More 787 Flaws Reported, 680 Aircraft May Be Involved

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As many as 680 Boeing 787 Dreamliners may be affected by the latest revelation involving manufacturing flaws in the jets. Boeing confirmed on Thursday that it was in contact with the FAA about out-of-spec gaps in the joints between fuselage parts. It was revealed on Thursday that the vertical stabilizer is affected by the potential flaws, which were actually discovered almost a year ago but the company said in a statement its engineers decided “it did not immediately affect the safety of flight and no immediate action is required.” The statement also said it expects the issue to be resolved by “a one-time inspection during regularly scheduled maintenance.”

The FAA has confirmed it’s looking into the issue and hasn’t decided on any action yet. The manufacturing flaw involved clamping the fuselage parts with greater force than specified that could have resulted in the gaps between the parts being incorrectly verified and the wrong shims used to fill those gaps. In many instances, the out-of-spec joints don’t pose a risk by themselves but “when combined in the same location however, they result in a condition that does not meet limit load requirements,” Boeing said. Last month eight 787-10 aircraft were taken out of service after adjacent gap issues were discovered in their fuselages raising concerns about structural strength.

Russ Niles
Russ Niles is Editor-in-Chief of AVweb. He has been a pilot for 30 years and joined AVweb 22 years ago. He and his wife Marni live in southern British Columbia where they also operate a small winery.

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21 COMMENTS

    • Excellent question, Bill.

      In a former life, I worked for a large aircraft Company in Kalyfornya which decided to establish a manufacturing operation in another southern Right to Work State. Talking with one of the trainers who went there to provide specific instruction to the locals, he told me that they couldn’t even manipulate fractions into decimals so math classes had to be established as a prerequisite to actual training. The Company was teaching people to do what they should have learned in schools. Judging by the number of airplanes potentially involved here, I’d guess it’s both locations but … who knows?

      This issue is made all the more problematic knowing that so much CAD/CAM and other computer automation is used to make drawings, keep records and applicability, etc. How the heck did we do SO good in the past when all of this work was done on paper only to arrive at such issues as this in the present?

      Chester A. Riley over at the Cunningham Aircraft plant had it right in the 40’s … “What a Revoltin’ Development THIS is!”

      • When I tell young engineers and wannabees that I used to design circuit boards, using colored pencils (one color per layer) and crepe paper tape, they always ask “what routing software did you use?” Really.

        Today’s engineers have little to no intuitive understanding of anything. They believe anything that their CAD systems tell them. Danger, Will Robinson.

      • As a 15-year employee of the “southern Right to Work State” branch of the company you mentioned, I can tell you that they won’t even hire people who don’t know basic math. And you do the company a disservice– if you worked in Anaheim, you know just as well as I that all the company does is manufacture the parts. The majority of machining (in my location, at least) is done elsewhere. And NO actual assembly is done in either location. So blaming this company’s workers for poor assembly work is like blaming the dude who supplies 2×4’s for building a crappy house.

  1. “greater force than specified…”. Why is that? Either the “leads”, “foremen”, or whatever are ensuring the job is done right or they aren’t. The “inspectors” aren’t doing their jobs either if that is the case. Let’s fall back to the “job card”…. did the engineers specify carefully via a “note”, “caution”, or “warning” on the job card that the clamping force selected was critical to proper selection of shimming because it affected structural strength? What about the post job completion inspection… was it written to ensure the proper gaps size or lack there of was verified?

    How much of this issue is related to lack of proper leadership? Sounds to me like a financial decision was made to “cut corners” and save money through cutting man-hour billing for the process. Faster, faster, faster is always a good thing. Too slow is just as bad but absolutely demanding that the construction process is done right is mandatory. Boeing’s lack of sensible leadership is really trying hard to kill the company. Boeing USED to be the “name” in aircraft quality, now they are trying really hard to grab onto the last rung at the bottom of the quality rating ladder. With all their management-related issues, they are quickly surpassing the quality rating of the first Japanese cars brought to America way-back-when, and sinking… The Japanese were embarrassed about that, figured out their problems, and today have some of the finest quality autos available. When is Boeing going to “extract their heads”, cut the financial stupidity, and start trying to regain their reputation?

    Boeing absorbed Douglas (MD, whatever) taking us down to two aircraft builders in this country. Airbag doesn’t count with their plastic disposable aircraft. It is looking like time for Lockheed to get back into the big airplane business. They have a fantastic rep with the Herc. I flew the -141 for 16 years and almost 7000 hours and would still fly it today had the AF not cut them into beer cans to protect their C-17. In my ALCE life I loaded a lot of C-5s and that is a fantastic aircraft since Lockheed got rid of all the flaws that Congress inflicted on the original aircraft. Even the B models were afflicted with the procurement process when the AF insisted on using more of the original engines instead of the readily available CF-6-50E2 like the KC-10s have. The L-1011 was a great aircraft it was just too late to compete with the DC-10. Lockheed does know big aircraft and really needs to get back in the game. Maybe come out with an updated C-141 / L-300 to fill the gap between the Herc and the C-17 while offering truck bed height ease of load/offload to freight operators.

    • Sorry folks, no way to edit the posts and I missed a word that completely changed the point I was making. The correct version is below.

  2. “greater force than specified…”. Why is that? Either the “leads”, “foremen”, or whatever are ensuring the job is done right or they aren’t. The “inspectors” aren’t doing their jobs either if that is the case. Let’s fall back to the “job card”…. did the engineers specify carefully via a “note”, “caution”, or “warning” on the job card that the clamping force selected was critical to proper selection of shimming because it affected structural strength? What about the post job completion inspection… was it written to ensure the proper gaps size or lack there of was verified?

    How much of this issue is related to lack of proper leadership? Sounds to me like a financial decision was made to “cut corners” and save money through cutting man-hour billing for the process. Faster, faster, faster is not always a good thing. Too slow is just as bad but absolutely demanding that the construction process is done right is mandatory. Boeing’s lack of sensible leadership is really trying hard to kill the company. Boeing USED to be the “name” in aircraft quality, now they are trying really hard to grab onto the last rung at the bottom of the quality rating ladder. With all their management-related issues, they are quickly surpassing the quality rating of the first Japanese cars brought to America way-back-when, and sinking… The Japanese were embarrassed about that, figured out their problems, and today have some of the finest quality autos available. When is Boeing going to “extract their heads”, cut the financial stupidity, and start trying to regain their reputation?

    Boeing absorbed Douglas (MD, whatever) taking us down to two aircraft builders in this country. Airbag doesn’t count with their plastic disposable aircraft. It is looking like time for Lockheed to get back into the big airplane business. They have a fantastic rep with the Herc. I flew the -141 for 16 years and almost 7000 hours and would still fly it today had the AF not cut them into beer cans to protect their C-17. In my ALCE life I loaded a lot of C-5s and that is a fantastic aircraft since Lockheed got rid of all the flaws that Congress inflicted on the original aircraft. Even the B models were afflicted with the procurement process when the AF insisted on using more of the original engines instead of the readily available CF-6-50E2 like the KC-10s have. The L-1011 was a great aircraft it was just too late to compete with the DC-10. Lockheed does know big aircraft and really needs to get back in the game. Maybe come out with an updated C-141 / L-300 to fill the gap between the Herc and the C-17 while offering truck bed height ease of load/offload to freight operators.

    • This IS what happens when bean counters are the ones making the key decisions at a company like Boeing. Very sad to see a company with such a storied history in the state it’s currently in. But as the old saying goes, they appear to be reaping what they have sowed.

  3. So many troubling things with this new announcement. First, I think we’re all running out of words to express dismay. Second, what’s even more troubling is that it sounds as if Boeing is spacing the flow of bad news. If this was spotted a year ago, how many other things were spotted a while back that we are going to hear about next? And how many new things are we going to hear next? And this is on their workhorse? Yikes Boeing, the problem blatantly runs deep. I’m left to ponder, what’s next?

    • Exactly and there in lies the the greater issue. How many more announcements will there be and when? The bigger picture is slowly being painted and it’s not looking to pretty. Boeing’s tactic, stretching it all out over time minimizes negative impact and in a perverted sense almost looks normal. If this is what is really happening, the deception and deceit is mind boggling.

  4. Increasing separation of management from engineering and the shop floor may be a factor. Having top executives now located in their headquarters in Chicago is telling. The actual engineering and manufacturing is located elsewhere. Lots of elsewhere’s actually. Chicago is the bean counter place, engineering and manufacturing not there. So do they have an intimate knowledge of what is going on? Contrast this with the legendary “skunk works” led by Kelly Johnson, where a small talented team performed miracles, such as the SR71.

  5. There is a YouTube video on this aircraft and two brave workers that blew the whistle a while ago about Boeing pushing 787 production and ignoring the workers complaints of faulty parts from suppliers. It is well worth your time to check it out. Non Union workers have as much pride in a JOB WELL DONE as a Union Worker does. It is the responsibility of Management to make sure FAA and engineering standards are met. It is incumbent of the workers to report issues, and they did. Management ignored them.

    I see it as mega-corporations dominating the market after buying out other manufacturers. The loss of North American Aviation, Bell Aircraft Corporation and many others has not helped with innovation or quality of product.

  6. Fast, Cheap, Good. Sadly it seems at Boiling when ever there was a choice fast and cheap was ALWAYS chosen over good…..

  7. Boeing is guilty of corporate crime. For several decades, they wined and dined Congress,
    controlled the economy of the state of Washington, and shafted their employees at every
    turn, while executives fought among themselves for power and profit. [For proof, see
    Edward L. Greenberg, Leon Grunberg, Sara Moore, and Patricia B. Sikora, Turbulence:
    Boeing and the State of American Workers and Managers (New Haven, CT: Yale U. Press,
    2010); Dana L. Cloud, We Are the Union: Democratic Unionism and Dissent at Boeing
    (Urbana, IL: U. of Illinois Press, 2011), Philip K. Lawrence & David Weldon Thornton,
    Deep Stall: The Turbulent History of Boeing Commercial Airplanes (London: Routledge,
    2016), and my essay, “The Rise and Fall of Boeing” (preprint, July, 2020)]. Now they
    are reaping the whirlwind for their hybris, though it is primarily the public that suffers.
    These problems are not unique to Boeing, of course. They plague the entire industry.
    Nor are they entirely the fault of private enterprise. Government incompetence and
    corruption share the blame, as do bureaucratic lethargy and indifference. The “culture
    of Boeing” is the culture of capitalism, but it is also the culture of arrogance and greed,
    which is the cult of American exceptionalism, and thus the collective fate of the world.

    • Shafted their employees at every turn?”
      Seems to me that Boeing financed the nation’s best-paid industrial workforce, in Washington.

  8. Brian B., good reference.

    By John Barnett, Boeing QA Mgr. “As time went on over the next several years they started ignoring safety issues and the defective parts. They wanted to just close those jobs out and not research them – that type of thing. Over the years, it just got worse and worse.”

    “Finally, we ended up with three pretty significant safety issues. I reported them inside the company. I pursued every avenue within the company to try and get them addressed. I filed an ethics complaint and they came back and substantiated my complaint, but they did nothing to correct it.”

    “Over time it got worse and worse. Not only were they ignoring the administrative procedures, but they were also getting into ignoring safety of flight conditions and aircraft safety issues.”

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