be purchased by a six-pack.” It lets the offending pilot know that someone not only saw his action, but that he cares enough about that pilot to bring it to his attention–and in a non-threatening way. The “six-pack buyer” knows that he is an accepted “insider”–a member of the local club–and that pilot ALSO looks for potential offenders to levy the “six-pack offense.” It’s a safety culture, without being preachy. In over 45 years in the FBO business, I’ve only seen one person that objected (and that person was a reformed alcoholic–he bought soft drinks instead).

    Try this “non-accusing” approach. “Peer Pressure” is far more effective that confronting someone, or “turning them in.”

  16. I’m glad to see I wasn’t the only one to (moderately) freak out at the «60 degree banks are ok above 300ft» rule, and glad they you caught it too Paul right after saying it!

    Personally, my comfort zone soft floor for doing mild aerobatics – where I put high angle banks – is more around 1500-2000ft than 300, which I consider insane. And I’m being nice.

  17. This is from the OTHER Jim H. (you mentioned fixing the issue previously) (laugh)
    Another thought-provoking column. You KNOW it is a good column when you find yourself agreeing and disagreeing with respondents on both sides of the issue.

    As CFI’s NONE of us want to be the “Narcs”–the “holier than thou” types. On the other hand, NOT speaking up does a disservice to the pilot and to the industry. What to do?

    For years, at our airport, we have had a beer refrigerator. After hours, any pilot around is welcome to sit with others in the back room. A lot of counseling and aviation lore is passed on there. How to keep this “aviation library stocked?” People soloing, or adding a rating are “charged” with buying beer–a case for soloing or a Private license, two cases for a more advanced rating. The OTHER way is for a pilot to observe another pilot doing something stupid. We call it the “six-pack offense.”

    If a pilot fails to secure the airplane after flight, he tells the other pilot “SIX-PACK”–in front of all around (this IS in Minnesota, where winds can get wild.) If the pilot does something more dangerous, it is a CASE “offense” (leaving the mags on, or cutting someone out of the traffic pattern.)

    The system WORKS–because offenses are leveled by the pilot’s peers. In effect, it says “I saw you do something stupid–but my silence can be purchased by a six-pack.” It lets the offending pilot know that someone not only saw his action, but that he cares enough about that pilot to bring it to his attention–and in a non-threatening way. The “six-pack buyer” knows that he is an accepted “insider”–a member of the local club–and that pilot ALSO looks for potential offenders to levy the “six-pack offense.” It’s a safety culture, without being preachy. In over 45 years in the FBO business, I’ve only seen one person that objected (and that person was a reformed alcoholic–he bought soft drinks instead).

    Try this “non-accusing” approach. “Peer Pressure” is far more effective that confronting someone, or “turning them in.” It is SO EFFECTIVE, that we developed a beer shortage. One of the “members” said “We’re out of beer–I guess SOMEONE HAS TO GO OUT AND DO SOMETHING STUPID!”

    • Jim, thanks for bringing this concept up. Every combat squadron that I was in in the navy used a similar method. We often called it “The Kangaroo Court”. The value was even more important because we could place senior officers before the court as well as junior. They had to perform up to the high standards of the squadron in operations, especially traps (as well as other standards) or defend themselves before the court at the end of every at sea period. The fines were placed in a highly guarded safe to be used to pay for rented hotel rooms/adult beverages to be enjoyed by every pilot/officer of the squadron when in a port. Occasionally we would have a senior officer who consistently underperformed and was observed by the Air Wing Commander for the future. It made pilots strive to be better or pay the piper. Most pilots had continual improvement as the deployment progressed and fun was had by all. It definitely saved lives and aircraft. The competition was also observed by other squadrons and at the end of the deployment the squadron with the best record of ops and safety was lauded by the Airwing Commander and CO of the ship. It was/is a great incentive to fly well.

  18. Ten’s of thousands of people pay to watch and cheer low level stunts. The aviation community praises their ‘DARING’ airshow performers. You think those performers were just born successful aerobatic pilots?

    The FAA and military have age restricting regulations because they think older pilots are risky. Should an Instructor tell an “unreachable” old pilot to stop flying???

    Are you one of those “unreachable”? How do you know? You justify your every decision ……… you’re “unreachable”.

  19. If you bell curve accident causes, the Halliday crash is an outlier IMO. Most pilots don’t go out of their way to do over the top stupid acts of piloting.

    Sadly most are caused by an egregious lack of basic piloting skill and knowledge. For every Halliday there are 10 pilots with unacceptably low levels of skill. They would never think to fly under a bridge, but unfortunately are also resistant to any advice to get some dual to sharpen up their skills or hit the books to review commonly used procedures.

    If we truly want to move the accident needle than stop worrying about the 5% of the accident waiting to happen pilot sub class that have a defective self preservation gene. We need to focus on the 95% who are just crappy pilots.

  20. The U.S. Marines have a saying “Every Marine a Rifleman”. In aviation it should be “Every CFI a Safety Counselor”. Anytime a CFI is aware of a safety issue, they have to do/say something, because the only question that can never be answered is “how many accidents have you prevented?”. You’ll probably never know if you reached the “unreachable”.

    CFI’s can not hesitate to use every arrow in the counselor quiver when confronted with a “problem child”. The lecturing, the scolding, the reprimanding, the rebuking, the begging, the pleading, the beseeching and if all that fails the logical argument. Probably at least one of those will work 99% of the time. However, there will be times when the CFI is left with a sickening feeling of not getting through.

    The last resort is a discussion with the local FAA (not the black hat ones, the white hat FAASTeam folks). I know no one wants to be a “narc”. But there are sometimes the only thing that will change someone’s behavior is a phone call from the FAA. Hopefully, even if the phone call fails (and the FAA folks are doing their job) they at will at least put a flag in the system. This comes in handy if the problem decides to move to another airport or another state.

  21. Had to look it up
    Dunning–Kruger effect
    Description
    Description
    In the field of psychology, the Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people with low ability at a task overestimate their ability. It is related to the cognitive bias of illusory superiority and comes from the inability of people to recognize their lack of ability. Wikipedia

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