The FAA has confirmed it is investigating a conflict between an Allegiant Airlines A320 and a Gulfstream business jet that resulted in unspecified injuries to an Allegiant flight attendant. The Washington Post says the Allegiant crew reacted to a TCAS alert that called for an immediate climb to avoid the Gulfstream. They had just been told to turn to the east by Miami Center and the agency said the turn caused the airliner to pass in front of the business jet at 23,000 feet. The Gulfstream crew also took evasive action in response to the TCAS warning.
The flight attendants were already out of their seats to get ready for the in-flight service when the abrupt climb occurred. Passengers were still belted for takeoff and none of them were hurt. The flight attendant was attended to by colleagues as the flight crew declared an emergency and headed back to Fort Lauderdale. The NTSB has not yet decided whether to investigate the incident.
The FAA issued the following statement: “Allegiant Air Flight 485, an Airbus A320, took evasive action on Sunday, July 23, after the pilot received an automated alert about another aircraft at the same altitude. An air traffic controller in the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center had instructed Flight 485 to turn eastbound at an altitude of 23,000 feet when it crossed in front of a northbound Gulfstream business jet. The pilot of the Gulfstream also took evasive action after receiving a similar alert. Flight 485 returned to Fort Lauderdale International Airport, where a flight attendant was treated for injuries. The FAA is investigating the incident.”
“The FAA is investigating the incident.” What? They are the ones that caused it, so what do you think the results of their investigation will show?
It will show exactly what happened as closes as it can be analyzed. Having done Ops Errors investigations for FAA facilities through my FAA ATC years, it is a very precise and complete investigation. If it was controller caused, the controllers will be decertified, undergo classroom refresher training, then training again on the positions that were involved. Then when deemed ok by the training personnel, the controllers will have to be given recertification check rides on the positions by supervisory staff to be recertified. The record of this event will remain in their personnel folder for 2 1/2 years. It’s very similar to a pilot operational error handled by FSDO. That is the way it was, could be modifications to the program now, don’t know.
As far as equipment goes, I believe that Enhanced GPWS/TAWS, TCAS, and Mode C are in the top five safety enhancements in the last 30 years.
Unfortunately, dumbing down the Airbus, so that a bright Sixth Grader could pass a type ride might be on my list.
Can I put experience and currency on my list? Part 121 does currency pretty well, GA seems to lag. In my mind experience is truly learned by making errors over time, and mitigating them. I’ve never had a perfect flight in 45 years.
If only their was a way to teach judgement. Or whatever the bloviated FAA name and useless mandated training for it is called this year. That would probably be number one.
TCAS resolution advisories require quick recognition and correct compliance actions from the crew, but should not require an aggressive maneuver of the airplane. TCAS computations are based on time of closest approach, so the system should always give at least 30 seconds of warning no matter the approach geometry of the scenario. (In other words the warning will come about 30 seconds before a head-on event or 30 seconds before an overtaking aircraft on the same heading.). The distance between the participating aircraft will be different, but the warning time about the same.
Not saying that a cabin injury was avoidable here. I can’t know that. Just saying that the conflict resolution maneuver should have been achievable with normal application of the controls for an airliner.
I don’t think TCAS can provide that 30 second warning in the event of a sudden change in conditions – e.g., traffic that ‘abruptly’ turns in front of you.
I agree with Mr Bunin. Just finished recurrent training on TCAS and what he has pointed out is correct. Unless crew delayed following the RA, there is no need for any abnormal or abrupt maneuvering to comply with the RA. Also TCAS when issuing a RA the command will always be a vertical, not a turn.
I understood it to say that the Airbus was in the act of making assigned turn when TCAS alerted them to climb…
Yes, sounds like it is going to be an ATC “Deal” and Allegiants ASAP program will determine if remedial TCAS training for the crew is mandated. The crew did not initiate the RA by turning, they were instructed to.
One further comment and I put the coffee down. I have never been given a TCAS training event that involved a turning RA. Always straight and level. The Sims don’t have the software for a turning RA, which would require money. If the ASAP goes to Toulouse, it won’t be their fault, or the sim manufacturer, can’t be blamed so it will fall on the pilots, ATC, or both. I’m going with ATC on this one.
This a training, not checking event, so I’ve seen guys over-react and get trained to proficiency, but you literally know the maneuver is coming from the TA, and have time to mentally prepare for the memory items.
A Bizjet in the windscreen, with an immediate RA is not trained. Had the pilots said, screw that vector on visual acquisition, kicked off the A/P and banked to max in normal law (67 deg.?) degrees they would be in direct contradiction with the FCOM, but may have avoided the RA, placing them in a Jackpot of potential blame.
We are specifically taught not to react to an RA by visually acquiring the other aircraft because both aircraft’s TCAS are talking to each other quicker than we can think.
The Bus is designed to make great pilots medium, and poor pilots medium.
You’ve never seen a “turning RA” in training scenarios because there’s no such thing. RAs are always vertical.
Besides, the turning radius of a 20 degree bank turn at 23,000 ft is so large that there’s no possibility of such a turn creating an sudden conflict on its own. The initial TA would have been generated many seconds in advance in response to a lack of vertical separation. I suspect the abrupt maneuver implied by the injured flight attendant was a result of bad plane handling, not the suddenness of the RA. How hard can it be to just turn off the autopilot and smoothly press the V/S into the green? No floating or crushed people, no yank and bank. And no further traffic conflict.
100% agree.
DEI in action but that will be found to have no bearing on this incident.
What is your evidence that this situation is “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in action”? Or is that comment just you pre-judging a situation you don’t know, beyond the summary on this page?
Bill B is a Russian troll.
When we (the industry) were inventing collision avoidance systems, we envisioned three levels of products. Because we engineers lack imagination, we called them: TCAS I and TCAS II and TCAS III. The -I version of Traffic Collision Avoidance System was to provide awareness only, no resolution guidance. TCAS-II would provide resolutions in the vertical to escape a building conflict. TCAS-III would provide both vertical and lateral avoidance suggestions once computer technology evolved enough to do that.
After TCAS-II was fielded, it became obvious that TCAS-III was unnecessary. This is because as long as you miss vertically, you miss each other. Also, planes are relatively long and wide but short. The vertical dimension is the easiest one to miss the intruder in your space.
That’s why you’ve never had a lateral resolution advisory. (Those of you who fly with TCAS.)
Also, regarding traffic that turns abruptly in front of you … while that happens to us (GA pilots) with a certain disappointing regularity in our local traffic patterns, it generally doesn’t happen to transport category jets in the flight levels. They go mostly in a straight line, very fast, and usually well-separated by ATC.
Thanks Dave, as I’ve said before I read this blog, because I learn stuff out of my 121 box, while keeping my CFI alive, but not current, in the hopes of returning to my roots in less than two years.
My only RA was with a GA aircraft. It was not the GA’s pilots “fault”. The landing traffic at HWO had to bear the onus of FLL arrival aircraft due to FLL construction, instructed to circle 500 feet below the FLL arrivals. Retired ATP’s to 15 hour student pilots. It was a big ask.
At any rate, the Allegiant crew in the turn had already loaded the wing to shy of 1.15 g’s by turning, so the increased LF demand of the climb was exacerbated. So even if they followed the TCAS commands within the commanded parameters (we’re taught to “Keep it in the green”).
I remember years ago to the TCAS II reference in our manuals, with your information I’m a TCAS III advocate, I imagine mid to late 90’s work?
The training would fit nicely into our very valuable EET training sessions.