FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker called on Boeing to “make a good airplane” during one of a series of media interviews he gave Tuesday after a tour of a Boeing plant in Washington State. He told NBC Nightly News anchor Lester Holt the company is too focused on production and not concentrating enough on safety. “There are issues around the safety culture in Boeing. Their priorities have been focused on production and not on safety and quality,” he told NBC. “And so, what we are really focused on now is shifting that focus from production to safety and quality.”
Whitaker said he was surprised that shop floor workers didn’t get a “thorough safety briefing” before going on the shop floor and that production dominated discussions between workers. When Holt asked him if Boeing was “too big to fail,” he deflected. “I would say they’re too big to not make a good airplane. They have all the resources they need,” Whitaker responded. “There’s no reason they can’t make a good airplane, and that’s our focus right now.”
Whitaker told Reuters earlier that he would be keeping Boeing on a short leash until the safety culture changes. That means he will not allow Boeing to increase production of the 737 MAX 8 and 9 in the meantime. The company is now allowed to build 38 aircraft a month but is not at that rate and is not expected to get there until the second half of the year.
The problems at Boeing have been exacerbated by a focus on short-term profits and aggressive cost-cutting measures, along with frequent changes in leadership. The main issue seems to be the pursuit of immediate gains at the expense of long-term safety and quality.
My insight is that when Mike Whitaker talks about shifting Boeing’s focus towards safety and quality, he hints at this problem. It is clear by now that Boeing has been more concerned with pumping out planes quickly to boost short-term profits rather than ensuring they meet high safety standards in the long run.
This approach has damaged Boeing’s reputation, credibility, profit, and has compromised the product’s public trust. Whitaker’s regulatory stance is aimed at correcting this imbalance by making sure Boeing prioritizes safety and quality over rushing to meet production targets.
And here’s my take: Despite the challenges Boeing faces, Whitaker’s tone suggests that there’s still hope for the company, (too big…), if it can adapt and make the necessary adjustments efficiently. Meanwhile, Airbus sees food around the corner.
These issues have been going on at Boeing for a very long time, Raf. At Edwards AFB, I worked with all the major aerospace players on various programs during my long time there in the 70’s and 80’s. When I was retiring from the USAF, I purposely did not send a resume to Boeing knowing how poorly they treated their employees. And that was nearly 40 years ago. Nothing has changed and nothing will. Oh … they’ll apply liberal amounts of ‘window dressing’ to the current problems and make it seem like they’ve done something positive but … in the end, they’ll revert to their old ways.
Witness that they sold off a piece of their production facilities in Kansas (Spirit). Why would you do that? Answer: to save money and increase profitability at the expense of your loyal employees. Witness that they established a 787 line in a ‘right-to-work State. Why would you do that? Answer: to save money and increase profitability while finding cheaper employees. The operative term is … “Shareholder value.” Boeing moaned to the Government when they gave the tanker program to Northrop Grumman / EADS twice (sic) and got the decision reversed despite Darleen Druyun. NOW, they’re still trying to correct the KC-46A program more than 20 years later (sic). A whistleblower mysteriously died. I could go on. These are strategic corporate inbred problems. You can’t repair all of this without strategic changes and it takes a LOT of time to modify the corporate mindset.
I would like to know how much stock is owned by the insiders. And I’d like to know how much was bought back by the company during the covid downturn and Max crashes debacle. Methinks one would be surprised? This isn’t JUST a CEO problem; it’s also a Board problem and a ‘way they run the Company problem. Frankly, I don’t see it improving. I’ll say it … Boeing has seriously lost its way. No amount of artful wordsmithing and tap dancing by the FAA Administrator will change it IMHO. Ultimately, they’ll all gladhand each other but nothing will change. A once proud company is dying right before our eyes. Sad!
Larry, I remember your concerns about Boeing favoring Northrop as an alternative employer. My family members retired happily from Northrop (Hawthorne) after years of dedicated work, thanks to Jack Northrop’s care for his workforce. Boeing’s recent history shows they’re backed into a corner; tap dancing won’t cut it anymore. They need a full overhaul from top to bottom.
But let’s not forget, Boeing is a major player in aerospace globally, with significant influence shaping regulations and operations. Government figures like the FAA’s Mike Whitaker are pushing for safety and quality, which is crucial. However, fixing Boeing’s deep-seated issues requires more than just tweaks – internal, governmental, and public pressures must force them to change course.
However, Boeing’s dissolution isn’t likely given their extensive network and importance. So, Boeing, make airplanes as if you corporate lives depended on it.
Me, too, Raf. Employee centered culture is prevalent at Northrop Grumman — and the employees take care of Jack’s legacy — whereas not-so-much at Boeing. THERE’s one of their problems along with having unions inside the factory. See below:
Larry, my mentor told me Boeing treated their employees poorly when he worked for them. He was told more or less indirectly but still convincingly that one had to be an insider, an “old boy” type, to get anywhere in the company, and his observations confirmed it. He was at Boeing in Wichita for less than a year. He moved over to Cessna and had a much happier experience, working on T-37 and earliest Citation programs before striking out on his own. That gives you an idea of the time frame. So some aspect of a dysfunctional/misfunctional corporate culture predates the obvious influence of McD-D.
Ironically, in 1974 I was assigned to a specific F-15 airplane at McDonnell Aircraft (BEFORE Douglas bought ’em). As a USAF type, I was warned about two things right away … DON’T touch the airplane and get away from IT and the employees when you hear the one minute warning bell to the break bell because when the real break bell rings, there’s gonna be a stampede to the bathrooms, telephones or smoking areas. That said, McDonnell built good airplanes … F-4 and F-15. When they merged with Douglas was when all the real serious problems started. I ALMOST went to work for them on the C-17 program but didn’t … thankfully. A few years later, ALL the employees had to RECOMPETE to keep their jobs. NOW, Boeing has entered that toxic stew making it even worse. That’s another problem … mixing too many corporate cultures together with the attendant infighting for position and power. At the root of this problem is the Government always wanting more for less, titillating the companies with massive contracts then backing away from the numbers. The only way for the companies to survive was to merge … which turned out to be bad for everybody involved.
McDonnell and Douglas merged in 1967 and operated as McDonnell Douglas Corporation from April 28 1967 until August 1, 1997.
So, your 1974 encounter with the F-15 was 7 years after the merger, so couldn’t have been “at McDonnell Aircraft (BEFORE Douglas bought ’em)”.
Not going to happen Raf. You’ve been living in loony land way to long.
Hope Whitaker will also address the FAA problems that led to the 737 MAX debacle.
Boeing didn’t get where it is overnight, so it may be several years before its structural problems will be solved. Public perception however, is a short-duration phenomenon, so a year or so of staying out of the headlines may bring it back.
“‘Make A Good Airplane:’ Whitaker Discusses Boeing Future“
And this is this guy’s solution? He’s going to fix things? Yeah, good luck.🤦♂️
Why would it be his job to fix things at Boeing? It’s Boeing’s job to fix things at Boeing, and the FAAs job to see to it that they meet the regulations.
Gary, you are correct. That being said, where has FAA enforcement of regulation’s been the last several decades regarding all of the violations that have been pretty much on going unabated?
In this day an age why settle for a “good” airplane. For the millions of dollars per copy and for the safety of up to 300 people, I would want to be flying on an “Excellent” aircraft piloted by an “Excellent” crew! Several of my friends have opted out of flying on Max equipment in favor of Airbus. SAD!!!
First my creds: worked at Boeing in Seattle as a design engineer from ’80 to ’00. Moved on shortly after the engineering union’s (SPEEA) strike.
This cultural problem started shortly after their “acquisition” of McD. Up until that time, I had the opportunity to work with a lot of design teams across the country, including Northrop (now NG), General Dynamics, Grumman, and Lockheed (now LM). During my travels, the only technical peers I found in the industry were at Lockheed (at Edwards); the balance were below our standards, including technical prowess, analytical abilities, and understanding the “big picture”. Unfortunately, after the merger, most of the senior engineering management at Boeing were replaced by McDonnell personnel who were obsessed with timelines and costs. Many in the design field changed departments, moving towards post-delivery service and support.
I have many coworker friends who remained at Boeing, but the culture and the morale cratered, and took another hit when senior management relocated to Chicago. Still, I have solid (yes, a bit biased) faith in the process that designs their airplanes. The MCAS debacle still galls me, however: that was an unconscionable breach of integrity. My bigger concern is the shop floor, where IAM managed to “kick out” the independent QA inspectors, and replace them with IAM personnel. Other readers have taken issue with relocating some of the production lines (e.g. 787) to “right to work” states, but the build problems seen lately with the 737 all originated right in Seattle (OK, Renton) under union control and responsibility.
The fix? Put engineers back in charge of that once proud company, with accounting subordinate. We had a three-legged stool during my time there: cost, schedule, and performance. Each were equally important when making the hard calls. Looks like they managed to saw off that performance leg quite a bit. It will take a lot of top-down attitude changes, AND the efforts of the unionized shop floor workforce, to complete a proper course-correct.
Mr Administrator, we need more than one. A bunch of good airplanes, in sequence, out the door and in operation is just a start.
Ever since McDonnel bought Boeing with Boeing’s money they have lost track of what made Boeing in the first place. The company needs to go back to being an engineering company that makes the best airplanes and not a bunch of MBAs looking to maximize profits at the expense of quality.
A bad case of the Emperor’s new clothes?
Certainly, it’s a reasonable role of government to ensure goods such as airliners are manufactured to a certain level of safety. Still, when the government is telling you how many you can make, that’s a huge red flag that the government is too involved. You cannot be the referee or judge and the player or coach at the same time because as the referee, you shouldn’t care about anything except the result meeting the rules. That includes not telling the company to slow down, what materials to use, what processes to use, etc. etc. etc. Once someone is involved, how are they going to be objective? If they are not objective, how do they have a right to be a judge?
Whatever problems Boeing has, they need to be held to a standard by officials who have no interest in whether Boeing succeeds or fails at all.
I feel I’m rather alone in this opinion, but I don’t ever seem to hear anyone actually presenting a good argument for what’s actually been going on. In fact, I’m not sure I’ve heard any argument for it at all.
To understand how Boeing got to where they are now, read “Flying Blind (Robison)”.
1997 was the beginning of the trouble: Phil Condit merged Boeing with McDonnell Douglas. Boeing quality was seen as overly expensive and the bean counters from McD took over, despite the fact that McD had pretty much run itself into the ground. Risk took a back seat and cost was king. Boeing minimized neither. HQ moved to Chicago in 2001 to keep the pesky engineers from complaining. The 787 subcontracting mess was the first result. Years of waffling on a new middle market aircraft let Airbus re-engine the A32xs with no competitive offering, leading to a reactive 737 Max. The 777x, Boeing’s only other commercial program, will be five years late if no other delays appear. It takes a lot to burn through a company as big as Boeing, but they are working hard on it.
The recent conversation surrounding Boeing’s future has offered a wealth of insights into the company’s challenges and potential solutions. But one key question remains unanswered: how long will it take for Boeing to recover?
Here’s a breakdown of the key takeaways along with an estimated timeline:
• Shifting Priorities: The need for a cultural shift at Boeing was a recurring theme. Prioritizing safety, engineering excellence, and employee well-being over short-term profits is crucial for long-term success.
• Employee Concerns: Comments from individuals with industry experience highlighted the impact of cost-cutting measures and leadership changes on employee morale and quality control.
• Regaining Public Confidence. A Tsunami in the making.
1. A Roadmap for Recovery: A Phased Approach
To regain trust and market leadership, Boeing needs a multi-pronged approach with a clear timeline, here’s my contribution:
Immediate Actions (12-18 Months):
• Safety First: Implement comprehensive safety briefings for all employees at every level. This ensures everyone understands and prioritizes safety protocols.
• Increased Oversight: Work collaboratively with the FAA to increase oversight and inspections of Boeing’s production lines. This strengthens public confidence in the manufacturing process.
• 737 MAX Resolution: Address all immediate safety concerns with the 737 MAX to ensure its safe return to service. This demonstrates a commitment to resolving past issues.
• Public Commitment: Publicly announce a clear plan for safety improvements with measurable milestones. Transparency builds trust and allows the public to track progress.
Mid Term (2-5 Years):
• Cultural Transformation: Overhaul Boeing’s corporate culture to make safety the paramount concern. This requires leadership commitment and a company-wide shift in values.
• Employee Training: Invest in improved training for employees, particularly regarding safety procedures and quality control measures. A well-trained workforce minimizes errors and potential risks.
• Stricter Quality Control: Implement stricter quality control measures throughout the production process. This ensures planes meet the highest safety standards.
• Outsourcing Review: Review outsourcing practices to assess potential impacts on quality control. Finding the right balance between efficiency and quality is essential.
Long Term (5+ Years):
• Trustworthy Image: Regain public trust by demonstrably producing safer airplanes. This requires consistent adherence to safety protocols and a history of reliable performance.
• Transparency as Policy: Maintain open and transparent communication with the public about safety measures, challenges, and progress.
• Engineering Excellence: Re-establish Boeing’s reputation for engineering excellence. This involves continual innovation focused on safety and performance.
…and 2. Regaining Public Confidence: A Long Road Ahead ( If it’s a Boeing…)
Regaining public trust is arguably the most challenging aspect of Boeing’s recovery. It will likely take several years, depending on their demonstrable commitment to these solutions and the success of their implementation. Consistent actions over a long period, coupled with transparent communication, are key to rebuilding public confidence.
Then, by magically prioritizing safety, exorcising the demons of short-term profits that have haunted them for years, and convincing everyone they aren’t about to repeat the same mistakes, Boeing can white-knuckle their way through this turbulence and maybe, just maybe, emerge as a slightly less tarnished leader in the aerospace industry.
RAF for CEO !! 🙂
I wouldn’t mind if all the airlines cancelled their orders and Boeing went bankrupt. I’m sure Gulfstream or Textron would jump at the chance to build an airliner, if there was space in the market for them.
Probably won’t happen, but bad companies ought to die to make room for new and better companies.
“I wouldn’t mind if all the airlines cancelled their orders and Boeing went bankrupt.”? Sink Boeing, sink communities. Jobs vanish, businesses crumble, airlines grounded. Global trade sputters. Hold Boeing accountable, but a financial implosion is not the answer.
Oh, just one more thing!
Sacre nom de Dieu! Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury has launched a public attack on Boeing. Forget crocodile tears – Faury is exploiting Boeing’s safety crisis for pure advantage. Let’s not forget Airbus hasn’t exactly enjoyed an unblemished safety record either. But to use Boeing’s current woes as a mere marketing opportunity is beyond cynical. While Airbus attempts to paint itself as the responsible choice, their comments reek of opportunism.
CEO Faury might want to put his own house in order before he throws stones at others’ glass houses! Besides, how much more market share can Airbus absorb before they befall the same “just get it out the door” fate infecting Boeing?
Boeing: so many mistakes by so many people. This narrative is not just a chronicle of technical failures and corporate missteps; it’s a profound reminder of the values that should guide the aerospace industry. The Boeing saga, especially the tragic incidents involving the 737 MAX, has unfolded as a cautionary tale highlighting the paramount importance of safety, transparency, and integrity.
These events underscore the necessity of rigorous oversight. They illuminate the dangers of compromising on safety for the sake of economic or competitive gains. Most poignantly, they expose the long-term consequences that errors—especially systemic ones—can have. The impact extends far beyond the immediate loss of human lives tragic in its own right; it reaches into the realms of corporate reputations and the very fabric of the aerospace industry.
As we reflect on these lessons, the story of Boeing becomes more than a series of unfortunate events. It becomes a beacon, guiding us towards a future where such mistakes are never repeated. It teaches us that the pursuit of innovation must always be balanced with an unwavering commitment to the principles that ensure our collective safety and trust in the marvels of aviation.
And that’s the way it is, March 22, 2024.